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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse the setting of the 
individual monetary policy instruments by the Australian monetary authorities 
overthe period 1961-1974. The motivation for the analysis of such an issue 
stems from the increasing interest in monetary economics and the growing 
sophistication of the Austral'ian capital market. The rapid increase in the 
money stock from 1973 onward has emphasized the need for more direct controls 
on the growth of the money supply. Successful control depends on a working 
knowledge of the behaviour of the instruments required. 
"fhe analysis of the setting o:f individual policy instruments is 
pursued in order to determine whether the monetary authorities set the 
instruments endogenously and in response to movements in policy targets, or 
whether they set the instruments independently. If the instrument setting 
is found to be endogenous, several related issues arise: the possible 
assignment of the instruments, the interdependence between the ins~ruments 
and the temporal stability of the policy responses. 
Before attempting to accomplish this aim, two chapters arc devoted 
to a review of monetary-fi sea 1 1 iter a ture and previous reaction function 
estimation. These chapter·s serve as a background to the problem at l1and. 
The monetary-fiscal debate brings to light bJo related issues - reverse 
causation and the identification problem. The reverse causation argument 
concerns the issue of whether the money stock is the cause or effect of 
economic activity. If it is the cause, then the money supply can be 
treated as exogenous. Alternatively, if it is the effect, then the 
money supply should be treated endogenously. The identification problem 
relates to the issue of how the variables are defined and identified. The 
success of the empirical tests in the monetary-fiscal debate depends upon 
this issue. The review of the previous reaction function studies provides 
an insight into the identification problem. Each of these studies has 
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attempted to define the variables in the.mo~t suitable way. Although none 
of these earlier formul~tions are exactly suited to the present problem, they 
serve to provide valuable background. 
In Chapter 4, ~ s~mple model of money supply determination is used 
to identify the appropriate monetary instruments for the Austra 1 ian economy. 
The reaction functions are then formulc.ted and the problems of da.ta and 
estimation a·e discussed. The regression results are discussed in Chapter 5. 
Results are also presented foY' the time period split into the contractionary 
and expansionary phases of economic policy. The differing response of the 
instruments to each policy target is observed. This test is an important 
aspect of the more general problem of temporal stability of the reaction 
functions. The problem ts examined by applying the TIMVAR technique and 
identifying the various periods of instability. 
Much of the observed instability is obviously due to the changing 
weights on the targets during different phases of monetary policy. The SRD 
function is analysed in terms of the movement in Australia 1 s economic cycle. 
It is observed that there is a close connection between the per·iods of 
instability in the function and movements in the cycle. A similar analysis 
is carried out for the securities function, this time in terms of the movement 
in the level of foreign reserves. In this case, however, the connection is no 
as obvious or specific. The results of this analysis are presented in 
Chapter 6. 
In Chapter· 7, the policy impl'icatior.s of the analysis are discussed. 
It is felt that more work in this area is vtarranted, especially ill regard to 
the determination of response lags. 
The object of this thesis is to analyse the setting of the 
individual monetary policy instruments by the Australian monetary 
authorities over the period 1961-1974. Tl.t:' pursuit of this objective 
involves an examination of several problems. The first focuses on the 
centra 1 issue of the authorities' philosophy towards monetary policy: 
either they set the ·instruments endogenously and in response to move-
ments in the policy targets, or they set the instruments independently. 
If the instrument setting is endogenous, then a number of related issues 
arise. The first is found in a comparison of the response of the 
individual instruments. A differing response in each case may indicate 
that the authorities have assigned the instruments to deal with specif:c 
economic problems. A second related problem concerns the potential 
interdependencies that may exist between the instruments themselves. 
A leading example is the nature of the relationship between interest 
rates and the success of open market operations. A final issue is the 
temporal stability of the policy responses. 
The motivation for an approach tc these problems stems from the 
resurgence of interest in monetary economics and the growing sophistication 
of the f\ustralian capital market. The ernphas·is in Australian monetaty 
policy to date is centted on the role of administered interest rates 
with the other monetary aggregates, such as the cash base of the economy 
or the money supply, varying freely. However, the consequences of a 
rapid growth in the money stock became apparent from 1973 onward. The 
events of this period underline the need for more direct controls on the 
growth of the money stock. The efficacy of such controls depends on a 
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working knowledge of the behaviour of the instruments required to 
control the money supply. This thesis attempts some preliminary_work 
in this direction. 
1 . 1 tl~th..Q90 1.~-
The genesis of this thesis is contained in a detailed review 
of the monetary literature. This review is presented in two related 
parts. The first focuses on the relevant aspects of the monetary-fiscal 
debate which brings to light two fundamental issues: reverse causation 
and the iden-tification problem. The reverse causation argument centres 
on the issue of whether the money stock is the cause or effect of economic 
activity. If it is the cause, then changes in the supply of money 
influence the level of economic activity. The alternative view is that 
changes in the money stock are engendered by changes in the level of 
activity. In brief, the fanner view treats the money supply as an 
exogenous variable whereas the latter treats it endogenously. Much of 
the criticism contained in the monetarist-fiscal debate concerns the 
definition of the key aggrega·tes. There is clearly an impor'tant 
identificat1on problem. The success of the empirical tests, which 
support one or other of the views, depends upon the way in which the 
variables are defined and identified. Thus the first step in this 
dissertation is to draw out the relevant issues in the monetary-fiscal 
debate on these two basic issues. 
Given the importance of the endogeneity problem and reverse 
causation, it is necessary to review the literature relating to these 
problems. Endogeneity of the instruments of monetai~y policy is 
accommodated in economic models by formulating a separate reaction 
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function for each instrument. These functions explain the instrument 
setting in terms of the targets of economic policy. The incorporation 
of reaction functions in structural models of an economy clearly affect 
the size of the dynamic policy multipliers. The review of previous 
reaction function studies provides insigh~s into the identification 
problem mentioned earlier. Each study has attempted to define the 
variables in the most suitable way. Clearly~ none of the earlier 
formulat·ions are suited exactly to the present problem, although they 
provide valuable background. 
The identification problem is resumed when appropriate reaction 
functions are formulated for the Australian monetary policy instruments. 
Here, three policy instruments are defined: the SRD r'atio, the Reserve 
Bank 1 s holdings of Government securities (S) and 1 the' interest rate. 
The first two are treated endogenously and reaction functions are 
formula ted for them. Reasons are advanced for treating the interest rate 
as an exogenous variable in the equations for SRD and S. These two 
reaction functions embody three short term policy targets: the rate of 
inflation (~),the rate of unemployment (U) and an external target (FR). 
In addit·ion~ the equations are formulated to accommodate interdependencies 
between S and SRD. 
These equations are fitted to quarterly data for the period 
1961{1)- 1974(4) and the results reported. The reaction of the two 
instruments is examined according to the authorities• policy intention. 
The time series is split into phases when the policy intention is either 
contractionary or expansionary. This test is an important aspect of 
the more general problem of temporal stability of the reaction functions 
which is examined by applying the TIMVAR technique and identifying 
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periods of instability. The th~sis concludes with a summary of the 
policy implications of these reaction function studies. 
1.2 Scope 
The study is confined to the time series 1961(1) - 1974(4). 
Quarterly data is used throughout the analysis in preference to both 
monthly or annual data. Monthly data is not available for all the 
variables used in the analysis. Quarterly data is more appropriate 
for the current study than annual data because the test concerns the 
short term reaction of monetary instrurnents to targets. There may be 
a current period reaction within the month but this is ignored because 
of the lack or unreliability of monthly data. The study focuses on 
the within ~uarter reaction. 
The thesis concentrates on an evaluation of monetary pol 1cy 
reaction. Government expenditure functions are estimated but prove to 
be relatively insignificant. Government expenditure is found to respond 
primarily to growth. Also, the quarterly time period is obviously too 
short for this fiscal instrument, which is more realistically seen as 
a longer-run policy variable. Within the context of a quarterly model, 
therefore, it appears more appropriate to assume that government 
expenditure is exogenous. The instruments of fiscal policy are more 
likely to be endogenous within the context of a model fitted to annual 
data. 
The estimates of the two reaction equations are based on 
ordinary-least-squares adjusted for serial correlation. This correlation 
is introduced by distortions in the data input. For example, data relating 
to internal, inter-governmental transactions in government securities 
were not available and could not be eliminated from the series on the 
variable S. The estimates of the functions subsume a fixed exchange 
rate regime which prevailed in the Australian economy over the time 
series considered. 
1.3 Outline of thesis 
Chapter 2 contains the first part of the review of the 
literature. This draws out the relevant aspects of the monetarist-
fiscal debate. In particular, the two issues of reverse causation and 
the identification problem are emphasized. The second aspect of the 
review of the literature is contained in the third chapter. There, the 
problem of endogeneity is discussed in general terms and the various 
reaction function studies, evoked by this issue, are analysed. 
Reaction functions for Australia are specified in Chapter 4. 
Two equations are formulated, one for the SRD ratio and the other for 
the Reserve Bank•s holdings of Government securities. These instruments 
are preferred to the cash base or the money supply since they both have 
their impact on the money supply in different ways. This point is 
illustrate~ by reference to a simple model of money supply dftermination. 
Chapter 5 presents the results of the reaction function estimation. 
Examination is also made, in this chapter, of the effect of splitting 
the sample period in contracti onary and ex pans ·ionary phases. Chapter 6 
tests the general stability of the estimated functions using the TIMVAR 
technique. The policy implications of the estimated functions are set 
out in Chapter 7. 
6. 
CHAPTER 2: TWO APPROACHES TO THE STUDY 
OF THE IMPACT OF MONEY AND MONETARY POLICY 
-----·---~~·-------"~ ~-·----
The monetarist-fiscal policy debate has proceeded unabated 
for a number of years. The extremities i~ the debate are concerned 
with the relative effectiveness of monetary policy action in influencing 
the economic aggregates. At one extreme are some Keynesian economists 
who argue that 1 money does not matter at all'. At the other extreme 
are those monetarists who sponsor the view that •money matters most•. 
The resolution of the controversy depends upon a detailed empirical 
evaluation of the issues involved, and although fue monetarists would 
claim that past empirical work strongly supports their position, the 
results are far from conclusive. 
This present chapter concerttrates on a review of the 
'monetarist' approach and, in particular, recognizes that such an 
approach has proceeded along two lines; the direct estimation and the 
structural model approach. Both will be reviewed in this chapter. 
The major emphasis in this chapter is on monetary policy, which is the 
suoject matter of this thes·is. t~onetary and fiscal policy however, are 
closely linked, and we cannot avoid comparisons of their relative impact 
and effectiveness. 
Several important points are necessary before a revimv of the 
'monetarist' approach can be undertaken. The points Y'elate basically to 
the inaccuracy of postulating a strict 'Keynesian' approach in which 
money is held to be unimportant. In fact, the two protagonists in the 
'r;onetary ... f·iscal' debate are not directly opposed with respect to their 
views on the importance of money in detennining the level of economic 
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activity. Whereas the extreme •monetarist' view that 'money matters 
most• is taken to preclude the influence or importance of fiscal 
policy, the opposite argument does not hold. Keynesian theory has 
always recognized the importance of both monetary and fiscal policy 
on econom·lc .;.ggregates. Leijonhufud' s [33] re-appraisal of the 
Keynesian revolution is one major attempt to draw the important 
distinction between Keynesian econorrzics and the economics of Keynes. 
In doing so, the author assigns a far more important role to Keynesian 
monetary policy, especially in the maintenance of full employment. 
The genesis of the 'monetary-fiscal' debate occurred with 
the publication of the study by Friedman and ~1eiselman [20] (hereafter 
referred to as F-M) in which the authors sought to compare a quantity 
theory mode1 and an autonomous expendituh~ ('Keynesian') model of 
induced changes in the economy. This study repr'esents the starting 
point for the so-called 'direct estimation• approach to the monetary-
fiscal debate. The F-M study is subject to considerable criticism and 
in the aftennath Andersen and Jordan [6] (hereafter referred to as A-J) 
attempt to modify and extend ·the F-·M results. This study also is 
reviewed in detail. 
These single-equation studies are then compared with studies 
by Kmenta and Smith [28] and Moroney and Mason [40] who evaluate the 
relative effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy with the aid of 
a small structur·al model, in preference to a single equation system. 
The analysis of these studies focuses on their treatment of the nonetary 
policy variables. A similar analysis is conducted with respect io an 
Australian study by Zerby [47] which can be interpreted as an atiempt 
to compare the r·elative impact of monctalny and fiscal policy despite the 
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fact that the author emphasizes his preference for experimenting with 
monetary policy. Two ·important observations are made on the alternative 
approaches to the study of the monetary-fiscal debate: firstly, neither 
the direct estimation nor the structural equation models accommodate 
the potentia·; endogeneity of the policy ·instruments; secondly, they both 
fail to adequately define the instruments of monetary policy. These tv10 
associated problems serve to provide an introduction to the so-called 
'reaction function' studies and the general problem of endogeneity, both 
of which are discussed in Chapter 3. 
2.1 The Friedman-Meisel!:nan_,_st!:!iY_ 
The first major development in the exposition of the monetarist 
view comes ~t.'ith the publication of the study by Friedman and Meiselman. 
Th·is study seeks to compare a simple quantity theory mode'! vrith a simp'le 
autonomous expenditure theory model. F-M maintain that the important 
argument in the debate is not theoretical but empirical. In terms of 
this empirical approach, the two theories compared by F-M conflict as 
to which of the two relationships is: 
(i) critical in the sense of being the primary source o7 
change or disturbance in economic activity; 
(ii) stable, in the sense of being able to express, 
empirically, a consistant relationship. 
The authors choose a simple level of study because they believe 
that the decisive issue is extremely basic in nature. To this end, they 
set out the two alternative theories as follows: 
9. 
Y = a + V'M ( 2. 1) 
Y = a+ K'A (2.2) 
where y = nominal commun·ity income 
M -· sr.ock of money 
v· = income velocity 
A -· autonomous expenditure 
K' = marginal autonomous expenditure multiplier. 
The criteria for choosing the periods of time to be studied 
are firstly, that the comparisons be made for relatively short periods 
of time, and secondly, since the relationships might differ at different 
phases of the economic cycle, it is necessary to ensure that one 
comparison covers one or more complete cycles. This will avoid any 
source of distortion from cyclical variations. The authors select the 
period 1897-1959. Annual observations are used for the entire period, 
but quarterly observations are introduced from 1945 onwards. The tim2 
period is broken into thirteen sets of subperiods for which annual data 
is used, and one or two subperiods for ~tlhich quarterly data is used. 
These various subperiods are as follows: 
Annua]_ly Quarter_l,t 
1897 - 1958 1945(3) - 1958(4) 
1897 - 1908 1946(1) - 1959(4) 
1903 - 1913 
1908 - 1921 
1913 - 1920 
1920 - 1929 
1921 - 1933 
1929 - 1939 
1933 - 1938 
1938 - 1953 
1939 - 1948 
1948 - 1957 
1929 - 1958 
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F-M also encounter a statistical problem brought about by 
the correlatior. between the variables on the two sides of the equation 
(2.2). Since, by definition, 
Y = C + A (2.3) 
then observations of Y and A for the same period would entail correlation 
of Y with some part of itself. Thus, the authors argue that it is 
preferable, in the absence of lagged responses, to use 
C = a+KA 
where C = induced consumption expenditure 
and K = K' - 1. 
Equation (2.1) is correspondingly altered to 
C = a + VM 
The authors also combine (2.4) and (2.5) to obtain 
C = a + KA + VM 
(2.4) 
(2.5) 
(2.6) 
This particular formulation is estimated in order to determ~ne 
whether the correlation between C and M is significantly different from 
the correlation between M and A. The partial correlations of M and A 
indicate the net contribution of each to the explanation of C, keeping 
the other constant. 
Price indices are also added as an additional independent 
variable, resulting in the following equations: 
C = a + VM + BP 
C = a + KA + BP 
C - a + VM + KA + BP 
(2.7) 
(2.8) 
(2.9) 
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One important implication of using these real variables is 
pointed out by the authors. They suggest that when nominal magnitudes 
are used, it is plausible to suggest that the direction of causation 
would run from the stock of money to the dependent variable (CorY). 
In the cas~ of real variables, however, the direction of causation is 
not as clear cut, since the money stock (real) is not under the control 
of the monetary authority as is the nominal value of the money stock. 
This is because the public determine the real stock of money by bidding 
prices either up or down. 
Apart from the basic criticisms of the F-M approach (see 2.1.1 
below), Stephanie Edge [19] suggests that the form of the equations used 
by the authors is not well founded theoretically. She suggests that, 
out of the six equations tested, only two [(2.8) and (2.6)] can be 
legitimately derived from theoretical models. Rao [43], in a matl.c;matical 
exposition of the problem, attempts to show that such a criticism cannot 
be substantiated, and that the six equations tested can be grouped 
according to whether or not they assume the existence of 'money illusion•. 
In attempting to define the variables to be used, F-M fin~ that 
there is no clear-cut agreement on the statistical definitions of 
•au~onomous' and 'induced' expenditure, and no criteria for choosing 
particular definitions. This aspect of the monetary debate forms the 
subject of numerous articles which followed publication of the F-M study. 
Its importance is critical however, since many analysts suggest quite 
correctly, that the F-M findings stand or fall on the accuracy, or 
th . f th . d f. . t. l o e rw 1 s e , o · ·- e 1 r e 1 n 1 1 on s . 
1. The definitions eventually decided on were: 
M = currency in public circulation+ adjusted demand deposits 
+ time deposits in commercial banks 
A = net private domestic investment + government deficit on 
income and product account + net foreign balance 
P = consumer price index. 
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Describing the results of their findings as •remarkably 
consistent and unambiguous' and the evidence obtained as 'one-sided•, 
F-M find that, for the 62 years as a whole, and for al~ but one of the 
12 overlapping periods, and for both annual and quarterly data (after 
1946)9 the stock of money is more highly ~arrelated with C than is the 
level of autonomous expenditures. The only exception to this result is 
the period 1929-39 in which autonomous expenditures are found to have 
more influence on consumption than the money stock. Table 2.1 below 
tabulates the results of estimating equation 2.6. 
Tables 2.II and 2.III below tabulate the regression equations 
2.4 and 2.5 for the various overlapping periods, as-well as the quarterly 
regression from 1945 - 1958. 
The results obtained also support the view that a positive 
correlation between C and one of the other variables might simply reflect 
the influence of this other variable in disguise. The partial 
correlations show that except for the period 1929-39 the relation 
between A and C is simply a disguised reflection of the effect of M. 
The positive correlation between M and A produces a simple positive 
correlation between A and C. The authors find that, when M is held 
constant, the partial correlation between A and C is small and often 
negative. However, the partial correlation between M and C is almost 
as strong as the simple correlation coefficient except for the period 
1929-39. See Table 2.IV below. 
The introduction of the price variable in the equations 
emphasises the •one~sided• nature of the results. For every period 
except 1938-53, rCM.P > rCA.P' and, in this particular period, both 
correlations are negative. The second order partial correlations, shown 
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TABLE 2.1 
Relations in Nominal Terms: 
B~tw~_n. ___ y_9__!:!~U_II!Qt ion or Income 9_nd -~ynchronous Values of Autonomous 
1~~nditures or tpe Sto~~-~fJ~oney 
C = a + KA + VM 
·----·--··-~--·--·- --·-- R~;ression coefficient of ~------··l Constant 
Period term (and its standard error) 
a A M R 
·--··-.-----~--- ---- ------------------
!\nnua 1 F" . l res 
1897 - 1958 8348.66 -.425 l. 380 .986 
. \ t.243, (. 047) 
1897 - 1908 3278.78 -·. 238 1. 690 .997 
( . 139) (. 052) 
1903 - 1913 574-.677 -.057 1 . 911 .997 
( . 050) ( . 019) 
1908 .. 1921 207.705 . 181 l. 750 ,996 
( . 126) (. 064-) 
1913 - 1920 357.789 .287 1. 74-9 .99" 
( . 27 4) ( . 158) 
1920 - 19i9 15730.4 .239 "1. 294 .971 
(. 300) (. 149) 
1921 - 1933 16891.88 .794 1.138 .978 
( . 133) ( . 1 50) 
1929 - 1939 32786. 1 1. 583 .653 .955 
( . 590) ( . 370) 
1933 - 1938 13826.75 .377 1.129 .992 
(. 479) (.240) 
1938 - 1953 1264.00 -.510 1. 333 .963 
(. 407) ( .114) 
1939 - l 948 22696.6 -.455 1. 029 . 975 
(.253) (. 090) 
1948 - 1957 -140155.6 .706 2.110 . 991 
(.690) ( . 182) 
1929 - 1958 -3321.58 -.866 1. 518 .979 
(.356) (. 088) 
_Qua_Tterl_y _ _l_i__g_~re~ 
1945II C 1958IV -174895. .064 2.411 .985 l ( .205) (. 007) 
--------- -·-... ·---------------
I 
I 
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TABLE 2.II 
.R~C1 t i 0.!1 s i n _N._o_!!!_f.Q~_I~_r!!l~U l _ _!.iEl_~_o Y' Simp 1 e:__8~e s s i o l:!__l_q~_a t i. on~­
!?~t \Ale ~!.!... .. ~9l}~..!:!i!]F_"tj.Q!2__.2!_) nc O!!le a Q_Q__~yn c h ron o u_s_\{_~~ e ~£. ~_!on Q_~o u s 
~d1J:ure~. or __ t_be S!!?_ck of Mon~y 
C:.::: a+KA 
- .~ Constant Regression Period term Coefficient of its standard error) a A 
Jjn n~_a 1.-fJ.uu res 
1897 - 1958 32416.3 5.162 .756 
(8970.45) 
1897 - 1908 10744.9 2.564 .587 
1903 - 1913 15873.0 2.427 .485 
(4456.62) 
, ()()0 1921 22968.3 2.407 .672 . 1:7VO - I 
I 1913 - 1920 21015.09 2.606 . 791 (7489.44) 
1920 - 1929 55133.5 1. 602 . 569 
(7244.35) 
1921 - 1933 58587.4 1.384 .843 
1929- 1939 58335.9 2.498 .937 
(1169.94) 
1933 - 1938 56504.0 2.452 .935 
. 
1938 -· 1953 96791.5 1.864 .397 
1939 - 1948 102057.8 .494 . 173 
(8291 .39) 
I 1948 - 1957 26341.4 7.164 .747 (63464.72) 
I 1929 - 1958 68467.5 3.944 .705 (16980.87) 
Q'=! a r· t e_rJ_y_ll_g~~r e s l 
l945II I-1958IV 124331. 3.695 . 511 (22455.) 
15. 
TABLE 2.III 
Re l~!.ig~_llllomLnaj_Ierms~_ .. Mu_l!]2l_e or Simp 1 e Regc_~_ss i oQ__J_9.!:!_~ti o_Q_~ 
~£Ltl:i~f:?_Q_ __ ~_Q n S!JI~I?..t. i o_~g_r:_J..!_!f.._Orn~-~~~.z!.l.f_h r_o no u s_'Jjl ·1 u e~_f __ f\u ton omou_?_ 
~xpen.di !.l:!_r~~~he Stgc~Q.i ~~o~~ 
C == a + VM 
-----·---· 
Period term Coefficient of 
(and its standa rei error) a M r 
---Con~ta~~----·-J Regression -
1-----·--------·-·-t- ·--··--·-- ---·---··--- ----·-
1897 - 1958 
1897 - 1908 
1903 - 1913 
1908- 1921 
1913- 1920 
1920 - 1929 
1921 - 1933 
1929 - 1939 
1933 - 1938 
1938 - 1953 
1939 - l9l~8 
1948- 1957 
1929 .. 1958 
[Qua rJ:~ r lL£l.9_ll_re s 
' 
7812.15 
(2472.42) 
3190.3 
533.612 
( 601.234) 
1427.4 
-123.296 
(2443.68) 
15303. 6 
(4934.39) 
337.53 
-9432.974 
(9453.36) 
•7278. 6 
-2434.5 
17438.1 
(l 0055. 7) 
-140039.6 
('18659. 53) 
-1198.28 
(6995.66) 
1 
1. 315 
1. 635 
1.900 
1. 810 
1. 875 
1. 357 
1. 663 
l. 527 
l. 303 
1. 262 
.976 
2.230 
l. 351 
.985 
.996 
.997 
.995 
. 991 
.968 
. 897 
. 912 
. 991 
.958 
. 963 
.990 
.974 
"194 5 II I-1 958 I v '--··------_,_ 7_5_0._88_. _____________ ,J..._ __ 2_. _4_2_2 _____ -.J.__. 9.85 I - (9668.) _j 
16. 
TABLE 2.IV 
_Cj:>_!'re 1 at ion:;_ Bt::~ween _j_yn chron<;>us 
Vadabl in Nominal Terms 
r
---------- Income--Expenditure 
Theory 
Period --+ 
~~-----~:: --~;:;M 
I AIJ.Q.Ua lly 
1897 .. 1958 
1897 - 1908 
1903 - 1913 
1908 - 1921 
1913 -· 1920 
1920- 1929 
1921 - 1933 
1929- 1939 
1933 - 1938 
1938 - 1953 
1939 - 1948 
1948 -· 1957 
1929 - 1958 
Q\}.9 r!.~.dL 
1945III-l958 
1946!-19581 
.756 
.587 
.485 
. 672 
. 791 
-.222. 
-.496 
-.127 
.400 
.423 
. 569 . 288 
. 843 .884 
.937 .688 
.935 .. 414 
.397 -.328 
.173 -.562 
.747 .361 
.705 -.4Z4 
. 511 
. 687 
.044 
.286 
(4) 
.985 
.996 
.997 
.995 
. 991 
.968 
.897 
. 912 
. 991 
.958 
.963 
.990 
.974 
.985 
.985 
Quantity Theory 
(5) (6) 
. 967 . 988 
.996 .991 
.996 .987 
.993 .975 
.980 .975 
.956 
.923 
.529 
.938 
.955 
.974 
. 980 
. 957 
.979 
.973 
.933 
.810 
. 915 
.985 
.966 
.967 
.986 
.983 
. 980 
.978 
( 7) I 
I 
. 791 I 
.622 1 
. 495 I 
.6461 
.761 I 
. s24 I 
I 
.586 1 
.880 1 
.921 i 
I 
. sao 1 
.327 1 
. 719 
.784 
. 512 
.660 
________ _I 
17. 
in Table 2.V below, also confirm the dominance of mon~y over autonomous 
expenditures. Holding both prices and autonomous expenditures constant, 
money and consumption are, overall, more highly correlated than are autonomous 
expenditures and consumption when prices and money are held constant. 
!n other experiments, the authors use quarterly data, in a 
seasonally adjusted form, to test for lagged relationships. They find, 
for example, that the simple correlation coefficient between C and M is 
highest when C is correlated with M two quarters earlier. See Table 2.VI 
below. The corresponding relationship between C and A is for the first 
quarter. In this case, the correlation becomes negative when the lead 
of A over C is extended beyond 4 quarters. 
The authors carry this examination of the lagged relationship 
a step furtl1er·, and consider the effect of M and A on the subsequent 
behaviour of C, by computing the multiple correlation equations b~tween 
C and the values of M and A in a successively larger number of quarters. 
The results, shown in Table 2.VII below, show that the multiple 
correlation coefficient tends to rise only sligh~y when additional 
values of A are added, but tends to rise greatly as each additional 
value of M is added. According to F-M, these correlations provide 
evidence that the stock of money has an influence on later levels of 
consumption. 
F-M also investignte further lagged effects by correlating 
C with pr·ior values of both MandA. From the results, given in 
Table 2.VIII below, the authors find that the addition of prior values 
of A have no significant effect on the multiple correlation coefficient. 
The results of this estimation, according to the authors, reinforces 
the fact that the addition of autonomous expenditures does not alter 
the strong relationship between money and consumption. 
18. 
TABLE 2.V 
----· 
i;_orrelattons~etv.Jeen ~_ynchro!Jous _yariables 
l n Rea 1 Terms 
...-·---------------- r-·---·· 
Peri8d r r CJL\. MP rCM.~-l- rCM.AP rYM.P 
1 
CfJ. .• P 
(1) (2) (3) (4) ( 5) (6) 
1--·--
---- ----
A n_n u a 1_ F 1.9..YX~-~ 
1897 - 1958 • 157 -.314 .878 .888 . 901 
1897 - 1908 .290 I -.570 . 911 .935 .910 
1903 "' 1913 . 126 -.113 . 918 . 917 .75'7 
1908 - 1921 -.673 -.443 .919 .880 . 137 
1913 - 1920 -. 701 .662 .863 .848 .059 
1920 - 1929 . 611 . 190 . 970 .954 .944 
1921 - 1933 . 611 .387 .956 .940 .917 
1929- 1939 .909 .807 .946 .887 . 912 
1933 - 1938 .442 .097 .952 .940 .896 
1936 - 1953 -.513 -.472 -.342 -.261 -. 010 
1939 ·- 1948 -.904 I -.929 .083 .505 . 287 
1948- 1957 -.606 .203 .856 . 771 .78'1 
1929 .. 1958 -.207 -.352 .222 .360 .485 
Quarterly Fi9L!Ies 
1945III-l958IV . 182 . 021 . 918 .915 .860 
J 19461-1958IV .000 .020 .900 .809 .855 
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23. 
The authors compute relationships between the first 
differences of the variables, in an attempt to remove the effect of 
a common trend. The modified results tend to confirm the general 
conclusions and although the correlation coefficients are low, they are 
largest whPn changes in C are correlated with changes in M in the 
preceding quarter. No systematic pattern is found in the correlation 
between C and A, and both negative and zero correlation coefficients 
are encountered. These results are tabulated below in Table 2.IX. 
The major implication of the F-M study is the conclusion 
that monetary policy is likely to be more predictableand to have a 
larger impact on income than autonomous expenditure. Some elaboration 
of this conclusion is necessary, especially in regard to the channels 
through which monetary policy has its ultimate effect on income. 
Again, the quantity theory and income-expenditur·e models ar·e at odJs. 
In a Keynesian context, changes which occur in the money 
stock are transmitted to aggregate income via changes in interest rates. 
These changes in interest rates which form the tr'ansi'tion mechan-ism, 
affect the level of investment spending which, in turn, affects the 
income aggregates by way of the multiplier process. On the other ~~nd. 
the quantity theory assumes that the public has some desired stock of 
money relative to its income. Any alte~ation to the stock of money 
alters this desired ratio and induces a response by the public which vrill 
be aimed at restoring the desired relationship. 
It is this response which is the source of changes occurring 
in the level of income. In comparison with the Keynesian •credit' view 
therefot'e, the quantity theory approach suggests that changes in the 
stock of money operate through a whole range of expenditures rather 
than simply through changes in investment expendHures. 
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The F-M study supports the monetarist position; the results 
suggest that the monetary instruments are the more effective vehicle 
of pol-icy. They also suggest that the quantity theorists' view of the 
operation of monetary policy is to be preferred to the Keynesian 'credit' 
argument. Changes in the money supply wor·k direci:Zy on aggregate 
expenditure and are not transmitted to expenditure through the interest 
rate. 
The large number of articles which followed publication of 
the F-M results is proof of the immense interest evoked by this study. 2 
In a survey of the criticisms and weaknesses of the F-M approach, 
Stephanie Edge concludes that the overall result of the original and 
subsequent studies is to lead the authors and others, 1 into an eco,,omic 
cul-de-sac' [19, p. 68]. The major criticisms of the F-M approach 
relate to the various definitions of both money and autonomous 
expenditures. In addition, there are criticisms of the inclusion or 
exclusion of particular time per·iods, a.nd the problems caused by the 
estimation procedure. 
It is in the definition of the autonomous expenditure variable 
that many consider the F-t1 analysis to be weakest. The majority of the 
critics maintain that nearly all the components of F-M's definition of 
autonomous expenditure are, in fact, endogenous, and should be eliminated 
from the final definition. Perhaps the main reason for this criticism 
2. Some of the studies and criticisms which followed from the initial 
F-M work are listed in the bibliography at the end of this chapter. 
See [12], [13], [25], [31], [32], [35], [36], [41], [42]. 
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is the statistical criteria used by F-M in determining the exogeneity, 
or otherwise, of the various components of autonomous expenditure [20, 
pp. 182-185]. Lewis [34] considers in detail the selection process 
used by F--111, and amongst others, Edge [19, pp. 65-67] suggests that 
the authors are not always consistent in applying their criteria. 
In his comment on the F-M paper, Donald Hester [25] argues 
that F-M have represented the autonomous expenditure theory in an 
unorthodox form which makes it very sensitive to statistical comparison. 
He maintains that the inclusion of the government deficit and the net 
foreign balance in A is not entirely correct, and that these two variables 
are not likely to be completely exogenous. 
In an attempt to improve the definition of A, Hester employs 
a simple model which recognizes the dependence of taxes on income. 
This is done in order to alleviate the alleged weakness in F-M's 
definition which, Hester argues, ignores the fact that taxation is a 
function of income. From his model, Hester considers four measures of A: 
-L ::: I + G + H - M 
-L' -· L + M + 0 
Lt' 
-- L' M 
Lu' ::: L' E 
where I - net private domestic investment 
G = government expenditure on income and product account 
H = exports 
M = imports 
0 - capital consumption allowances 
E = change in inventories. 
28. 
In computing correlation coefficients to test the new 
definitions for the period 1929-58, Hester finds that, with the 
exception of the 1929-39 period, the correlation between C and every 
proposed measure of A exceeds the corresponding correlation between 
C and F-M's definition of A. He also finds that the correlations 
between C and any of the proposed definitions of A do not differ from 
the correlations between C and t~ by more than 0.06 for the 30-year 
time period studied. 
In reply to Hester's criticisms. F-M [21] criticise Hester's 
use of a limited time period. They maintain that, if the World War II 
years are excluded, almost half of Hester's test period is made up of 
the years 1929-39 which they originally considered to be a period 
substantially different from other period~. 
Ando and Modigliani (hereafter referred to as A-M) [9] also 
attempt to call attention to a number of basic shortcomings in the F-M 
paper. Making use of a full scale set of definitional expressions and 
identities, A-M test a consumption-autonomous expenditure relationship 
once again using a drastically altered definition of autonomous 
expenditure .. 3 
The equation tested fit~ the data well, and the fitting of 
a correlation between C and the newly defined autonomous expenditure 
3. Their definition comprises net investment in plant, equipment, and 
residential houses, total government purchases of goods and services, 
exports, the property tax portion of indirect business taxes, net 
investment paid to government, government transfer payments 
(i.e. unemployment insurance benefits), subsidies less current 
surplus of government enterprises, less the excess of wage accruals 
over disbursement. This can be compared to F-M 1 s original definition 
given in footnote 1 above. See p. 11 . 
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variable reduces the unexplained variance by 90 per cent when compared 
with the original F-M equation. 
In another major attack on the F-M paper, de Prano and Mayer 
[17] (hereafter referred to as O-M) submit further alternative 
definition:.: of A, us·ing different selection techniques from those used 
by F-M. They suggest that the definition of A used by F-M (consisting 
of the sum of fixed private domestic investment, government deficit on 
income and product account, and the net foreign balance) contain 
endogenous elements. To show this, 0-M correlate the various components 
of F-M•s definition of A with C to show how the correlation coefficient 
falls as non-endogenous components are added. From this test, the 
authors conclude that three components - inventory investment, imports, 
and the government deficit or surplus - are, in fact, endogenous. 
0-M suggest that the new definitions of A4 used, tend to 
perform much better than the definition used by F-M in their tests. 
The other major definitional criticism of the F-M approach 
concerns their choice of M, the monetary variable. Ando and ~1odigliani 
[9, p. 708], for example, suggest that, during the period tested by 
F-M, the variable M used was at least partly induced, and thus positively 
correlated with the error term in the tested equation. These authors 
maintain that there are adequate gr'ounds for suggesting that the causal 
links from the money supply to money income are more complex than F-M's 
analysis suggests. The high correlations obtained by F-M for the 
4. A as the sum of investment in producers• durable equipment, 
non-residential construction, residential construction, federal 
government expenditures on income and product account and exports. 
A as the above definition less capital consumption measures. 
A as gross fixed private domestic investment. 
A as gross fixed private domestic investment plus exports. 
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monetary variable may actually overstate the strength of the causal 
mechanism from the money supply to the level of income. Because of 
this fact, A-M experiment vJith another monetary variab'1e, M*, which 
they define as the estimated maximum amount of money that could be 
created by the banking system on the basi:, of the monetary authorities' 
reserves, taking into account the reserve requirements and currency 
holding habits of this authority. This approach is based on the 
somewhat dubious assumption that the bank's reserves are autonomous. 
In fact, it has been suggested that because deficit financing serves 
to increase bank reserves, M* is related to A, and this definition of 
a new monetary variable does not improve the F-t~ approach greatly [19, 
p. 59]. 
Other studies which attempt to l~edefi ne the monetary variable 
also base their criticism of the F-M definition on the fact that such a 
variable may not be truly autonomous. The studies by Barrett and 
Walters [12] and Laumas and Laumas [31] highlight the fact that critics 
of the F-M approach recognize the problem of exogeneity in the definition 
of the monetary variable. Barrett and Walters 2xamine the possibility of 
a lag existing in the effect of money on consumption. Such an analysis 
is pursued with the aid of Friedman's 'permanent income' hypo~hesis. 
Despite their exhaustive study, the authors are unable to conclude that 
onl,y money or only autonomous expenditures are the predominant variable 
influencing income. They find that money is relatively more important 
in the full employment years leading up to World War I, and autonomous 
expenditures account for most of the changes in consumption in the high 
unemployment years between the wars. Laumas and Laumas, similarly, are 
unable to come to any definite conclusion concerning the relative 
31. 
i1:1portance of M and A, despite a detailed monetary analysis aimed at 
improving the F-M definition. The basis of this particular approach 
is a test of the so--called 'degree of moneyness' of va\'ious monetary 
definitions [30]. This approach merely leads to the conclusion that 
both A and the newly defined M are equally important in determining 
income, and that their relative importance depends upon the period 
considered. 
The use of time periods differing in length is also the 
individual subject of debate en the Friedman-Meiselman paper. The 
authors themselves consider the entire period from 1897 to 1958, but 
ignore many of the results of the Depression years because they do not 
accord with their overall results and because they consider the period 
to be one characterized by breakdowns in the banking and financial system 
which wou·ld adversely affect the monetary mechanisms. In this regard, 
it is worthwhile noting that the inclusion of the War years in the 
Friedman-Meiselman study has no detrimental effects on the obviously 
overwhelming superiority of the quantity theory in determining economic 
activity. Many of the critics of F-M's selected time period criticise 
the inclusion of the war years which bias the results in favour of the 
monetarist case because war time rationing produces a spasmodic pattern 
of consumption. 
Other antagonists of the F-M approach also attack the 
estimation rrocess on the grounds of the presence of distortion due to 
autocorrelation. However, much of the criticism in this regard is 
obviated by the fact that F-M also estimate their results in terms of 
first differences. This is an attempt by the authors to eliminate the 
presence of a cannon trend, but, unfortunately, the results prove less 
32. 
than conclusive. Other ctitics of the F-M approach are also less 
than conclusive in their attempts to solve this problem. 5 
One further criticism of the F-M approach st2ms from the 
author's use of a simple one-equation model to test the competing 
theories. P1ndo and fv1odigliani [9~ pp. 71L:·-16] are among the critics 
who question the meaning and relevance of simply comparing the 
correlation coefficients for the variables A and M. They suggest that 
the F-M approach fails to shed any light on the problem of how the 
dependent variable, either C or Y, can be effectively controlled. 
This faibre stems from two fundamental flaws in the F-M approach which 
have, as their basis, the use of the simple single equation model. 
Firstly, A-M argue that there is no justification for the 
treatment of the autonomous expenditure variable and the money supply 
variable as mutually exclusive stabilization devices. In fact it is 
more accurate to suggest that the quantity theory is a theory of demand 
for money and, as such, is an important part of the Keynesian framework 
of income determination. 
Secondly, and more importantly in the context of the following 
chapter of this thesis, A-M suggest thut neither of the two rival 
theories tested can be properly regarded as a behavioural or structural 
relation. Even if the independent variables used in the tested equations 
can be regarded as truly exogenous, at best they can be regarded as 
'grossly misspecified "reduced forrns' 11 [9, p. 715]. A-M,however, fail to 
agree that the independent variables can be regarded as truly exogenous. 
5. For example, Ando and Modigliani utilize the 'permanent income' 
hypothesis with the incorporation of a lagged consumption variable. 
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At best, they argue, the independent var·iables can be regarded as 
1 autonomous 1 in the sense of being uncorre l a ted with the erTO¥' term 
of the test equation. Such a situation is quite different from being 
exogenous in the economic sense. This particular problem, along with 
several othe:·s inherent in the F-M approach,also appear in the later 
monetary-fiscal studies of Andersen and Jordan [6]. The first article 
which appears to fully recognize the consequences of incorrectly 
treating endogenous variables as exogenous is the study by Goldfeld and 
Blinder [23] who analyse closely many of the erroneous conclusions 
which may be reached under these circumstances. The general problem 
of endogeneity and the points raised by Goldfeld and Blindet· are 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
2. 2 I!:!_~nd~[s_~rc~orq~_!]_-~tudy 
The study by Andersen and Jordan (hereafter referred to as A-J) 
represents a step forward in the monetarist argument. 
The basic thrust of the A-J approach is to place more emphasis 
on the relative attributes of monetary and fiscal policy, rather than 
merely atte~pting to examine the relative influences of money and 
autonomous expenditures in influencing income movements. Their study 
sets out to examine whether or not the response of economic activity to 
fiscal actions is (i) greater in effect; (ii) more predictable and 
(iii) induces a more rapid response, than the response to monetary policy. 
They do not experiment with structural forms. For example, they_do not 
test for the directness or indirectness of monetary actions upon the 
aggregates. 
The measure of economic activity used in this study is GNP at 
current prices. Two measures of monetary actions are used by the 
34. 
author's; the monetary base and the money stock. The monetary base, which 
is assumed to be under the din;ct control of the monetary authorities, 
is defined to include reserve deposits of member banks at the Reserve 
Bank and all currency held by commercial or non-banks, adjusted for 
changes in r0serve requirements. Anders~n and Jordan, in an earlier 
article [7] examine the concept of the monetary base ~in more detail. 
They consider the base to be a good measure of monetary influence for 
two reasons. Firstly, it acts as an important link between monetary 
authority actions and their impact on economic activity, and secondly, 
it is considered to be a variable over which the monetary authorities 
have the most complete control. 
The two monetary measures are chosen because of their strategic 
importance ·in both the Keynesian and the Quantity theory approaches to 
explaining movements in economic activity. The channels through which 
the tvJo schools view the influence of monetary policy have been exanrlned 
6 previously in relation to the stock of money. The use of the monetary 
base simply adds a further stage of influence in that changes in the 
monetary base engender changes in the money stock which, in turn, affect 
prices, interest rates and spending in general over a wide range of 
capital and consumer goods. 
Turning to a measure of fiscal influence, A-J suggest the use 
of so-called 'high employment' budget concepts. These comprise both 
expenditures (goods and services and transfer payments) and receipts 
(legislated changes in Federal Government tax rates) which are adjusted 
for the influence of economic activity. The full employment budget 
6. p. 23 above. 
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surplus (receipts less expenditures) is also used. To test the 
empirical relationships, quarter-to-quarter changes in GNP are regressed 
on quarter to quarter changes in the money stock and the various measures 
of f·i seal policy. The various equations tested are as follows: 
t,GNPt ::: ao + a1M\-n + a26(R E)t-n (2.10) 
t,GNPt ·- bo + blt,Mt-n + b2AEt-n + b36Rt-n (2.11) 
t,GNPt - c + c-1 AMt-·n + c26Et-n 0 (2.12) 
(2. i3) 
where GNP = Gross National Product at constant prices 
t•1 :::: money stock 
R :::; high employment Government receipts 
E :::: high employment Government expend i tur·e 
B = monetary base 
and n = 1, 2 and 3 periods. 
The changes in the variables are calculated using conventional 
•first differences• by subtracting the value from the previous quarter 
from the value for the present quarter. An averaging procedure known as 
'central differences• is also used. This method necessitates the 
summation of the forward difference and the backward difference which, 
according to Kareken and Solow [26], gives a better approximation of a 
smooth rate of change at any point of time. The above equations [(2.10) 
to (2. 13)] are therefore estimated for variables calculated by both the 
normal •first differences• and the •central differences' methods. 
The Almon lag structure [1] is used to estimate the structure 
of the lags present in the regressions. A-J's procedure, however, 
36. 
necess ·i tates the a priori imposition of the 1 ag 1 ength, even though the 
actual lag structure is determined by the regression itself, rather 
than being imposed a prior'i. 
In terms of the R2 statistic (adjusted for degrees of freedom) 
the results obtained fit well. The authors find that the estimated 
coefficients for both the money stock and the monetary base are highly 
significant and of the correct sign, whereas the estimated coefficients 
for the high employment measures of fiscal performance are not 
significant and tend to vary in sign. The rAesults, using f·lrst difference 
and central difference techniques,are tabulated below in Table 2.X. 
The monetary measures of either the money stock or the 
monetary base perform extremely well, and are highly significant ove1A the 
four quarter lag distributi~n. On the other hand, as the table above 
displays, all measures of fiscal action fail to generate significa11t 
results. In fact, in the case of high employment expenditures, it is 
shown that an increase in Government expenditure is mildly stimulative 
in the quarter in which the increase occurs, but becomes negative in the 
second and third quarters. 
The authors then use the results obtained from their estimations 
to test the propositions put earlier that fiscal actions are greater, 
more predictable and faster acting than monetary actions. In order to 
test the strength of the fiscal and monetary actions, the authors make 
use of 'beta coefficients' for their comparison9 rather than the simple 
regression coefficients as tabulated in Table 2.X below. The beta 
coefficients are used to take account of past variation of changes in 
each independent variable relative to the past variation in GNP. The 
results of the conversion to beta variables are given in Table 2.XI 
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above, for the monetnry variables, and the fiscal expenditure and 
receipts variables~ 
The results above indicate quite conclusively that changes 
in the money variables generally have a greater impact on GNP than 
changes in the fiscal high employment variables for the current period 
and the two quarters preceding the change. In those cases where ~E 
provide the greater beta coefficient, it is associated with a negative 
coefffci ent sign, i ndi cati ng a contracti onary effect. 
Pc. rti a 1 coefficients U-.c~ _ .......... e~...., ...... ..:-. ........... .:-.,...7 a~r'lo ••rrtd Ut:l- !llllllUl.IVII It: U.:>t:: to check the 
results for this proposition, and thes~ tend to coincide with the former 
results. See Table 2.XI. From these tests, the authors are unable to 
confirm the first proposition that fiscal actions are stronger than 
monetary actions. 
The second proposition, that the response of economic accivity 
to fiscal actions is more predictable than the response to monetary 
influences, is tested by a comparison of the t-values (the value of the 
regression coefficient relative to its standard error) .. The higher the 
value of the t-ratio, the greater the reliability of the estimated 
change in GNP resulting from a change in the variable. 
The two monetary variables outperform the fiscal high 
expenditure variables in all quarters, except the third. See Table 2.XII 
below. The t-values for the sum of the regression coefficients are 
extremely large for both ~M and ~B, but are not statistically significant 
for the 6E variable. Accordingly, the second proposition is not 
confirmed. 
7. These measure the percent of variation of the dependent variable 
remaining after the variation due to other variables in the 
regression has been subtracted. 
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TABLE 2.XII 
Mea su rem~~~~-2.LB.~ l_i a b iJ_j_tL.Q_f the Res .1?.Q!:!. se __ ot_QNP 
to_ Mo n (~ t~r,L..9.~~Q_J i _?.s:_~J....j-._c t i on~ 
("t-va'lues 11 of Regression Coefficientsa) 
·---·--~-~~~·-·-..-.~------------·--------·- ··----------·----·--------~ 
First Differences 
---------------------------------1 
Quarter !1M L1E L1R !18 AE AR 
---
---~·--~3·~_... ______ 
t 2.03 l. 15 0.53 0.49 0.67 l. 68 
t-1 2.35 2.15 0.03 3.37 l. 63 0.07 
t-2 2.69 0.19 0. l 0 4.10 0.84 0. 64-
t-3 1.82 2.82 0.32 1. 54 3.10 0.39 
sum 5.57 0.13 0.32 5.67 0.89 0.67 
Centra 1 Differences 
Quarter LIM liE liR 68 liE AR 
t 2. Ol 1. 52 1.05 0.28 0.73 2.55 
t-1 2.78 2.44 0.17 3.16 1.87 0.27 
t-2 2.45 0.60 0.46 3.92 l. 04 1. 31 
t-3 1.72 3.15 0.48 l. 71 3.65 0.87 
sum 7.57 0.04 0.54 6.95 l. 37 1.16 
----·--- ----·-------
a. t-values associated with equations (2.11), (2.13) for both 
first differences and central differences in Table 2.X. 
The third proposition concerning the speed of response of the 
fiscal and monetar·y var·iables is tested by comparing the lag structure 
of the regressions primarily in terms of the size of the beta coefficients 
in the quarter of the change and the quarter following the change. 
A-J plot the beta coefficients (see Figures 2(1) and 2(2) below) and 
conclude that a change in M induces a large and equal response over the 
four quarters. A change in B induces the largest response in the first 
t 
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two quarters and a change in E is greatest in only the third quarter. 
Accordingly, A-J were unable to confirm that the major impact of 
fiscal policy on economic activity occurs within a shorter time period 
when compared with monetary policy. 
In discussing the implications of the three propositions 
tested in the study, the authors basically conclude that monetary actions 
play a highly prominent role in economic stabilization. Evidence tends 
to suggest that the money stock is an important indicator of the general 
thrust of stabilization actions, basically because any changes in this 
var·iable reflect the discr·etionary actions of the monetary authorities 
in their use of the major instruments of policy. 
Two Australian studies which have adopted the A-J approach 
are those of Dewald and Kennedy [18] and Sheppard [44]. Dewald and 
Kennedy duplicate the A-J study for Australia and find support for both 
monetary and fiscal influences, especially when unlagged equations are 
analysed. Using the Almon lag technique and either M1, M2 or M3 as the 
monetary variable, the authors find that the evidence overwhelmingly 
supports the monetarist position. 
Sheppard duplicates Argy•s [10] reduced form approach, 
regressing annual percentage changes in GNP against annual percentage 
changes in M1 and M2 for the period 1950-1972. He finds that, by 
altering Argy's time period, he obtains results which again support the 
monetarist view. Sheppard then estimates regressions with quarterly 
percentage changes in nominal, real and nominal less real GNP against 
quarterly changes in M1 and M3 for the period 1959(4) - 1972(4). Using 
the Almon lag technique with a third degree polynomial, Sheppard finds 
a strong association in the current and first lagged period between the 
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money supply and GNP. He admit:; that there is a pass i bi 1 ity that some 
of this association may be due to a reverse causation from economic 
activity to money, although he also po·ints out that much of the 
fluctuation in the monetary aggr·egates is the result of policy actions 
rather thar the result of a simple 1 accommodating 1 policy. 
Sheppard also duplicates the A-J approach using either M1 or 
M3 as the monetary indicator, and Commonwealth Government spending, full 
employment Government receipts and exports as the fiscal indicators. 
The period covered is 1959(4) - 1972(1). In all cases, the fiscal 
indicators prove insignificant, whereas the money supply variable is 
highly significant. 
2.2.1 Criti~l?.~~qf the A-J appl~oach_ 
In general, the A-J approach manages to accommodate many of 
the criticisms of the F-M study. They overcome the criticism of the 
time period and the problem of trends caused by F-M's use of levels for 
the variables by using post-war quarterly first differences of data. 
Also, they use 'high employment' fiscal variables, carefully choosing 
the components of each so as to do away \·lith the arbitrary endogenous-
exogenous allocation which was roundly criticised in the F-M study. 
The same principles are applied to the choice of a monetary variable, 
where both the money stock and the monetary base are used. A-J attempt 
to alleviate endogeneity in these variables by giving results of their 
estimations for both the money stock and the monetary base. 
Gramlich [24] maintains that the A-J study tends to alleviate, 
by concession, many of the stumbling blocks thrown up in the F-M study. 
However, as Gramlich also emphasizes, there has obviously been little 
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progress made, or concession gtanted by way of determining a truly 
exogenous monetary or fiscal variable. Gramlich suggests that the 
problem is quite intractable, since 'it depends (as far as monetary 
policy is concerned) on~ first, whether the Federal Reserve is really 
exogenous in its short-run response to movements in aggregate demand, 
and, secondly~ on how this exogeneity can best be represented'. [24, 
p. 512] In this respect Gramlich touches on a point which is central 
to the whole problem surrounding monetary policy and the tests of its 
effectiveness and impact. He po·ints out that the pr·oblem of endogeneity 
can only be important in those cases where the authorities are not 
constrained by competing objectives and where their actions are an 
immediate response to stabilization needs. 
Despite these obvious improvements on the F-M approach, the 
large number of articles which have followed the publication of thd 
A-J study emphasize the fact that the problems of testing monetary and 
fiscal policy strengths still exist. For example, in a comment on the 
A-J studyj Frank de Leeuw and John Kalchbrenner [16] make use of 
alternative equations which, they suggest, appear to cast doubt on the 
A-J results. 
The main basis of the criticism by de Leeuw and Kalchbrenner 
is the fact that A-J are not strict enough in using policy variables 
which are free from the influence of current movements in economic 
activity. Because of this fact, they argue that the model used does 
not employ variables which are strictly exogenous in terms of being 
subject to control by policy makers and also unresponsive to current 
endogenous forces. In this respect they are critical of A-J's use of 
the tax receipts variable, and the monetary base variable. In order to 
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remove some of the influence of current movements in the price level 
on tax receipts (which would make them endogenous) de Leeuw and 
Kalchbrenner adjust the rr~ceipts in per·iod (t-1) to em-rent prices by 
multiplying full employment receipts by Pt/Pt-l" They then subtract 
this result from the current figure to get the difference in full 
employment receipts expressed in current year prices. 
In addition, the authors delete borrowed reserves and currency 
from the monetary base, in order to eliminate endogenous movements in 
these items. Using these adjustments de Leeuw and Kalchbrenner find 
that the fiscal variables are generally more significant and the 
monetary variables less so. 
Davis [15] questions the realism of A-J•s paper for several 
reasons: 
( . ) \ 1 the fiscal multipliers are virtually zero. He contrasts 
these to the results obtained from the FRB-MIT model 
where these same multipliers were found to exceed 3 
after one year; 
(ii) the monetary variable explains an unreasonable percentage 
of the variance of quarterly changes in GNP; 
(iii) the monetary multiplier is too high to be realistic; 
(iv) the money policy instrument works with an unrealistic 
speed. 
One of the common criticisms of the A-J study is the argument 
that the money stock is influenced by economic activity. Because of 
this fact, it may be very difficult to identify the response of GNP to 
changes in money stock. This so-called •reverse causation•. argument is 
tested by Davis and he concludes that the association between changes 
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in money and changes in GNP is not due primarily to the presence of 
the reverse causation effect. Further analysis of this reverse 
causation argument is also ~ttempted by Andersen [2] ~ho tests four 
hypotheses which, he maintains, are crucial in supporting the original 
A-J study. 8 These hypotheses are as follows: 
(i) that changes in GNP have a greater influence on changes 
in money than do changes in the monetary base. The 
relationship tested is 
(ii) that changes in GNP have a greater influence on changes 
(2.14) 
in the monetary multiplier than do changes in the monetary 
base. The relationship tested is 
(2.15) 
(iii) that changes in GNP have a significant effect on the 
monetary base. The relationship tested is 
(2.16) 
for two subperiods and the total time period. 
Andersen finds that, in regard to the first hypothesis, ~B has 
a much larger overall impact on ~M than does ~GNP. Secondly, he finds 
that neither L'IGNP nor ~B have much influence on the monetary multiplier. 
Thirdly, a positive but varying relationship is found between ~GNP and 
~B, but the direction of causation is not clear. Only in the second 
8. See Appendix 2A for a discussion of the Brunner Metzler framework 
on which Andersen's tests are based. 
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subperiod is there a significant relationship between ~B and ~GNP, and 
a significant shift in the relationship is detected between the two 
subperiods. This findin~ leads Andersen to test one further hypothesis: 
(iv) that the response of GNP to changes in money will be 
grrater in the subperiod where there is a greater 
response of the base to changes in GNP. 
Andersen finds in this case that the regression coefficients 
are almost identical for the two subperiods and that there is no sign 
of any significant shift in the relationship between the two subperiods. 
From these tests, Andersen concludes that, even though there is support 
for the idea that ~B responds to ~GNP, the variations in this relation-
ship are not accompanied by corresponding changes in the regression 
coefficients which relate ~GNP to ~M. For these reasons, Andersen 
rejects the 'extreme' version of the reverse causation argument. He 
maintains that the money stock cannot be said to respond to changes in 
economic activity to the extent that it would cast doubt on the validity 
of the A-J equation. 
Despite this evidence, it can be concluded more realistically, 
that the A-J approach is subject to the same criticism as the F-M approach 
on one important issue ~· the assumption that monetary policy is 
exogenous. 
One of the other major criticisms of the A-J approach (and the 
F-M approach) is the use of the simplified 'reduced form' method of 
estimation. Several critics suggest that it is better to make use of 
a structural model in the analysis of monetary and fiscal policy action. 
Such an approach has several advantages and disadvantages which will be 
discussed in section 2.3 below. 
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On the other hand, one of the advantages of the single equation 
approach is that it avo·ids the problem of specifying and measur-ing the 
links which exist between the monetary and fiscal varii bles and economic 
activity. The single equation approach, however, fails to explain anything 
about the monetary and fiscal policy decisions of the authorities. Hte 
fact remains that the independent variables, which are designed to 
measure the monetary and fiscal influences on the economy, can only be 
taken as a measure of the policy intentions of the authorities if it can 
be assumed (or proven) that the authorities have acted to control these 
monetary and fiscal variables. Keran [27, pp. 7-8] discusses this 
problem in detail and argues that information as to whether the policy 
makers act to control these variables can only come from the so-called 
'reaction functions~ of such authorities .. This important argument is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
The suggestion that more realistic and practical results can 
be obtained from the use of a structural model is supported by Artis 
and Nobay [11, p. 36] who emphasize that: 
' ... it is likely to be difficult to sort out the impact of 
income on money from the impact of money on income, (or, 
alternatively, to sort out the dependence of each on some 
third factor). In principle, a set of relationships is 
needed to resolve the different effects, and this requires 
a much more detailed analysis. Detailed econometr-ic work 
on the financial sector and its relationships with the rest 
of the economy is st n 1 something of a novelty.' 
2.3 The structural mog~~E,Proach 
The logical consequence of the Artis-Nobay argument is to 
extend from the limitations of the single equation approach and to 
attempt an analysis of the monetary-fiscal debate in the context of 
structural models of the economy. 
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The number of structural models designed to test the 
relative effects of monetary and fiscal policy is limited. In order 
to demonstrate the basic principles. two studies are reviewed: the 
Moroney-!Yiason [ 40] and the Kmenta-·Smi th [28] studies. 
The Moroney-Mason study is basically an attempt to investigate 
the quarterly impact of monetary and government expenditure policies 
using a dynamic model of aggregate demand. The authors suggest that 
their structural approach is an improvement on the F-M and the A-J 
approaches 1n at least three ways. Firstly, it is a full theoretical 
model approach, as compared with the single equation ordinary-least-
squares estimates of the earlier studies. Secondly, it treats the 
money supply as endogenous being influenced, among other things, by the 
monetary ba:;e which is treated as the major instrument of monetary 
policy. Finally, the model is estimated by three--stage-least. squares 
which the authors suggest is preferable especially within the context 
of an interdependent system. 
Moroney and Mason argue that the F-M approach of treating the 
money supply as exogenous is objectionable both from theoretical and 
statistical points of view. From the theoretical point of view it is 
not accurate to do so, since the money supply contains an endogenous 
component which is induced by changes in ·income. Because of this, it 
cannot be treated as a pure instrument of stabilization policy. Following 
from this, the regression coefficient of the money supply estimated by 
ordinary-least-squares is inconsistent. 
The Moroney-Mason model consists of 7 equations and two 
identities and the estimates are based on seasonally adjusted, quarterly 
data from 1953(3) to 1965(4). The equations and identities contained 
in the model are 
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yt -- Ct + It + Gt + Et - Ot 
ct ::: a0 + a 1 Y~ + a~ct-l + a3Mt + a4Mt-l +ult 
It :::: bo + b,(ct-1 
- ct--2) + b2Yt + b3r·~-2 + b4 1t-l 
yd 
- cOYt t 
ot - do+ dlYt + u3t 
rl s ::: eo+ elrt + e2Yt + u4t t 
Ms s d fo + flrt + f2Rt + f3 8t + u5t ::::: t 
rs 0 
- 9o + glYt + g2Mt + u6t t 
t\ - r·~s -· MD t t 
where Y = Gross National Product 
yd = disposable income 
C = consumption expenditure 
I - gross private domestic investment 
G = government purchases of goods and services 
E = exports 
0 = imports 
M = money stock 
r5 = short term interest rate 
rl = long term interest rate 
B = monetary base 
Rd = rediscount rate. 
(2.17) 
(2. 18) 
+ u2t (2.19) 
(2.20) 
(2.21) 
(2.22) 
(2.23) 
(2.24) 
(2.25) 
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d From these equations, the endogenous variables are Yt' Yt' 
Ct, It' Ot, f\1~, M~, r~ and r~:- The predetermined variables ar'e Ct-l, 
Ct_ 2, Mt-l, r~_ 2 , Gt' Et' R~ and Bt, with the last four being exogenous. 
Before discussing the important features of the money supply 
equation, reference should be made to the problem of exogeneity in 
regard to government expenditures. Moroney and Mason treat government 
expenditut"es as exogenous in their model since they argue that it is 
only realistic to treat it as endogenous vrithin the context of an annual 
model. Within an annual model, government expenditure could, •within 
the course of one year, be influenced by the pace of economic activity• 
[40, p. 796]. On the other hand, it is reasonable, according to Moroney 
and Mason, to suggest that government expenditure is exogenous within 
the confines of a quarterly model because the so-called •reaction lag• 
is much greater than three months. 
The authors formulate the money supply equation as a function 
of two exogenous instruments, the rediscount rate and the monetary base. 
As well as these they include the short term rate of intel~est. The 
authors argue that both these instruments are under the direct control 
of the Federal Reserve. The monetary bas~ is also a relevant instrument 
of monetary policy manipulated mainly through open market operations. 
Because of its attraction, 9 the authors use three-stage-least-
squares to obtain the structural form of the model. At the first stage 
of the estimation, positive autocorrelation is encountered which 
necessitates the use of a first order autoregressive scheme for the 
9. According to the authors, the chief merit of the 3-S-L-S method 
is that it utilizes 'in the estimation process, the sample 
covariances among structural disturbances• [40, p. 802]. 
estimation of each equation. T~e reduced form for GNP is then obtained 
from the structural estimates, giving the impact multipliers. These 
impact multipliers measure the immediate, first quarter impact on GNP 
of a change in the corresponding predetc~rrrrined variable, with al·l other 
predetermined variables held constant. In order to determine the net 
influence of the policy instruments (free from the influence of exogenous 
variables), ~~oroney and Mason eliminate all lags from the reduced foY'm 
to obtain the so-called 'fundamental dynamic equation'. From this 
equation, tbe authors obtain the dynamic multipliers for the monetary 
base and the government expenditure instrument with lags up to twenty 
quarters. Such dynamic multipliers measure the net change in GNP during 
a given period which is exclusively attributable to a one unit change 
in an exoge~ous variable during a past period. 
Moroney and t~ason • s results show that the monetary base 
multiplier rises to its peak two quarters after the change, whilst the 
government expenditure multiplier is greatest in the quarter in which 
the change is made. The monetary base multiplier then declines in 
strength and eventually becomes negative after 15 quarters. The 
government expenditure multipli~r follows a similar path, becoming 
negative after 13 quarters and displaying a damped oscillation towards 
zero. The change in government expenditure has very little effect beyond 
the initial period, whereas the monetary base has a much stronger 
influence during subsequent periods. 
Moroney and Mason, in summary, suggest that a large number of 
questions remain to be answered before a confident conclusion can be 
r·eached in regard to the relative efficacy of monetary and fiscal policy. 
The conclusions reached by Moroney and Mason are subject to the 
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l~mitations of the estimation process. As the authors themselves 
point out: 
' ... the degree of co~fidence one attaches to [the conclusions] 
consequently depends upon one's faith in the robustness of the 
theoretical and empirical specification of the model. By 
comparison with the models used by Friedman and Meisel man and 
by the·;r chief critics, as well as u.~:~ more recent models 
employed at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the ground 
for faith seems to be firm. ' [ 40, p. 811] 
The Kmenta-Smith study is an attempt to test two propositions 
concerning monetary and fiscal policy. The first proposition is that 
both rnonetar'Y and fiscal policy variables are ineffective because of the 
lag involved in their impact. The second proposition is that the money 
supply is a more important determinant of aggregate demand than is 
autonomous expenditure. This second proposition is simply a re-statement 
of the original F-M hypothesis, using a structural model rather than a 
single equation approach. 
The Kmenta-Smith model consists of 5 equations and 3 identities, 
and the estimates are based on seasonally adjusted, deflated quarterly 
data from 1954(1) to 1963(4). The coefficients of the model are 
estimated using three-stage-least-squares except for the adaptive 
expectations coefficient in the consumpt~on function which is estimated 
by nonlinear two--stage least squares. The equations and identities 
contained in the model are 
\ ::: ct + Id + I r + I i + Gt (2.26) t t t 
\ :::: yt Ii (2.27) t 
Lt :::: f\ + Rt (2.28) 
ct ::: ao + alYt + a2(Lt- Lt-1) + a3Ct-1 (2.29) 
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rd bo + blrt b2( 5t-l st-2) .l.t - + + 
Ir co + + c2( 5t-l 5t-2) ::: clrt ·r t 
Ii do + dlrt ~· t + d2 (\-1 - 5t-2) + 
rt .. C· + elYt + e2Mt + e3~\-1 0 
where Y = gross national product 
C ·· consumption expenditur'es 
Id -·plant and equipment investment 
Ir - residential construction 
11 - inventory investment 
b t d + b4 1t-l 3 
c t + r c4 1t-l 3 
d t + i d4 I t-·1 3 
G - government purchases of goods and services plus net 
foreign investment 
S - final sales of goods and services 
t = time in quarters (first quarter of 1954 = 0) 
r =yield on all corporate bonds 
M = money supply 
R - t·ime deposits in commercial banks 
L - money supply plus time deposits in commercial banks. 
The variables Gt' Lt' Mt, Rt are considered exogenous. 
(2. 30) 
(2.31) 
(2.32) 
(2.33) 
In so much as Mt is considered to be exogenous, the yield on corporate 
bonds (rt) is chosen as the 'dependent' variable which is influenced by 
Mt. Kmenta and Smith make no comment on either the tr~atment of Mt or 
Gt as exogenous variables. 
After computing the structural form of the model~ the authors 
derive the impact multipliers and, in a similar fashion to Moroney and 
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Mason, compute the •fundamental dyncuwic equation•. From this equation, 
the dynamic multipliers are calculated. The results lead the authors 
to conclude that a positive change in government spending is stimulatory 
for the first four quarters and then tends to become mildly depressing. 
This contrasts with the 1~or·oney-t,1ason study which suggests that the 
depressing effects of a change in government spending occur after a lag 
of 13 quarters. On the other hand, a change in the money supply, 
although having a smaller initial impact, tends to become mildly 
depressing after a lag of 18 quarters. This again compares with 15 
quarters as recognized by the Moroney-Mason study. Because of the 
nature of the model, the money supply variable acts to change GNP through 
the effect of the interest rate on investment demand. Such a link is 
evident froT the use of the money supply as an explanatory variable in 
the interest rate equation and the use of the interest rate as a 
determining factor in all the investment equations. In order to test 
an alternative hypothesis, Kmenta and Smith demonstrate the impact of a 
change in so-called 'liquid assets• (Lt) which, according to the model, 
operates to change GNP by increasing consumption via equation (2.29). 
The effects of a change in this variable are very much weaker than those 
resulting from a change in the money supply. 
In contrast to the ~1oroney-Mason results, Kmenta and Smith 
find that the long run multiplier for government expenditure is slightly 
higher than the long run multiplier for the money variable. Table 2.XIII 
below sets out the dynamic multipliers, for the time path of GNP for 
both studies, for government expenditure and the monetary variable. 
As the table shows, government expenditure in the Moroney-Mason model 
has its major impact in the quarter in which the change occurs. Beyond 
LAG (k) 
-----·--··-·-
0 
1 
2 
3 l 
4 I 
5 
I 6 
I 7 
8 
9 
I 
10 I 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
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TABLE 2. XII 
_p_xn_~~~j c ~~(!_!j_2_}_j_5?_!_~_f._o l~---~t~~-lji~~-1' at h 
of GNP for G and M Variables 
-----~--------·-·~---~--~·-·-------
MM KS M~1M 
Gt-k Gt-k t-·k 
·-~·---·~-~-·--
1.225 1.143 0.586 
0.372 0.980 0.968 
0. 281 0.210 I 
0.156 
0.226 0. 031 1. 983 
0.179 -0.015 0.808 
0.138 -0.029 0.650 
0.104 -0.034 0. 511 
0.076 -0.035 I 0.392 
0.053 l -0.036 0.292 
0.035 ··0.036 0.211 
0. 021 -0.035 0.145 
0. 011 -0.034 0.094 
. 
0.003 i -0.032 0.055 
-0.002 I -0.030 0.026 
I I 
-0.006 -0.028 0.002 i 
-0.008 -0.026 -0.014 
-0.009 -0.023 -0.025 
-0.009 -0.021 -0.030 
-0.009 -0.018 -0.033 
-0.008 -0.016 -0.033 
----···· ________ , ___ .:_ _________ ~ 
~1Ks 
·t-k 
0.3'17 
0.223 
0.153 I 
I 
I 0.114 I 
0.087 
0.068 
0.053 
0.041 
' 
0.032 I 
0.025 
0. 019 
0.014 
0.010 
0.007 
0.005 
0.003 I 
0. 001 
0. 00"1 
-0.001 
-0.001 
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that quarter a change in govern~ent expenditure exerts only minor 
influence. The Kmenta-Smith study reveals that government expenditure 
has its major impact in the first two quarters of the change eventually 
becoming mildly depressing after 4 quarters. 
The monetary variable in the t1oroney-f•iason model tends to 
exert a strong influence over a period of 4 to 5 quarters and becomes 
mildly depressing after 15 quarters. On the other hand, the Kmenta-
Smith study shows a much weaker impact for the monetary variable, even 
though it becomes mildly depressing after 18 quarters. 
An examination of the cumulative or long-run mutlipliers is 
also informative in revealing the differences between the two studies 
in terms of the impact of the monetary and fiscal variables on GNP. 
Table 2.XIV below gives the long-run multipliers for the monetary and 
fiscal variables from these studies. In the case of the Krnenta-Snnth 
results, only the multiplier for the money supply is calculated since 
the 'liquid assets• multiplier operating through consumption is basically 
insignificant. 
2.XIV 
Cumulative ~1ultioliet'S for G and n ----~-------'--------· 
Variables for Time Path of GNP 
,----·------.----·---
After 
0 
l year 
2 years 
3 years 
4 years 
5 years 
GM~11 
--·-~-
1. 225 
2.104 
2.601 
2. 721 
2.708 
2.673 
GKS M~1~i 
1.143 0. 586 
2.364 3.693 
2. 251 I 6.054 2.110 6.696 
1. 994 6.765 
1. 916 6.644 
0.317 
0.807 
1. 056 
l. 146 
1 . 171 
1 . 171 
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The above tabulation once again highlights the influence 
that the t·1oroney-Hason monetary variable has over periods after the 
initial change. The Moroney-Mason results support the contention 
that, although government expenditure has a stronger initial impact, 
the monetary instrument has a stronger overall influence on economic 
activity. Convetsely, the Kmenta-Smith study supports the suggestion 
that fiscal policy, in the form of a change in government expenditure, 
has both a greater initial impact and a slightly greater overall 
influence on the time path of GNP than does the monetary vatiable operating 
through both the interest rate and consumption. 
The t1oroney-~1ason study can be considered superior to the 
Krnenta-Smith model on several counts. Firstly, it defines the supply 
of money as being endogenous. Secondly, it tests the monetary base as 
a possiole policy instrument, and finally, it contains another possible 
instrument in the form of the rediscount rate. Once again, however', 
these two models, which can be taken as representative of the small, 
structural model approach to studying monetary and fiscal behaviour, 
fail to tackle the problem raised by the possibility of the monetary 
policy instrument being endogenously set or manipulated in response to 
prescribed eco~omic or financial objectives. 10 In this respect then, 
the structural model approach fails in the same sense as the earlier 
F-M and A-J approach fail to gain a concensus of opinion on an 
autonomous or exogneous monetary policy variable. Gramlich [24, 
pp. 513-15], in his evaluation of the two approaches, alludes to the 
10. It is assumed that within the confines of a quarterly model, the 
government expenditure variable is always exogenous. Thus, the 
problem centres solely on the monetary variable. 
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fact that the structural approach appears superior on one other issue: 
the structural models' attempt to define the instruments of monetary 
policy. However, these structural model studies are open to the same 
criticisms regarding their treatment of the policy instruments. The 
structural model studies also fail to recc:Jnize the fact that the 
moneta~y policy variable may not be exogenous. That is, it may be set 
or manipulated in response to certain economic targets. In other words, 
the two structural model approaches described above both fail to 
consider· the impact of monetar~y policy set in a non-random manner as 
an anti-cyclical stabi-lization tool. The Kmenta-Smith study fa"ils even 
to consider the possibility that the money supply (however defined) may 
not be the appropriate policy instrument but may be more accurately 
defined as a proximate target. 11 The Mor~ney-Mason study also contains 
a ~veakness in this regard, in that it treats the monetary base as the 
monetary policy instrument. It ·is more realistic to argue that open 
market operations or the rediscount rate (for the United States) are 
the directly manipulated instruments. 
One Australian study which has attempted to utilize the 
structural l!iodel framework to test the effectiveness of monetary and 
fiscal policy is that of Zerby [47]. Zerby integrates both monetary 
and real variables into his model, but emphasizes that his experiments 
relate primari"ly to monetary policy. 
The monetary sector of Zerby's model consists of an equation 
for interest rates and one for 'liquid assets'. The short-term rate of 
---·----------·------------··---------·----------· 
11. A 'proximate target' is a variable which is controlled by a policy 
instrument in order to influence an ultimate target. For example, 
open market operations as a policy instrument effect the monetary 
base (the proximate target) in order to influence inflation or 
unemployment (ultimate targets). 
6t~. 
interest (R2) is expressed as a function of the demand for money 
(represented by income, YDt), the supply of money (represented by liquid 
assets, At) and the lagged rate of interest: 
The liquid asset variable is assumed to be dependent on income, the 
rate of interest, the previous level of liquid assets and a variable 
which reflects monetary policy (Pt). In this model Zerby takes the 
SRD ratio and the cash base (Kt) as potential instruments. 
The Zerby model consists of ll equations and 4 identities 
and the estimates are based on annual data for the period 1949-1965, using OLS 
and two- and three-stage-least-squares. The model takes the following 
for·m: 
(2.34) 
(2.35) 
(2.36) 
(2.37) 
(2.38) 
(2.39) 
(2.40) 
(2.41) 
Rl 0 "' t 
vet 
YN 
E t 
t 
-· 
-· 
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i 0 + i 1R2t + i 2Rl0t-l 
jo + jlEt + j2Yet-·1 
ko + klYt + k2YNt-l 
where COt = consumer durable expenditure 
YNt = non-farm personal income 
y~·t = farm income 
TPt = personal income taxes (yield) 
R2. = short-term rate of interest (.: 
CNt = consumer non-durable expenditure 
ID+ =investment in priyate dwellings 
IF~ = gross private fixed investment 
L 
Yet = company income 
RlOt = long term rate of interest 
TCt - company tax (yield) 
L'lSt = change in non-farm stocks 
St = non-farm stocks 
L'lNSt = change in farm stocks 
Bt = trading bank advances to business 
Yt - gross national product 
(2.42) 
(2.43) 
(2.44) 
(2.46) 
( 2. 47) 
(2.48) 
~1t - imports 
xt -· exports 
At - liquid assets 
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YDt - total personal disposable income 
Kt -- cash base 
SRDt = statutory reserve deposit ratio 
Et = total domestic expenditures 
Gt - government expenditure on goods and services 
- fixed government enterprise investment 
Zerby obtains the reduced form of the set of equations and 
computes the 'delay 1 multipliers using the lagged v~lues of the endogenous 
variables. These multipliers trace out the time path of an exogenous 
change with all other time paths held constant. Zerby performs 
•sensitivity' tests by means of simulated changes in structural 
coefficients. This method of simulation is different from the usual 
method where definite values are given to the exogenous variables and 
are used, along with the disturbance or error term, to generate values 
of the endogenous variables. On the other hand, Zerby's method consists 
of changing the estimated coefficient value for various endogenous 
variables and then computing the time path for the one unit change in 
the exogenous variable. 
From his tests Zerby concludes, among other things, that 
monetary policy tends to require more 'fine tuning' than fiscal policy. 
Monetary actions have a tendency, in the model, to be destabilizing 
and, although this can be minimized by increasing the responsiveness of 
expenditures to the interest rate, this can only be done at the expense 
of a reduction in the marginal effectiveness of monetary policy. 
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Although Zerby provides no figures for the delay multipliers 
accumulated over each of the 6 periods, it is possible to obtain these 
by interpretation from his graphs. Only those delay mdltipl·Jers for 
the effect of the monetary (SRD decrease) and the fiscal (government 
expenditur(~ increase) po 1 icy vari ab 1 es on GNP are tabulate d. The 
results of the estimation give the following delay multipliers: 
TABLE 2.XV 
-----·-·~--..... 
Delay Multipliers for GNP 
-~----·---···-·-··-----··-·-
One Unit Change in: 
-----·----'~-
-----------------··-..,r·--··--------·------··-·--;----------------·-·-, 
Lag ( k) 
--------··-··-·--·---------·--------+-----------·----------·: 
0 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
2.66 
1.40 
1.26 
l. 26 
1. 55 
1.80 
2.26 
1.40 
2.53 
3.80 
5.26 
6.93 
8.66 
10.93 
-------·------- ___________________ _... ___________________ ~ 
The initial impact of the change in G is very close to the 
impact muHiplier of 2.47 wh·ich is obta·ined by Kmenta [29] in another 
Australian model. Kmenta's model, however, does not contain a monetary 
sector and is not analysed in this section. 
Zerby's model contains a monetary sector which is a distinct 
improvement on the sectors contained in the ~1oroney-Mason and Krnenta-
Smith models. Zerby recognizes the fact that the 'proper' monetary 
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instrument is the SRD ratio. He errs, however, by suggesting that the 
cash base (Kt) is another potential instrument. The monetary 
authorities in Australia have a direct influence on thG size of the 
base. This is effected through control of Reserve Bank holdings of 
Government securities which form one of t~e sources of the base. 
However, the proportion of the base made up by the holdings of 
securities is only small, and is thus insufficient to offset any 
uncontrolled influences on the base as a whole. 
2. 1. 4 ~u~ni_na lL 
Attempts to compare the relative strengths of monetary and 
fiscal policy have generally proceeded in two directions. One of the 
earliest attempts, epitomizing the direct estimation or 1 reduced form' 
approach is the Friedman-Meiselman study. This VJas follO\r.Jed up, and 
significantly improved by, the Anderser:-Jordan study severa 1 years 
later. Basically several criticisms and weaknesses are inherent in the 
F-~1 approach. The major weaknesses have already been discussed; 
disagreement over the data period, the possibility of a time trend 
distorting the results~ and the difficulty in defining a truly exogenous 
expenditure and monetary variable. 
The A-L1 study attempts to remedy these 1 imitations by using 
post-war quarterly data, estimating using first differences, using 1 high 
employment' fiscal variables and by using both the money supply and the 
monetary base as monetary variables. However, the literature which 
follows the publication of this study shows only too clearly that the 
problems are far from resolved. The A-J study still fails on the test 
of adequately defining a satisfactory exogenous monetary and fiscal 
policy variable. 
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The second approach to comparing the relative strengths of 
monetary and fiscal policy is through the use of structural models. 
Two of the attempts which directly attack this problem are the Moroney-
Mason study and the Kmenta-Smith study. Both these studies, which are 
basically similar in their approach, can be regarded as a significant 
improvement on the simplified reduced form approach. Both however, 
fail to recognize the possibility of their monetary variables being set 
endogenously in response to changes in economic conditions. The 
Australian study by Zerby also fails in this respect. Furthermore the 
Moroney-Mason and the Kmenta-Smith studies both fail to take account of 
the fact that the money supply may not be the monetary policy variable. 
Thus, the discussion of these two differing approaches to the 
monetary-·fisr::al debate has opened up tvto significant problems. 
(i) the general problem of endogeneity especially in regard 
to monetary policy variables; 
(ii) the •instrument-target• problem which deals with the 
recognition of the fact that variables such as the 
money supply, or the monetary base may, in fact, not be 
the real instruments of monetary policy. 
These two problems are discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
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APPENDIX 2A 
In the Brunner-Metzler model, the narrowly defined money 
stock (M) is given as the product of a money multiplier (m) and the 
monetary basP (B): 
M = mB 
The money multiplier is defined as: 
m = 
where k = ratio of currency held by the non-bank public to private 
demand deposits 
t -· ratio of private time deposits to private demand deposits 
d -· ratio of Government deposits at commercial banks to 
private demand deposits 
r = ratio of total commercial bank reserves to total bank 
deposits. 
See: Burger, A. 'An Analysis and Development of the Brunner-Metzler 
Non-Linear Money Supply Hypothesis.' Working Paper No. 7 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. May 1969. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE PROBLEM OF ENDOGENEITY 
----·~-·~~--.-·---------¥~-----~--~----
The publication of the Friedman-Meiselman anG the Andersen-
Jordan studies evokes criticism which applies equally to both studies. 
The endogeneity problem underlies much of tMis criticism, but comes to 
light more clearly in the discussion of the Andersen-Jordan work. This 
chapter discusses the problem of endogeneity in general and illustrates 
the erroneous nature of comparing monetary and fiscal policy in a 
situation where the policy variables are incorrectly treated as exogenous. 
Much of the work in the area originates from the detailed study by 
Goldfeld and Blinder [6]. A second section of the chapter investigates 
previous work in the estimation of •reaction functions• which are seen 
to be a natural corollary of the endogeneity problem. Some criticisms 
of the previous reaction function approach are then analysed especially 
in rE:gard to the monetary policy variable. In particular, the problem 
of a correct definition of the monetary policy variable ·is analysed. 
Finally, the aspect of instrument •assignment• is discussed and its link 
with the endogeneity problem examined. 
De Leeuw and Kalchbrenner [2] put forward the first major 
criticisms which tend to cast doubt on the reliability of the A-J results. 
The main criticism is that the A-J model does not employ policy variables 
which are strictly exogenous. That is, they are not subject to control 
by the policymakers, and are unresponsive to current endogenous forces. 
De Leeuw and Kalchbrenner bring the problem clearly into focus by 
describing the two different ways in which the A-J studies can be viewed. 
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Firstly, the equations can be seen as attempts to use multiple regression 
to measure the influence of certain exogenous policy variables on 
national ·income. Secondly, t!.ey can be viewed as reduced forms of a 
more complex econometric model. In this type of model, the current 
endogenous variables are assumed to depend on lagged endogenous and 
other exogenous variables. 
The whole basis of de Leeuw and Kalchbrenner's criticism 
lies in the different definitions of 'exogenous' used in these two views 
of the A~·J system. In the first instance, the term 'exogenous' refers 
to variables that can be directly controlled by the policymakers. In 
the second case, the term 'exogenous • refers to variables which are not 
affected by current movements in the endogenous variables. Here, the 
statistical requirement is that the exogenous variables are independent 
of the disturbance term in the equation. This assumption is crucia 1 
since, if the exogenous variable is not independent of the disturbance 
tenn, it is impossible to detect the direction of influence or the 
seriousness of bias in the equation. On the other hand, if the variable 
does not meet the first requirement, it cannot be considered to be an 
effective policy instrument. 
Although A-J are apparently a~vare of this problem when they 
define their policy variables, they do not, according to de Leeuw and 
Kalchbrenner, go far enough in removing the influence of current movements 
in economic activity from these variables. Generally however, the use of 
the reduced form approach of A-J and F-M makes it very difficult to devise 
variables that meet the two exogeneity requirements. This stems from the 
fact that firstly, the policy variables are influenced by economic 
developments, and secondly, policy makers are influenced by current 
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economic developments in their decisions. In other words the notion 
of exogeneity in policy variables on the one hand, and the ex·istence 
of deliberate stabilization policy on the other, is com~letely 
contradictory. 
The problem of endogeneity in t~r A-J study, and in other 
reduced form studies in general, is discussed widely by many critics. 
Keran [15] emphasizes that the single equation approach makes no mention 
of the monetal~y and fiscal policy decisions of the relevant authorities. 
Keran argues that the r·elevant pol icy vadables only represent a measure 
of the act,1al policy intentions of the authorities if it can be shovm 
that the policy makers act consciously to systematically control them. 
Keran stresses that this type of evidence ca.n only come from studies of 
the so-called 'reaction functions' of the policy makers, in which a 
relationship is established between the policy instruments and the 
independent target variables. 
The idea that policy instruments used in either reduced form 
studies, or even in structural model studies, can be endogenous has been 
put forward by other critics as well. Karaken a~d Solow [14] in their 
study of monetary policy lags make the ~o~nt that a perfectly successful 
monetary policy, as far as forecasting and stabilization is concerned, 
shows a zero correlation between monetary change and the level of 
economic activity. Similar conclusions are also suggested by Rhomberg 
[24] and Shariro [25] and the general problem of correlation between 
targets and instruments is discussed by Prest [22], IJlorswick [28] and 
Pes ton [21]. 
Gramlich [7], in a study which concentrates on the relative 
impact of monetary and fiscal poiicy, suggests the inclusion of policy 
instruments in the welfare function of the stabilization authorities. 
He also highlights the question of whether or not the actions of the 
monetary authority an: entirely exogenous. Gramlich su~Jgests that the 
problem of the enclogeneity of stabilization authorities is not important 
if their actions •cto not respond immediately to stabilization needs• 
[7, p. 52]. This latter point means, in effect, that the problem of 
endogeneity of pol icy actions is not important if thE! response of the 
authorHies to the endogenous forces in the economy occur with a lag. 
That is, if they occur in a period other than the current quarter. 
The same point is made by Rhomberg [24] in comments on 
Gramlich•s paper. Rhomberg suggests that one of the difficulties 
involved in estimating the impacts of monetary and fiscal policy on 
economic activity is the fact that instruments of stabilization policy 
cannot be regarded as exogenous (or predetermined) in the exogenous 
sense, • ... because if they really were exogenous, they would not be 
conducive to stabilization• [24, p. 548]. 
Rhomberg suggests that it is not possible to accurately test 
the rel<:1tive impacts of monetary and fiscal policy as long as monetary 
policy is used more actively for stabilization purposes than fiscal 
policy. This conclusion follows because, if a stabilization authority 
is able to forecast accurately, and stabilize income perfectly, any 
reduced form regression which uses a monetary policy variable as a 
determinant of GNP yields an insignificant regression coefficient for 
that policy var·iable. The same idea is also stressed by Shapiro [25] who 
suggests that where the monetary authorities are able to perfectly 
forecast future events, a reduced form regression analysis of the 
monetal'Y var-iable on GNP would show up large variations in the monetary 
variable with no movements in GNP. 
77. 
One of the first major attempts to investigate the 
implications of the endogeneity-exogeneity problem is contained in an 
article by Goldfeld and Blinder [6]. In this study, the authors discuss 
the problems encountered in econometric studies when the policy variables 
treated as ex:,,genous are, in fact, endogenous. f.. simple illustration 
of these problems is presented with the aid of a representative structural 
model in which there are control instruments for each of the two 
stabilization authorities. National income is assumed to be determined 
by a single stochastic relationship relating consumption (C) to income (Y) 
with a stochastic element (~). 
( 3. 1 ) 
The equilibrium condition is: 
(3.2) 
where I - investment demands 
and G = government demands. 
The Gt element is assumed to be controlled by the fiscal 
authority and the It element is controlled by the monetary authority. 
Goldfeld and Blinder suggest that problems will arise if the policy 
instruments. even though exogenous in the economic sense, are related 
to some endogenous variables in the model. 
For example, A-J, ·in their monetary--fiscal study, make use 
of the reduced form to estimate the relevant policy multipliers by 
ordinary-1 east-squares. That is, the reduced form given by the fall ow·i ng: 
a Gt It llt 
y t ::: ---··--- + --~··--- + --·---- + ----1-b 1-b 1-b 1-b (3.3) 
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In the Goldfeld--Bl·inder example this expression is estimated by 
ordinary-least-squares, and the estimated coefficients of Gt and It 
are taken as the fiscal and monetary multipliers, respectively. This 
method produces satisfactory results only as long as the policy variables 
are known to be exogenous in the statisticel sense. If policy is 
formulated endogenously then Gt and It may be correlated with the 
disturbance term, ~· Thus, the whole thrust of Goldfeld and Blinder•s 
argument is that equation (3.3) is not a true reduced form equation, 
and a specification error is introduced by treating Gt and It as 
exogenous when they are, in fact, endogenous. 
Goldfeld and Blinder also argue that the interpretation of 
the reduced form coefficients as policy multipliers in (3.3) is extremely 
misleading, unless the policy variables are endogenous. They maintain 
that, if endogenous policy is treated as exogenous the effective use of 
stabilization pol icy wil"l result in a small and statistically insignificant 
multiplier. On the other hand, ineffective use of stabilization policy 
will result in a large and stat-istically significant multiplier. 
This aspect of the problem i~ illustr?.ted by Goldfeld and 
Blinder with the use of two hypothet·ical •reaction functionS 1 v-1hich 
assume that the policy makers are reaching endogenously to economic 
conditions. Even if the estimation biases are negligible, thus making 
the estimated coefficients a and bin equation (3.1) reasonably accurate, 
the continued ignorance of these policy reaction functions results in 
biased estimates of the policy multipliers. 
Suppose, for example, that the policy authorities are reacting 
endogenously to economic conditions, then they may have a long run 
desired path for their policy instruments which can be formalized as 
follows: 
(3.4) 
(3.5) 
. * * * In th1s ex3mple, Gt, It and Yt are the target values of the variables, 
and g and m are the reaction coefficients. 
If the reaction functions are ignored, then the normal policy 
multiplier obtained from (3.1) and (3.2) is as follows: 
dY 
::::: dG 1-=-b- and 
dY l 
= elf Gb (3.6) 
On the other hand, acknowledgement of the existence of reaction functions 
results in pol icy multipliers (by computation from equations (3.1), (3.2), 
(3.4) and (3.5)) of the form: 
and dY CiT* (3. 7) 
Goldfeld and Blinder suggest that the multiplier bias is more 
likely to occur in the estimation of monetary policy multipliers. In 
the monetary ar·ea, the decision period for stabilizat·ion policy is often 
shorter than the quarterly data period most often used in econometric 
models. In these types of models, the effect of the decision peY'iod 
being shorter than the data period is to hold the policy instrument constant 
throughout the quarter. Goldfeld and Blinder maintain that there is no 
reason, in practice, for an authority to be bound, for the entire quarter, 
by any initial decision. Their basic contention is that the continual 
revision of data needed for forecasting purposes emphasizes the need for 
a prompt adjustment of initial forecasts, and consequently, for prompt 
alteration of policy instruments. 
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The constant revision of the stabilization tools, due to 
alterations to initial forecasts, has the effect of imparting 
contemporaneous correlation between the policy variables and the 
disturbance terms. Equations (3.4) and (3.5) above are specific examples 
of how the policy instruments, Gt and It' used in Goldfeld and Blinder•s 
model,can become negatively correlated with the disturbance term of the 
partial reduced form. However, if the policy makers react only with a 
lag and there is no autocorrelation in the disturbance term, the 
multipliers calculated from such a system will be unbiased. If there 
is autocorrelation present the bias will persist. That is, lags which 
may occur in the reaction of the authorities to current endogenous forces 
will tend to eliminate any simultaneous equation bias if the disturbance 
term is independent over time, and not serially correlated. 
The study by Goldfeld and Blinder stresses the necessity for 
deriving estimates of monetary and fiscal policy multipliers from a 
structural model in preference to the A-J reduced form approach. They 
also concede that even the structural model view does not resolve the 
endogeneity problem discussed above. The problem can be resolved only by 
comb·i ni ng a structura 1 mode 1 approach with reaction functions describing 
the manipulation of policy instruments in response to movements in various 
targets of economic policy. In line with this view, Goldfeld and Blinder 
estimate the Moroney-Mason model of the United States economy [18], and 
include hypothetically estimated reaction functions. These functions 
relate the two stabilization instruments, given as unborrowed reserves 
plus currency, and government purchases, contemporaneously to growth, 
interest rate and external balance targets. These functions are 
hypothetically estimated, by setting their parameters to correspond with 
BL 
a less active fiscal policy. 1 Goldfeld and Blinder are able to conclude 
that the incorrect treatment of policy instruments as exogenous has no 
significant effect on the estimates of the structural e~uations. Rather~ 
the authors show that the benefit of including the reaction functions in 
the simple model becomes apparent in the calculation of the fiscal and 
monetary multipliers. They find that the policy multipliers obtained from 
the model which ignores the endogeneity problem differ substantially from 
those obtained from the model augmented by the reaction equations. 
The above discussion and summary of the endogeneity problem 
establishes the fact that it is important to attempt to detennine the 
nature of reaction functions. This follows from the-conclusion that 
serious bias results in the comparison of the relative strengths of 
monetary and fi sea 1 po 1 icy in those cases v'!here an endogenously deterrni n':!d 
policy instrument is incorrectly treat~d as exogenous. The following 
section will focus on a number of previous attempts to estimate reaction 
functions for the monetary sector. From this review of the 1 iterature 
it is hoped to pinpoint the weaknesses and pitfalls of the various 
approaches, especially in relation to the probleM of adequately choosing 
the appropriate instrument. 
One of the earliest studies attempted in this area is one by 
Dewald and Johnson [3] who argue that the monetary authorities have 
certain economic policy objectives in mind in all their monetary policy 
changes. The authors perform statistical regressions using quarterly 
1. In later tests, the authors altered the coefficients of the functions 
to correspond to alternative monetary and fiscal policies. 
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data for the period 1952(1) to 1961(4). The objectives or targets are 
defined as price stability, high employment, a satisfactory balance of 
payments and economic growth. For these targets the authors use the 
Consumer Price Index (Pt), the unemployment percentage (Ut) ~ the balance 
of payments deficit (Bt) and real gross national product (Yt). Taking 
the reaction function with the money supply (Mt) as the dependent 
variable, the following equation is tested: 
(3.8) 
Dewald and Johnson emphasize that the use of the money supply as the 
policy instrument or indicator 'does not necessarily establish the money 
supply as the contr'ol variable actually used by the monetary authorities' 
[3, p. 174]. 
Only the first three independent variables prove to be 
statistically significant in the estimation. Dewald and Johnson make use 
of their estimated function to analyse the 'tradeoff 1 between the 
independent variables and the money supply. Also, they investigate the 
distributed lag reaction structure by assuming that the money supply 
indicator is subject to an exponentially diminishing distributed lag. 
The more important result of this test is that the weighted average lag 
in reaction is found to be more than three quarters. According to the 
authors, this finding raises important questions concerning the flexibi1ity 
of monetary policy. 
The authors also experiment with various indicators of money 
market conditions, namely the Treasury bill rate, the Treasury long term 
bond rate, and free bank reserves. The latter indicator is insignificant, 
but significant results are obtained with the first two. In general, 
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however, the authors conclude th~t only the unemployment and the growth 
targets remain consistently significant as economic targets with all the 
postulated policy indicators. Also, from their experiments with the 
distributed lag techn·ique, they argue that the monetary authorities 
appear to react more quickly to the economic targets if they aim to 
control money market conditions rather than the quantity of money. 
Although not producing any new ideas in regard to the 
estimation of a reaction function, Christian [1] emphasizes two important 
faults of the Dewald-Johnson analysis. Firstly, no attempt is made to 
report on the stability of the regression coefficients for the purposes 
of deter·m·ining whether or not a temporally consistent policy making 
frameV'JOrk exists. 2 The consequence of this instability is that the 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is unstable over time, making 
the distributed lag formulation, used by Dewald and Johnson, unreliable 
for estimating the lagged response. The second major criticism 
suggested by Christian is the impossibility of disentangling the combined 
influence of weight and effect from the regression coeffic-ients obtained 
in a reaction function estimation. In this regard, Christian queries the 
desirability of assuming that policy objectives can be treated as 
independent of one another. 
To measure the stability or instability of the reaction functions, 
Christian makes use of •moving regressions• of 20 observations each for 
the period 1952(1) to 1966(4). The use of these moving regressions helps 
2. Christian argues that a •temporally consistent policy making 
framework• simply means that the relative weights attached to each 
coefficient do not change over time. According to Christian, the 
single period estimation used by Dewald and Johnson gives no idea 
of how these relative weights change over time. 
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to eliminate the arbitrary selection of initial and terminating dates. 
His major contention, in using this approach, is that if the coefficients 
are shown to be unstable, the monetary authority is unlikely to have any 
consistent set of decision rules for the achievement of different 
objectives. Christian also defines •periods of concern' for particular 
economic targets. By taking moving averages of the values of each of 
the targets, Christian denotes 'periods of concern• as those which show 
a relatively large change in the value of the moving average from period 
to period. He argues that large regression coefficients for each of tne 
targets should be associated with the 1 periods of concern' for those 
particular targets. 
Christian uses the same four po-l icy ta1Agets as used by Dewald 
and Johnson. He also experiments with one other derived from taking the 
difference between desired and actual income. In general, he finds that 
a reasonably consistent policy formulation framework does exist. Thus, 
the periods of concern for each of the economic targets are closely 
associated with large regression coefficients for these targets. However, 
there is a certain degree of i~consistency with respect to the price 
stability and balance of payments objectives which, Christian suggests, 
can be either due to a non-linear response or, to the fact that the 
response to inflation is dependent on the achievement of the full 
employment objectives. He also finds a genera·! instability in the 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable. This suggests that the 
distributed lag formulation, as used by Dewald and Johnson, is unreliable. 
Using an analysis similar to Dewald and Johnson, both Reuber 
[23] and Havrilesky [8] run multiple regressions of certain indicators 
of monetary policy on various economic tal''gets. Havrilesky makes use of 
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one indicator, defined as total reserves adjusted for legal reserve 
requirement changes, whilst Reuber tests the money supply, cash reserves 
and the Treasury Bill rate, Reuber's study uses similar targets to the 
Dewald-Johnson study; full employment, price stability and economic 
growth. Havrilesky also uses these targets and, in addition, uses an 
external tal'get. Havrilesky' s reaction function takes the following 
form: 
where Y - gross national product 
U = percentage unemployment 
P = Wholesa1e Price Index, base 1958 = 100 
P' = Wholesale Price Index goal, bases 1952-57 = 92; 
1958-65 - 100 
B = balance of payments deficit or surplus 
(3.9) 
if = average of several overseas long term government bond yields. 
The response of the policy indicato~to changes in the economic targets, 
is linear in all cases except for price inflation. Because of the uneven 
increase in this target during the period analysed, Havrilesky assumes 
two price level targets. He also introduces these into the equation in 
squared form. The purpose of this is to effect policy reactions to 
increases in the price level above these two target levels. According 
to Havrilesky's results the monetary policy indicator responds to all the 
specified targets except for the balance of payments. 
Reuber's study, although adhering to the three main targets 
of price stability, growth and unemployment, experiments with several 
variations. For ·instance, he tests the recipt'ocal and the square of the 
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unt:mployment percentage, a productivity index as a proxy for gr·owth and 
various loglrithmic forms of the equation. After several experiments 
Reuber disnrisses cash rese1nves and the Treasury b'ill rate as potential 
indicators, and selects the money supply, both real and nominal. as the 
best performed. The eventual form of his function is as follows: 
(3.10) 
vJhere M - money supply 
~·l 
unemployment percentage u -" 
e -· producti v·i ty index 
p 
-· consumer pY'i ce index. 
Reuber fillds simi"lar results to Havrilesky but also notes an oscillatory 
reaction pattern probably implying that the authorities react to changes 
in the economy by a process of •successive approximation•. Here they 
observe errors in the peY'formance of the economy, such as increasing 
unemployment or declin·ing income, and they react accordingly. 
One of the first signs of increasing sophistication in the 
study of reaction functions is evident in the work done by Wood [27]. 
His study advances the argument a stage further and postulates more 
realistic monetary pol·icy instt·uments. Instead of assuming that the 
monetary authority actually uses the money supply or bank reserves as the 
policy instrument, Wood is more realistic. He postulates that the 
Federal Reserve manages its portfo 1 i o of gover·nment securities in order 
to maximize utility, subject to the constraints imposed by the economy. 3 
3. Wood 1 S mathematical derivation of the form of reaction equations is 
set out in Appenuix 4A at the end of Chapter 4. 
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Consequently, his work cr'iticizes the approach of Dewald and aohnson. 
He maintains that their study falls short of an analysis of Federal 
Reserve behaviour in that they treat the so-called 'intermediate 
financial variables' as policy instruments. Wood argues that the 
Dewald-Johnson approach4 can only cast light on Federal Reserve behaviouv· 
if the intermediate financial variables are completely contr·olled by the 
monetary authorities, and are actually manipulated as policy instruments. 
A somewhat different approach is used by Keran and Babb [16] 
who link the monetary base to a free reserves target, an 'even keel' 
target (the change in the national debt held outside Federal Government 
trust accounts), and an interest rate stability target. The free reserves 
target is used as a proxy for the usual economic targets used in the 
previous reaction function studies. The authors put forward the argument 
that it is possible to relate changes in the level of free reserves with 
the direct-ives of the Federal Open Market Committee. These are aimed at 
the maintenance of full employment, price stability, growth and external 
balance. Keran and Babb pr·efet' changes in the cash base of the economy 
to opE!n market operations as the major monetat~y pol icy instrument. Tfle 
cash base is not used to smooth out any fluctuations in the level of free 
bank reserves. 
Keran and Babb argue that the use of the cash base is justified 
by the drawbacks inherent in previous studies which relate objectives or 
targets to instruments. The major drawbask is that the policy objectives 
may not be independent of each other. Secondly, the preferences of the 
policy maker, with respect to achieving desired levels of alternate 
4. And, by implication, the other studies by Reuber, Havr"ilesky etc. 
which use intermediate variables as instruments. 
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targets, may be interdependent. Finally, the observed values of the 
target variables may differ very little during the period being studied, 
thus making diff·icult any attempt to quantify the l-ink between actual 
and desired levels of the targets. In general, Keran and Babb conclude 
that the behav·iour of the monetary authority ·is cons ·i stent over the 
period studied with the various stabilization objectives. They find 
that the Federal Reserve tends to concentrate on 'even-keel' and 
financial objectives, which may interfere with economic stabilization 
objectives. 
Further work is also carried out in this m~ea by Lombra and 
Torte [17] who attempt to test the basic hypothesis that 'the majority 
of open market operations can be explained by the systematic response of 
the Federal Reserve to changes in economic activity' [17, p. 50]. The 
authors conclude that the monetary authorities use open market operations 
as a 'defensive' instrument to offset changes in the monetary base and to 
accommodate changes in the demand for deposits and currency. 
The work of both Fisher [4] and Nobay [20] is concerned with 
a direct estimate of reaction.functions for sever·al instruments of 
British monetary policy; the Bank rate, Special Deposits, hire purchase 
controls, the liquid-assets ratio, the Treasury Bill rate, the 2~ per cent 
Consul, the Bank of England portfolio of Government securities, and a 
quantitative instrument, the Advances Ceiling. Fisher concentrates 
primarily on the first three of these monetary instruments as the more 
important and attempts to relate each to three target variables; the 
the price level and the 5 l eve 1 of gold reserves, rate of unemployment. 
-----------------
5. Fisher finds the growth variable to be insignificant as a monetary 
target. 
89. 
Generally, he is able to find a significant reaction to all three 
targets. 
Nobay's work is of more interest because he experiments 
with a fiscal policy surrogate6 and also allows for possible inter-
dependencies between the monetary policy ir:struments. For this purpose, 
he experiments with the inclusion of moneta1rty policy instruments as 
dependent variables in other monetary reaction functions. This approach 
was originally used by Dewald and Johnson who included the money supply 
'instrument' in their reaction function for free bank reserves. Nobay 
also includes other financial objectives along with the usual economic 
stabilization targets. 
Nobay's paper differs somewhat from previous reaction function 
studies because of his above-mentioned exp~riments. He finds, for 
example, that the inclusion of the fiscal surrogate (in the form of a 
measure of the cumulative impact of the 'first-round' effects on GNP of 
defined taxation changes) substantially improves the estimated relation-
ships. Also, the simultaneous introduction of the other policy 
instruments, in the reaction function, leads to satisfactory results. 
This finding is backed up by the fact tha·~: the results obtained using 
either two-stage-least-squares or the full-information-maximum-likelihood 
method differ considerably from those obtained using ordinary-least-
squares. 
6. Several attempts at derivation of appropriate fiscal indicators 
were carried out in the United States in the original work on the 
Andersen-Jordan approach. These usually took the form of 1 initial 
stimulus 1 or 'full employment 1 measures. The surrogate used h~re 
by Nobay has been derived from work done by Hopkin and Godley [10]. 
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Nobay•s findings support the ideas that variables 
conventionally assumed to be •instruments• of monetary policy have not 
always been treated as such by the monetary authorities. His findings 
also highlight the possible need to consider the general interaction 
of monetary policy setting, not only in refjard to the simultaneous 
setting of monetary instruments themselves, but also the possibility 
of an interaction between monetary and fiscal policy. One further 
aspect which is brought up in Nobay•s discussion is the contention that 
monetary policy concerns itself primarily with the maintenance of 
external equilibria. Several overseas financial objectives, such as 
overseas interest rates, the forward discount rate on sterling, and 
ratios of overseas to domestic interest rates, all clearly have a role 
to play in determining the behaviour of th,2 monetary authorities. 
Later American studies increase the degree of sophistication 
of reaction function estimation, and at least one attempts to experiment 
with lag techniques other than the simple distributed lag technique of 
the earlier approaches. 7 Froyen [5], in his analysis of monetary policy 
reaction functions,uses the monetary base and experiments with monthly 
data and the Almon lag technique. This study is one of the first to 
explicitly use the work of Goldfeld and Blinder as a background for 
reactibn function estimation. Froyen emphasizes the importance of 
determining current period reactions between policy instruments and 
--------·-··-
7. For example, both Dewald and Johnson and Fisher experimented with 
the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in order to determine 
the average weighted lag of the reaction of the instrument to the 
economic targets. The expression for the weighted average lag is 
L. = b./1 - b. where b. is the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
1 l 1 1 
variable. The distributed lag itself is computed from the expression 
To = 1 - b; T1 = 1 - b
2 etc. where T is the proportion of the total 
effect realized by the end of each time period. 
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targets. However, the use of monthly data enables him to experiment 
with lags of up to three periods whilst still demonstrating the presence 
Df contemporaneous influences in terms of quarterly data. 
Th2 use of Almon lags also serves to increase the scope of the 
study, although a major flaw in Froyen 1 s study is his assumption that th~! lag 
between each of the targets and the cash base is identical. Froyen also define 
desired unemployment, a desired rate of inflation and a desired balance 
of payments target in his study. In the course of his analysis, the 
desired inflation rate of 2 per cent is altered and both higher and 
lower rates are tested. Froyen reports that .these adjustments fail to 
improve his results. A closer examination of Froyen 1 s estimation 
technique however, reveals that the use of 1 desired 1 targets has no 
influence on the outcome of his results since they are merely equivalent 
to the subtraction of a constant term from the target itself. Froyen 1 S 
reaction function takes the following form: 
P*)t . 
-1 
where M = the monetary base (the adjusted monetary base, equal to 
unborrowed reserves plus currency is also tested) 
U = the percentage unemployed 
P = the consumer price index (1958 - 100) 
B = balance of payments surplus 
Y = total manufacturing and trade sales 
0 = outstanding privately held federal Government debt. 
r = long term corporate bond rate 
FS = fun employment surplus. 
(3.11) 
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The first four variables defined above are designed to 
represent macro-economic stabilization targets. The next two (D and r) 
.. represent the influence of independent f·inancial objectives of the 
monetary authorities on monetary policy. Such an approach stems from 
the findings of Keran and Babb [16] who suggest that macroeconomic 
stabilization goals are not always important and, that other independent 
financial objectives dominate Federal Reserve policy. 
In each of three separate subperiocls studied (1953-60, 
1961-68, and 1969-72) the stabilization targets are found to have some 
influence~ in varying degrees and combinations, on monetary policy. 
Froyen is able to conclude that in the case of single equation reduced 
form models the monetary base cannot be assumed exogenous. All estimates 
of policy mu~tipliers, based on the coefficients of such a model, are 
therefore biased. 
The approach adopted by Hosek [11] assumes that the Federal 
Reserve attempts to control four monetary aggregates; the money supply, 
total member bank reserves, member bank free reserves and bank credit. 
These are assumed to influence ultimate economic targets such as 
unemployment and inflation. Instead of treating the monetary aggregntes 
as instruments, Hosek assumes them to be intermediate targets which can 
be controlled by the Federal Reserve through the use of open market 
t . 8 opera 10ns. 
8. This is the approach adopted by Wood, although that author fails to 
explicitly bring in the idea of an intennediate target. The study 
by Nobay [20] serves to place emphasis on this aspect of the monetary 
authority controlling ultimate targets by the influence of inter--
mediate variables on these ultimate targets. However, even his 
approach falls slightly short of Hosek's method of analysis. 
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Each of Hosek•s reaction function models contains three 
equations; a desired target function, an actual target function and 
an equilibrium condition. The desired target function relates the 
intermediate target to the ultimate targets of pol icy. Hosek defines 
the desired target in terms of the ultimate targets. He then defines 
the actual level of the target, equates the two and is able to derive 
a reaction function for the open market instrument. This function is 
now in terms of the ultimate targets and the various components of the 
monetary base which need to be offset in o:·der to achieve these targets. 
For example, if it is assumed that the monetary authorities desir·e to 
control the money supply in response to certain economic targets (taken 
as unemployment (U) and inflation (P)), 9 the desired money supply (M) 
function is as follows: 
M*t = a + a U + a2Pt 0 l t (3.12) 
Hosek then assumes that the monetary authorities respond to a weighted 
average of current and past values of the target variables. With 
geometrically declining weights, the desired money supply function 
becomes: 
00 00 
M* ; ip t - a0 + a1 I r Ut-i + a2 ~ r t . i=O i=O -l 
--------·-·----------------··---------------
(3.13) 
9. Hosek uses only inflation and unemployment targets for two reasons. 
Firstly, previous studies have failed to produce any significant 
results for the external target and, secondly, the objectives of 
growth and unemployment are not independent of one another. 
Higher levels of growth, for example, are associated with higher 
employment. 
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This can be written as: 
(3.14) 
The actual target function defines the money supply as the 
product of base money (B) and the money mu1tiplier (m): 
M = mB (3.15) 
Total base money can be split into holding::; of Government Securities (S} 
and the total of all other components (B0). Hence: 
M = mB O + mS ( 3 • 1 6) 
Assuming that the monetary authorities act in order to equate 
the actual level of M with the target level, the following reaction 
function is formed: 
s :::: (3.17) 
The same method is used by Hosek to obtain reaction functions 
for total reserves, free reserves and bank credit in terms of open 
market operations. Using quarterly data from 1952(1) to 1971(4) the 
equations are estimated using the ordinary-least-squares method. In most 
cases the coefficients of the inflation and unemployment targets are of 
the correct sign, although the statistical significance varies somewhat. 
Hosek also splits his test period and detects instability in all but 
one of the functions. 
One of the first Australian monetary policy reaction studiesis 
that of Jonson [12]. This study is part of an overall reaction function 
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analysis for both monetary and fiscal policy instruments. The tergets 
chosen by Jonson are designed to reflect the state of the labour market, 
the price level and the external position. These targets are represented 
respectively, by the ratio of registered job vacancies to registered 
unemployment, the consumer price index and the level of foreign reserves. 
Apart from the two monetary instruments, the SRD ratio (SRD) and 'the' 
bond rate (RGM), Jonson also tests several fiscal instruments including 
a set of tax rates and Commonwealth non-defence expenditure. Stability 
tests, as stressed by Christ·ian, are carried out by splitting the total 
sample period into two subperiods, 1959-1965 and 1966-1971. 
The function for the interest rate (RG~~1) equation requires 
modification to allow for the fact that lagged changes in the stock of 
money (M) might influence interest rate policy. This will occur if the 
money stock is growing either too rapidly or too slowly. Thus, a desired 
relationship for the interest rate is specified which postulates that an 
increase in interest rates occurs if the money stock grows too r·apid.iy. 
This r·elationship is of the form: 
( 3. 18) 
where a.1 > 0. 
From the estimated equation Jonson concludes that there is, in fact, some 
evi de nee that the rate of growth of the money stock influences interest 
rate policy. 
The SRD equation also requires some degree of modification 
because of two influences. Firstly, the ratio has a declining trend 
during the period studied, and secondly, Jonson maintains that the ratio 
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is set so as to offset the influence of variations in foreign reserves 
(FR) on bank liquidity. This relationship is of the form: 
(3.19) 
where T - time trend. 
Jonson is able to conclude that there is some evidence of a 
systematic manipulation of the policy instruments in accord with movements 
in the target variables. In the first subperiod studied, Jonson's results 
tend to support the view that fiscal policy is a more effective domestic 
policy weaoon, and monetary policy is more effective in countering 
external imbalances. For example, the interest rate instrument, as 
used by Jonson, has a greater influence on external balance. On the other 
hand, fiscal variables, in the form of government expenditure, are more 
conducive to controlling prices. In the second subperiod however, the 
issue becomes less clear and the assignment of various instruments to 
specific areas of policy, almost non-exlstent. 
3.3 Criticisms o ious reaction fu n studies 
Despite the progress made tovva Y'ds de vel oping a sat i sfactor·y 
approach to the formulation and estimation of reaction functions, at 
least two problems still exist. Firstly, there is the problem of choosing 
a suitable monetary policy instrument. Th·is inadequacy, on the part of 
nearly all previous reaction function studies, becomes of great importance 
when considered in the light of Waud's [26] arguments. Secondly, there 
is the obvious failure of previous studies to investigate the assignment 
of monetary instruments between external and internal pol icy. Both these 
difficulties are discussed in the following sections. 
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The early reaction function studies of Dewald and Johnson, 
Reuber, Havrilesky and F·isner an make use of indicators such as the 
money supp.ly for the monetary policy instrument. Dewald and Johnson 
recognize that the use of the money stock may be misleading and they 
subsequently proceed to estimate reaction functions for various 
indicators of money market aondi·tions rather than money market quantities. 
However, the use of money market variables (such as interest t'ates) 
implicitly presupposes that these are the instruments of policy. 
The work of Nobay marks a basic change in this approach and, 
in the discussion leading up to his particular study, he examines the 
problem of selection of an appropriate monetary policy instrument 
[20, pp. 294-6]. In examining the traditional framework behind the 
behaviour of the monetary authorities, Nobay stresses that it is important 
to distinguish between the instr-umen-ts of the monetary authorities~ the 
in·termedia·te targets and the uUimate targe-ts VJhich the monetary 
authorities attempt to influence. The variables treated as instruments 
must be completely under the control of the monetary authorities. They 
must also be capable of eventually influencing the ultimate tai'gets, 
either directly or indirectly, by way of the intermediate financial 
targets. In this analysis, Nobay emphasizes the need to avoid confusing 
the instrument variables .with the intermediate variables. He defines 
these intermediate variables as either inter·est rates or various financial 
quantities such as the money supply. 
A major article by Waud [26] concentrates solely on the problem 
of defining appropriate and accurate instruments, intermediate targets 
and ultimate targets. In this article, Waud is critical of the approach 
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of previous papers which assum9 that (i) the monetary authorities 
treat variables such as the money supply and interest rates as policy 
instruments~ and (ii) that there exists a perfectly unambiguous 
relationship between the money supply (or the interest rate) and the 
ultimate targets of policy. Waud argues against the assumption that 
the money supply or the ·interest rate are instruments of pol icy because 
they are not completely controlled by the monetary authorities. Waud 
maintains instead, that other variables, such as open market operations 
and reserve requirement changes are the true i nst~'uments of po·l icy. 
He classifies variables such as the money supply and the interest rate 
as ini:errnediate or proximate targets. These are influenced by the true 
instruments of policy. The intermediate or proximate targets, in turn, 
affect the ultimate targets of policy. 
After an extensive mathematical exposition Waud conclude~ 
that the moneta.ry author'ity cannot assume that a proximat~ or intermediate 
target is d good substitute for an ultimate target. He maintains that the 
monetary authority is better advised to focus on ultimate targets because 
of the unambiguous relationship between the intermediate targets and the 
ultimate targets. 
This criticism tends to show up a basic weakness in previous 
reaction function studies. The majority of these studies formulate their 
reaction functions in terms of a relationship between the intermediate 
target and the ultimate targets of policy. In doing so, they make two 
incorrect assumptions. Firstly, they postulate that an unambiguous 
relationship exists between the intermediate and the ultimate targets. 
Secondly, they suggest that intermediate targets can be correctly used 
as instruments of policy. 
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In an Australian context, the identification of the policy 
instruments and their relationship to the intermediate targets is again 
ambiguous. The credit rat·ioning instrument is clearly the SRD ratio~ 
but the identification of the market instrument is a contentious issue. 
There are two views at the official level which may be summarized in 
the argument about rates and quantities. The first view argues that the 
instrument is the set of administered rates of interest and that an 
active interest rate policy envisages a flexible attitude to these 
administered rates. Such a view also assumes that administered rates 
influence market rates. An active interest rate policy will need to be 
reinforced by open market operations. The alternative 'quantities' 
view treats open market operations as the instrument of policy. This 
instrument is reinforced by required interest rate changes. In brief, 
the 'rates' approach treats 'the' interest rate as the policy instrument. 
The Reserve Bank's holdings of securities are adjusted to suit the policy. 
The 'quantities' view treats the Reserve Bank's securities stock (S) as 
the instrument, with the interest rate being adjusted to make open 
market operations workable. 
3. 3. 2 Ass'i_g_tJment of monetary instrumen~~ 
One further drawback of the previous reaction function studies 
is their obvious failure to concentrate any attention on the assignment 
of moneta.r~y instrumentB. Munde 11' s [19] or·i g·i na 1 interpretation of the 
assignment problem suggested that, in an economy with a fixed exchange 
rate, monetary and fiscal policy instruments could be assigned to external 
and internal stabilization respectively. The approach adopted in this 
thesis differs from that taken by Mundell. Here, emphasis is given to 
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the problem of assignment of mon~tary instruments be·L-ween intel~nal and 
external stabilization targets. Thus~ it is a simple extension of the 
t~undell argument which considers monetary po"licy unsuitable for internal 
policy stablization. 
One of the major reasons for the failure of previous reaction 
function studies to analyse the assignment problem ruithin monetary 
pol icy is the fact that these studies fail to differentiate betv'Jeen 
intermediate targets and instruments. If the correct instruments had 
been used then some conclusion could have been reached as to their 
relative importance in dealing with external or internal policy 
stabilization. Instead~ however, the tendency to experiment with 
variables which are more correctly defined as intermediate or proximate 
targets means that the relative influence of the true instruments on 
external and internal stabilization is concealed. For example, by 
incorrectly using intermediate targets as instruments, one may come to 
the conclusion that the rate of interest or the money supply is strongly 
associated with movements in external targets. However, the rate of 
interest and the money supply ar'e only intemediate targets which can 
be influenced by more than one monetary instrument. Thus, no accura~e 
conclusion can be reached as to which monetary instrument is reacting to 
external disequilibria. Instead, all that can be said is that the money 
supply or the interest rate changes in order to offset or correct 
external disequilibrium. However, either of two or three monetary 
instruments could have reacted to alter the original external imbalance. 
The same argument can be used in regard to the internal targets, price 
stability and full employment. 
One further important fact also adds to the inability of the 
previous reaction function studies to detect an assignment of monetary 
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policy instruments: the unambiguous nature of the relationshio between 
the intermediate targets and_the ultimate targets. Whereas the early 
studies may not have found any reaction of their chosen monetary 
instruments to external targets, this may have been entirely due to a 
weak and stat·:stically insign·ificant relationship between these monetary 
targets and the external targets. Combining this with the fact that the 
majority of these early studies actually use incorrect monetary policy 
instruments, one can see why unsatisfactory results are often obtained 
for a response to external targets, and why there has been no adequate 
discussion or analysis of the assignment problem between various monetary 
instruments. 
Studies such as those of Dewald and Johnson and Havrilesky 
all fail to find a significant relationshi:: between the chosen monetary 
·j nstrumer,t and the externa 1 target. In addition, the Dewa l d-Johnson 
study failed to find any significant relationship between the price 
stability target and any of the money market rates or quantities tested. 
As has been emphasized, these findings may be the result of a combination 
of the above mentio~ed weaknesses in the early reaction studies. 
s~milarly, in his analysis of the various potential monetary 
'instruments' in the Appendix to his major study, Jonson, by failing to 
correctly define the proper instruments of monetary policy, leaves 
unanswered the question of the correct assignment of these instruments. 
That is, by dealing solely in terms of the money supply or the interest 
rate, Jonson is unable to infer any conclusions about the relative 
importance of various instruments of monetary policy for external or 
internal policy stabilization. Even the study by Nobay, which is 
significant in its discussion of the problems of instruments versus 
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intermediate targets, fails to explicitly study the assignment of 
monetary instruments between internal and external targets. 
3. 3. 3 i~!l}m~ 
The Friedman-Meiselman and Andersen-Jordan studies evoked 
a large amount of criticism; the most important aspect of which centred 
around the problem of def·ining a truly exogenous monetary variable. 
Rhornberg accurately establishes this inherent problem by arguing that 
the instruments of stabilization policy cannot be perfectly exogenous, 
since, if they are, they cannot be conducive to stabilization. This 
problem is also carefully examined by Goldfeld and Blinder who emphasize 
that the problem of endogeneity is more likely to exist in monetary 
variables because the decision period for monetary stabilization policy 
is often shorter than the quarterly da~a period used in most econometric 
models. The continual arrival, and subsequent revision, of new data 
relating to the settings of monetary stabflization policy serves to 
impart a contemporaneous correlation between the policy variables and 
the disturbance term. Such a contemporaneous correlation occurs in those 
cases where the policy makers react immediately (with no lag) to these 
changing economic conditions. 
Goldfeld and Blinder stress that any monetary-fiscal policy 
analysis is best carried out with the aid of a structural model rather 
than by simple reduced form analysis, typified by the Andersen-Jordan 
study. Unfortunately, the endogeneity problem still exists in structural 
models, unless the so-called 1 reaction functions 1 , describing the 
manipulation of the policy instruments in reaction to movements in 
targets of policy, are introduced into these models. 
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A review of previous reaction function studies reveals that 
many flaws exist in their construction. The most important of these is 
the incorrect treatment of 'intermediate targets• as 'instruments•, 
combined with the assumption of an unambig110US and strong link between 
such targets and the ultimate goals of policy to which they are related. 
These flaws, in turn, have led to reaction function studies which are 
deficient in at least two respects: 
(i) they incorrectly define the instrument variable. This 
will obviously result in inconsistent conclusions from 
the study; 
(ii) they ignore the problem of assignmen-t of monetary 
policy instruments. This deficiency automatically 
f1 OWS ft'Oin ( i ) . 
The following chapter discusses appropriate monetary instruments 
and targets for Australian reaction functions and details problems 
associated with data and estimation of such functions. 
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CHAPTER 4: AN AUSTRALIAN MONETARY POLICY REACTION FUNCTI 
In the previous chapter some early monetary policy reaction 
function studies were analysed within the context of the problem of 
endogeneity first discussed in Chapter 2. Several of the problems and 
basic shortcomings of these reaction function studies were highlighted, 
particularly in regard to the choice of an appropriate policy instrument 
and the lack of any study of the 1 assignment 1 problem associated with 
monetary pol·icy instruments. 
This chapter' deals vJith the major problem of identifying 
appropriate policy instruments. Background on the possible choices open 
to the Reserve Bank is presented, and two monetary instruments are 
defined. The differing impact of the two instruments on the money supply 
is demonstrated within the context of a simple model of money supply 
determination. This demonstration highlights the importance of using 
a disaggre~1ated approach and reveals the necessity to consider an 
assignment of monetary policy instruments to problems of internal and 
external balance. The problems of data and est~mation are then 
considered and the form of the function to be estimated is established. 
The following analysis centres on the reaction of the 
monetary policy ·instrurnents. In Appendix 48, it is demonstrated that 
fiscal policy instruments show little, if any, current quarter reaction 
between government expenditure and any of the suggested economic 
targets. There is, however, some evidence of a reaction to the long 
term grov1th target. ~1oroney and ~'lason [14] have already discussed 
this problem and conclude that, within the confines of a quarterly model, 
it is unrealistic to treat government expenditure as endogenous. For 
lU/ 
this reason, the problem of instrument endogeneity is discussed in 
terms of monetary policy only. 
4.1 Instruments of moneta in !\ustra 1 i a 
The central banking authority in Australia, the Reserve Bank, 
has the function of controlling the money supply, and thus the rate of 
interest and the cost of borrowing. The Bank regulates liquidity in 
the following ways: 
(a) by control.ling bank lending 
(b) by the use of bank interest rate policy 
(c) by supervising savings bank investment policy 
(d) by regulating b'ading bank liquidity 
(e) by the use of open market operations. 
The Reserve Bank has the power to determine the lending 
policies of the trading and savings banks. This is achieved through 
directives outlining the classes of purposes for which advances can 
or cannot be made. By these means, the Bank can influence both the 
volume and the distribution of bank advances. Generally, however, 
such a policy of controlling bank lend·ing by this method 1Aelies on the 
co-operation of the banks in adhering to the stated policy objectives. 
Similarly, the Bank has the authority to control the rates of interest 
paid or received by banks. Maximum rates are fixed after discussion 
between the Reserve Bank and the banks, and the banks are then required 
to observe these maximum rates. Within the maximum rate, the banks can 
vary rates for certain borrowers or classes of borrowers. Any change 
in the maximum rate, however, will usually induce a similar movement 
in other lending rates in the same direction and basically by the same 
lOg. 
amount. The Reserve Bank also supervises the investment policies of 
the savings banks by requiring these banks to maintain, in prescribed 
assets, an amount equal to not less than the amount on deposit in 
Australia with that bank. 
The methods (d) and (e) by which the Reserve Bank implements 
its monetary policy are the more important. The Bank regulates bank 
1 iquidity directly by use of the Statutory Reserve Deposit System (SRD) 
in combination with the LGS (liquid assets and Government securities) 
convention. Also, by its presence in the trading of financial assets~ 
the Bank affects financial market conditions. This influence is 
exercised by means of the buying and selling of Government securities 
whereby, it seeks to either support existing market conditions or to 
induce appropriate changes in these conditions. These two methods of 
implementing monetary policy are the most often used and constitute 
almost the whole thrust of monetary policy in Australia. The tvJo 
instruments concerned, the Statutory Reserve Deposit Ratio (SRD) and 
open market operations (S) are discussed in detail in sections 4.1.1 and 
4.2.1 below. and their impact on the money supply is then analysed within 
the context of an Australian model of money supply determination. 
4.1.1 The SRD instrument 
Each of the trading banks subject to the Banking Act is 
required to maintain a Statutory Reserve Deposit with the Reserve Bank. 
Such a deposit, the minimum amount of which is determined by the Reserve 
Bank, is expressed as a percentage of the banks' current level of 
Australian deposits. The SRD ratio is uniform for all the major trading 
banks. The important 'lever', by which the SRD instrument is made 
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effective, is the LGS convention. Under this convention, eac~ bank 
undertakes to hold a certain proportion of its total deposits in the 
form of liquid assets and Government securities. These assets consist 
of notes and coin, cash deposited with the Reserve Bank, Government 
Treasury bil~s and notes, and other Government securities. Each bank 
ensures that the LGS ratio (i.e. the ratio of LGS assets to deposits) 
does not fall below an agreed minimum which, again, is uniform for all 
banks. The importance of the LGS convention lies in the fact that it 
places some restriction on the banks' responses to SRD action implemented 
by the Reserve Bank. 
Any change in the SRD ratio alters the level of trading bank 
cash. An increase (decrease) in the ratio causes the banks to reduce 
(increase) their holdings of cash, and ultimately to possibly reduce 
(increase) their other assets. The importance of the LGS convention 
enters at this stage. If the LGS assets held by the banks just approach 
the prescribed conventional minimum, a call to the SRD accounts (i.e. an 
increase in the SRD ratio) can usually only be met by a reduction in the 
holdings of other assets, pafticularly loans to clients. This makes it 
extremely difficult for borrowers to finance their spending. 
The implementation of SRD policy can, however, be partially 
offset by the presence of excess LGS assets. Under these circumstances, 
a call to SRD can be satisfied by the commercial banks running doVJn 
their excess LGS assets which are usually held as Government securities. 
Thus, a call to SRD accounts may be satisfied by the banks selling some 
of their surplus securities. Under these circumstances there is ~o 
effect on other assets such as bank advances. This action will, however, 
leave the banks less 1 iquid. ~1oreover, because they sell a proportion 
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of their assets to the private sector to obtain the funds, the private 
sector becomes less liquid. Such action can also restrict the capacity 
of the banks to lend in the future as the LGS assets approach the 
conventional minimum. 
4 . 1 . 2 .Qll_e..!l_ rna r _l( e t __ QJ?_~~!j_Q_n s _ 
Open market operations are transactions in Government 
securities by the Heserve Bank with other sectors of the economy. Such 
transactions seek to influence the liquidity of the economy and may 
also be designed to affect the structure of interest rates. A sale of 
securities by the Reserve Bank serves to soak up excess liquid assets 
and reduces the reserves available to the private sector. Conversely, 
a purchase of securities by the Reserve B~nk serves to substitute cash 
for Government securities in the private sector's portfolio. Such 
action leads to a re-arrangement of the private sector's asset holdings 
which results in increased loans by the banks and other intermediaries. 
Open market operations are also designed to influence the 
interest rate structure. The Reserve Bank is able to reduce or increase 
upward pressure on interest rates by becoming either a willing buyey or 
or seller of securities. Tighter or easiar conditions in the bond 
market are subsequently transmitted to other areas of the capital market, 
and private interest rates respond accordingly. 
4. 2 I__b_e l!iodus_p.r_er•andi of m2!1_~t9_t:';L __ p_g_] i c.'L.__i n a simp 1 e mode 1 of 
!!l()_n ey ___ ~l..L f q_!'JII at i on 
4. 2. 1 ~- mosJ~.l..Qf__!_fl~_Aus t_r_9]_1_an mQ_n~_~p£ly_ 
The assets and liabilities of the Reserve Bank- the monetary 
base- form the basis of the money supply determination model. The 
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assE~ts of the Reserve Ba.nk (thE: sources of the monetary base) are 
given by: 
B - S + G + A - (K + OL) + Cp 
and the liat ilit·ies (the uses of the monetary base) are given by 
B -· R + Cp 
where B -· monetary base 
S - Reserve Bank holdings of Government securities 
G = Reserve Bank holdings of gold and foreign exchange 
R = Re + Rs - total reserves of trading banks held at 
the Reserve Bank 
Re = excess reserves of trading ba~ks held at the 
Reserve Bank 
R5 ::: statutory reserves of trading banks held at the 
Reserve Bank 
CP- notes and coin in the hands of the public 
A = Reserv2 Bank lending to the banks 
K - Reserve Bank capital 
OL- Reserve Bank other liabilities. 
The money supp.ly (~1), narrowly defined, is given by 
where Dp - deposits in trading banks. 
The Statutory Reserve Deposit ratio can be defined as 
( 4. l ) 
(4.2) 
( 4. 3) 
( 4. 4) 
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Similarly, we can define the excess reserves ratio and the currency 
ratio for the public sector as, respectively 
re = Re 
(;P" (4.5) 
and cP 
·- [t k (4.6) 
The LGS convention as agreed upon by the banks is expressed 
in the form of the LGS ratio (¢) 
( 4. 7) 
where N =liquid assets of the banking sector. 
This ratio is kept at or above some agreed minimum level (¢*) 
Individual banks hold excess reserves in the form of excess 
LGS assets. These are maintained in Government Securities. Thus the 
excess reserves of the banks is the margin between the actual LGS ratio 
(LGSA) and the conventional minimum (l.GS*). 
(4. 8) 
The relationship between the supply of money (M) and the 
monetary base (B) is obtained in the following way. From (4.2), (4.3) 
and (4.6) we know 
B - R + Cp 
M -· cP + Il 
and k 
cP 
= r;r· 
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rh:nce cP .. kDP 
M -· kDP + !l 
Dp ( l 
-· r+-T )n 
From the definition, we know 
R ::: Re + R s 
R ::: re . oP + SRD Dp 
R -· (re + SRD) oP 
From (4.2) again, we have 
B = R + C 
p 
B 
and, after inserting (4.12) and (4.9) into (4.2) we obtain: 
B = (re + SRD + k)Dp 
oP - [ ______ _1___ ] B 
(re + SRD + k) 
Substituting (4.13) into (4.11) gives 
[---1--]B = [--1 -]M 
re + SRD + k 1 + k 
Rearranging gives us the desired relationship between M and B: 
1 t·1 = [ e-···--·-· ] B 
r + SRD + k 
(4.9) 
(4. 10) 
( 4. 11) 
(4.12) 
(4.13) 
(4.14) 
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Expression (4.14) shows that, if the Reserve Bank wishes to 
reduce the money supply by increasing the SRD ratio, ti1e ult ·imate effect 
win be to reduce the monetary multiplier. The change in the monetary 
base ·is zero and all U1e reduction in the 1noney supply occurs as a 
result of the decl-ine in this monetary multiplier. This result is 
dependent on the assumption that the trading banks have no excess 
reserves in the form of excess LGS assets. If the trading banks do hold 
excess reserves, then the impact of the SRD change is negated by the 
banking sector since the banks can meet the additional liability to SRD 
by selling some of their Government securities or by reducing their 
liquid assets. 
4.2.3 in relt~ion to the model 
Suppose the Reserve Bank wishes to reduce liquidity by the use 
of open market operations. To achieve this, it must sell securities to 
the public sector. Such an action reduces the assets of the Reserve 
Bank and, as such, reduces the sources of the monetar'y base: 
+8 = +S + G + A - (K + Ol) + Cp 
The public sector buy the Government securities from the Reserve 
Bank for cash, and hence cP in equation (4.2) is reduced: 
Thus, from (4.14) above, the decline in B reduces the money supply with 
no change in the monetary multiplier. 
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The difference between the two instruments results from their 
effect on the monetary base of the Reserve Bank. The SRD instrument 
has no impact on the bas~, whilst open market operations serve to change 
the monetary base. From this point of view, it is obvious that the 
criticism of many of the previous reaction function studies is 
wat"ranted, on the gr·ound that these studies use a mon,~tary indicator 
as the policy insh'1Ament when, in effect, it is an intermediate -ta-:eget. 
This criticism applies particularly to the work of Dewald and Johnsori 
[5], Reuber [17] and Havrilesky [8]. All of these studies make use of 
the money supply as an instrument of monetary policy. The use of the 
money supply as an instrument of policy in Australia however, would fail 
to distinguish between the effects due to the SRD instrument and the 
effects due to the open market instrument. For these reasons the SRD 
r·ati o a.Jci open market ope rat ions can be seen to be the true instrurnen-ts 
of monetary policy. Reaction functions for these instruments are 
estimated in Chapter' 5. 
4. 3 I_~.§. _ _p_r_::_o b j_~1_?__2f__ d ~ t a '!--~~~-so t:@j_j_!)'__JI n d est i rna t i__Q_!l 
In this section, the various problems associated with the 
formulation and estimation of the r·eaction functions a.re discussed. 
There are several main themes: the form of the reaction functions, 
their estimation and the problem of seasonality in the data used. 
A discussion of the data used in the estimation is also set out in 
Section 4.3.2. 
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4. 3. "! ification of the Reaction Functions 
The specification of the reaction functions follows the 
standard pattern of relating targets and instruments. 1 One notable 
exception in this particular formulation, however, is the treatment 
of the interest rate (R) as an intermediate target rather than as an 
instrument. Under this framework the interest rate is partially 
controlled by the Reserve Bank but is also influenced by conditions 
prevailing in Australian financial markets. The consequence of this 
approach is that R is treated exogenously for econometric purposes. 
The functions are specified to test for an endogenous 
reaction of the two monetary instruments to general economic conditions. 
The general targets of the study, designed to represent the appropriate 
economic conditions, are the rate of unemployment (U), the level of 
foreign reserves (FR) and the price ·:evel (P). The: short term intet·est 
rate (R) is also tested as an intermediate target. Previous reaction 
function studies incorporate a growth target in the form of GNP, or 
its deviation from some long-term desired level. However no attempt is 
made,in this study, to test for a reaction to the growth target for 
the following reasons. Firstly, as Hosek [9, p. 18] argues, the 
inflation, employment and growth objectives may be interdependent. 
Faster rates of growth are associated with lower rates of unemployment 
for example, and vice versa. Secondly, the inclusion of a growth 
target is not compatible with an analysis which emphasizes short-run 
quarter-to-quarter reaction of targets to monetary policy. The idea 
of a growth target is generally of a longer run nature and is usually 
-~~--·----·--·--------------
l. For a derivation of the form of the reaction function, see 
Appendix 4A. 
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accepted as one of the targets of fiscal policy rather than monetary 
policy. Finally, the inclusion of an income or GNP vatiable may not 
be acceptable in terms of the 'target-·instrurnent' apprr:ach adopted 
here. Jonson [ll, p, (vi)] suggests that the inclusion of such a 
variable may be taken to represent an accc•;nrnodation of money supply 
to demand, rather than genuine stabilization response. 
The question of a similar or dissimilar reaction by the two 
instruments to the economic targets is crucial to the case for or 
against the use of a d·isaggregated view of the monetary aspects of 
economic policy. If the reaction of the two instruments is similar, 
then there is a stronger argument for using an aggregated monetar'y 
view of economic policy in terms of, for example, the money supply. 
Such a result supports the approach taken in the earlier reaction 
function studies and, in particular, the ideas put forward in the 
Australian study by Jonson. If, on th~ other hand, the reaction of 
SRD and S to the targets of policy is different, then the case for 
using an aggregative money supply approach is weakened. Such a result, 
in this cose, strengthens the argument for treating an investigation 
of the effects of monetary pol·icy in t2rrT1S of the individual instruments. 
One other important feature of the specification of the two 
reaction functions relates to the potential interdependency between the 
instruments and the intermediate target; the rate of interest. Naturally, 
if these interdependencies do exist, then they sh6uld be accommodated 
in any policy formulation exercise. In order to test for these possible 
interdependencies, the equation for the open market instrument (S) is 
tested with the intermediate target (R) and the SRD instrument as 
explanatory variables, along with the two other economic targets. 
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Similarly, the equation for the SRD instrument contains both R and s. 
The important criteria for these tests will be the sign and 
significance of the coefficients in each particular equation. If the 
sign is correct, we can expect an increase in the SRO ratio to induce 
a net sale of securities. That is, the coefficient of the SRD 
instrument in the S equation should be negative, thus indicating that 
the induced reaction in S is in harmony with the original policy 
intention of contracting the money supply. A positive sign for SRD 
in the S equation indicates that the induced change is running counter 
to the original policy intention. A similar argument can be advanced 
for the insertion of the S instrument in the SRD equation. 
Previous reaction function studies, with the exception of 
Nobay [15], ignore the possibility that the monetary authorities may 
set their policy instruments in an interdependent manner. The ear~y 
study by Dewald and Johnson [5] made sor.1e progress in this regard by 
including the money supply, which they previously treated as an 
instrument, in another of their tested reaction functions. Many of the 
studies test only one • instrument•, but it is realistic to assume that 
the monetary authorities have rnore than one instrument at their disposal, 
Nobay [15, pp. 296-297] suggests that it is also unrealistic to suppose 
that the various instruments of policy are set independently. Suchvan 
assumption presupposes that the instruments are not structurally linked 
and that any alteration to one instrument has no impact on the others. 
In practice it is preferable to assume that movements in one particular 
instrument wiZZ affect the others and that, in such cases, the policy 
maker will treat these other instruments as ·targets. Although the 
monetary authorities can vary the policy instruments at will, there are 
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costs involved in doing so. Thus, the values and movements of other 
instruments will be taken into account when changes in any one instrument 
are contemplated. 
The role of the interest rate variable (i.e. the intermediate 
target), in the two reaction functions, should also provide some basis 
for analysing the differing nature of the operation of the two instruments. 
The open market policy instrument is represented by the Reserve Bank's 
holdings of Government Securities. This instrument is basically a market 
orientated technique. Hence, we can expect to find a relationship 
between this instrument and the interest rate. This result is due to 
the fact that open market operations are only feasible if the bond 'price', 
set by the Reserve Bank, is adjusted to achieve the desired policy 
objective of withdrawing funds from, or injecting funds into, the private 
sector. The recent developments in the bond market, resulting in a 
wider holding of bonds, and a greater willingness of the public to 
accept variations in interest rates, have facilitated the increased use 
of open market operations as a policy instrument. The operation of SRD 
policy is less directly associated with interest rates as such a policy 
operates almost exclusively on the availability of trading bank credit. 
Hence, if this a priori reasoning is correct, there are political costs 
associated with open market operations which take the form of interest 
rate adjustments. Such political costs are not associated with the use 
of the SRD instrument. 
Using this argument, the reaction functions can be formulated 
as follov;s: 
s :::: 
t 
SRD -t 
(4~ 15) 
(4.16) 
J..£..v. 
One further aspect of importance in this reaction function 
study relates to a comparison between the form of the endogenous 
reaction in those periods vvhen the policy intention is expansionary, 
and the form of the reaction in those periods when the policy 
intention is contractionary. Such a compc,r·lson will enable a clearer 
understanding of whether, in fact, any endogenous reaction, which is 
present, is symmetrical or not. That is, the comparison will help 
determine whether the nature of the instrument reaction to the economic 
targets varies between periods of monetary contract·ion and expansion. 
Such an approach would suggest functions of the following form: 
(4.1 n 
(4.18) 
where the superscripts •e• and •c• represent ~he variables in 
expans·ionary and contractionary periods r·espectively. 
Although the formulation of the two reaction functions appears 
to be straightforward from the preceding discussion, there is one 
important issue which must be resolved ab i.ni-tio. This concerns the 
problem of ~hether the monetary authority reacts to changes in the 
absolute price level (P) or to movements in the rate of inflat-ion (P). 
The majority of the earlier formulations of the target-instrument 
approach to policy reaction functions have taken the price level as the 
appropriate policy target. For example, the functions formulated by 
J.~..l.. 
Wood [19], Dewald and Johnson [5], Havrilesky [8] and Froyen [7] all 
incorporate general price indices as their ultimate price stability 
targets. The Australian study by Jonson [11] also makt.:s use of the 
general Consumer Price Index. However, it is possible that reaction 
functions formulated in such a way may be nisspecified, since the 
monetary authority may react to movements in the rate of inflation 
rather than to movements in an index of prices. The use of a price 
level target suggests that the monetary authority has a certain target 
value for the price index for each quarter. Such an approach appears 
dis ·j ngf:n i ous, as it suggests a 1 so, that the monetary authoY'i ty fails 
to distinguish between upward and downward movements in the rate of 
inflation. That is, it appears illogical to argue that the authority 
teacts solely to an index of the price leve·l, which has a continual 
upward trend, whilst ignoring the fa~t that the actual rate of inflation 
may have dropped. Instead, a desired rate of inflation appears to be 
a more plausible target. 
If these arguments are correct, and the monetary authority 
does respond to movements in the rate of inflation rather than the 
price level 1 then it may be more correct to specify the reaction functions 
in terms of a rate of inflation target (P), where this target is 
measured by the propottional annual rate of change of the consumer 
price index. 
Since arguments can be advanced for either approach, and in 
order to compare the two alternative formulations, data is fitted to 
functions where the rate of inflation represents the desired price 
target: 
SRD ::: t 
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4.3.2 Dc:1ta sources definitions and the em of_~-~~sq.IJ_~_Jjj:_y_ 
(4.20) 
The time series for the data covers the period 1961(1) to 
1974(4). All data used is of a quarterly nature, in order to capture 
the short-run response of the monetary policy adjustment to changing 
economic conditions. Monthly data is u1available for all the variables 
used in this study. The use of monthly data would, anyway, be 
unrealistic in terms of the length of the policy planning period 
envisaged for the monetary authorities. The quarterly data figures 
are taken as those at the end of each quarter. An alternative to this 
would have been the use of the four-quarter-moving average method which 
would have served to el irninate a degree of seasonality from the data. 
However, the seasonality, inherent in the data, can just as suitably 
be removed with the use of seasonally adjusted data. The general 
problem of seasonality is discussed after a description of the data. 
Observations on the foreign reserves target are in current 
prices, as are the observations on the level of Reserve Bank holdings 
of Government Securities. This approach is adopted since it is the 
nominal value of the instruments which is directly controlled by the 
monetary authorities. 
The open market instrument (S) is defined as Reserve Bank 
holdings of Government Securities. This instrument, however, should 
ideally be net of internal transactions with the Treasury and Trust 
funds. Reserve Bank holdings of Government Securities may change, 
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even though there are no open market operations with the private 
sector. The published series includes the securities held as a 
result of these internal transactions. However, it was not possible 
to obtain details of these transactions, and thus, the data for S may 
be slightly jistorted. 
Observations on the actual value of the SRD instrument as 
set by the Reserve Bank cannot be observed systematica·lly over the 
quarter long data period. This problem arises because of the non-
systematic and often rapid variations in the set value of the instrument. 
One solution to this problem would be to average the value of the 
changes in SRD during each quarter to obtain an average end of quarter 
value. Such an approach is not practical, however, as there are several 
instances over the time period when the SRD instrument has not moved in 
the cou:se of the three-month data period. Such examples are in the 
minority, but they would still serve to exacerbate the problem of 
settling on a value of the SRD instrument at the end of each quarter. 
The SRD instrument used is therefore calculated from total statutory 
reserves of the Trading Bank~ as a percentage of total Reserves of the 
major Trading Banks. Such a calculated value of the SRD ratio will 
tend, more accurately, to reflect the direction of SRD policy. The 
value of the calculated SRD ratio is an important indication of the 
adherence of the Trad·ing Ban.ks to SRD policy. The actual value of· the 
SRD ratio and the calculated value are compared in Figure 4(1) belDw .. 
The two values are observed to be closely correlated. 
The foreign reserves target is defined as total gold and net 
foreign assets. Such a definition is broken into two measures of 
international reserves; the official r•ese:Pve assets, and other net 
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and Calculated SRD 
% 
[ 
l.~.~~"----~-~·~-~·-~ 
Source: Reserve Bank Statistical Bulletins [3]. 
fo.Peign (w::o·ets. The first and major component of the official reserve 
assets is the gold and foreign exchange holdings of the Reserve Bank. 
This component includes gold, cash balances in London, deposits with 
overseas banks. money lent on the London money market and securities 
investments in overseas countries. The gold and foreign exchange 
holdings form the main component of Australia 1 S international reserves, 
and any trend in its movement reflects whether these reserves are 
rising or falling. Official reserve assets also include Australia 1 s 
holdings of Special Drawing Rights issued by the I.M.F., gold holdings 
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of the Trading Banks and the government and Australia's gold tranche 
position with the IMF. Other net foreign assets consist of the net 
assets of the Trading Banks 1nd government balances on deposit with 
the Reserve Bank. 
The interest rate target is defined as the theoretical yield 
on Australian Government rebate bonds with two years to maturity. 
The inflation target is defined as the proportional change in the 
Consumer Price Index expressed on an annual basis. The alternative 
formulatioYJ defines the price target as the Consumer Price Index. 
The unemployment target is defined as the percentage of the workforce 
unemployed, and includes school leavers. 
Data on the foreign reserves and unemployment targets is 
obtained from the Australian Bureau of Statistics publication, Seasonally 
Acljus-f:;ed Indica·tors [1 J. The data on Government Securities he: 1 d bv the 
Reserve Bank and the information necessa.ry for the calculation of the 
SRD ratio is obtained from the Research Department of the Reserve Bank. 
The Consumer Price Index figures are obtained from the relevant ABS 
publication [2], and the data on the interest rate is obtained from 
various copies of the Reserve Bank Statistical Bulletin [3]. 
One further important aspect of the data problem relates to 
the question of whether seasonally adjusted or unadjusted data should 
be used. Seasonally unadjusted data is often preferred [16] because 
it permits seasonal, as well as other, movements to be explained by 
economic variables. On the other hand however, seasonally adjusted 
data helps to exclude Seasonal influences from any policy reaction to 
economic targets. All remaining reaction to these targets can, nwre 
accurately, be specified as a policy reaction rather than merely a 
seasonal reaction. 
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Wood [19, pp. ·145-6], in his study of Federal Reserve octions, 
argues that the problem of seasonality is a difficult one. On the one 
hand, certain actions by 1 olicy makers are likely to be di~ectecl at 
offsetting the seasonal movements in such things as the money stock. 
The removal nf the seasonal variation from these instruments would appear 
to suppress information of interest, and cause the results obtained to 
be distorted. On the other hand~ Wood argues that there is ample 
evidence of the Federal Reserve responding to seasonally adjusted policy 
targets, especially the unemployment and for'ei gn rese1Aves targets. illi s 
argument does not extend to the price level because the amount of 
systematic seasonal variation in aggregate price indices is insignificant. 
Wood's argument is that the Federal Reserve does not react to seasonal 
variation in targets. 
This view is supported by Friedlaender [6] who suggests that 
the relevant stabilization authority responds primarily to seasonally 
adjusted data where these are available. When seasonally adjusted data 
are not available, Friedlaender suggests that no attempt should be made 
to adjust it. Instead, it is. assumed that the policy maker responds to 
the unadjusted data and therefore to the seasonal variation in the 
targets. 
4.3.3 Method of estimation 
The application of ordinary-least-squares (OLS) to the 
estimation of equations (4.15) to (4.20) proved abortive because of the 
presence of positive autocorrelation which is indicated by the Durb·in.-
Watson statistic. One of the most important assumptions of OLS is that 
successive values of the disturbance term are independent of previous 
127. 
values [13, pp. 243-66]. If this assumption does not hold and the 
value of the disturbance term in a particular period is correlated 
with its previous value, then autocorrelation is present in the 
disturbance term. When autocorrelation is present, the parameter 
values of OLS are unbiased~ although the variances of the parameter 
estimates are biased downward. That is, a variable coefficient may 
erroneously be classed as reliable when, in fact, it is not. 
The problem is countered, in this particular instance, by 
modifying the method of est·imation. Consider equation (4.15): 
where st is the disturbance term. 
In the first instance, the adjustment is made by applying 
a first order autoregressive scheme as follows: 
(4.16) 
where i = l, 2, 3 and Vit possesses the classical disturbance properties. 
A Cochrane-Orcutt [4] transformation is then applied by lagging the 
original equation, pre-multiplying by p and subtracting from the 
original equation to give: 
st - a0(1 - p) + a1ut ~ a1put-l + a2Pt - a2pPt-l + a3FRt 
- a3pFRt-l + a4Rt - a4pRt-l + a5SRDt - a5pSRDt-l 
( 4. 17) 
where Vit is, by assumption, serially independent and autocorrelation 
is successfully eliminated. 
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This relationship is then estimated2 and the value of p tested for 
significance. If p is found to be statistically significant the 
estimates of a0, a1, a2, ct 3, a4, a5 and p, obtained fnm the estimation, 
are used in place of those obtained from the original OLS estimation. 
In equations (4.15), (4.16), (4.17), (4.18) and (4, 19), the 
estimated value of p is found to be stdtistically significant and less 
than one. However, autocorrelation is still detected in equation (4.20) 
following the application of this first order adjustment with 6 exceeding 
unity. A second order autoregressive scheme is applied as follows: 
where Vt once again possesses the classical disturbance properties. 
The second-order scheme is applied to equ~tion (4.20) and the estimatio~ 
is again perfonned by non-linear-least-squares. Autocorrelation is, 
this time, successfully eliminated as the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for covar-iance stationatity are satisfied at the 5 percent 
level of significance as follows: 
P + p < 1 : 2 1 J P < 1 ·, 2 - pl 
4. 4 ~ummat'.Y_ 
The preceding discussion suggests reaction functions which 
test the reaction of the two true instruments of monetary policy in 
Australia (SRD and S) to an external target, an inflation target, an 
unemployment target and an interest rate variable. The problem of 
2. The non-linear-least-squares program used for this estimation was 
written by Mr. D. W. Challen of the Economics Department, University 
of Tasmania. 
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seasonality is discussed, along with the choice of a suitable price 
target. 
The estimates of the equations are presented in the next 
chapter, and the results of the estimation are discussed in detail. 
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APPENDIX 4A 
The theoretical underpinnings of the reaction function form 
can be derived from the constrained minimi?ation procedure developed 
by Theil [18]. This procedure assumes that the po 1 icy maker attempts 
to minimize the weighted sum of the squared deviation of both targets 
and instruments from their desired values. The quadratic preference 
function is of the following form. 
d = a' (X x*) + 6' (Y- Y*) +~[(X- x*)•A(X- x*) 
+ (Y- Y*)'B(Y- v*)J 
where X - (m x 1) vector of the actual v~lues of the policy instruments 
x* = (m x 1) vector of the desired values of the policy instruments 
Y = (n x l) vector of actual v&lues of the target variables 
y*- (n x 1) vector of desired values of the target variables 
A - (m x m) diagonal matrix of weights attached to the squared 
deviations of desired from actual values of the policy 
instruments 
B -· (n x n) symmetric matrix of weights attached to the squared 
deviations of desired from actual values of the target 
var·iables 
a - (m x l) vector of weights attached to linear deviations of 
desired from actual values of .the policy instruments 
a - (n x 1) vector of weights attached to linear deviations of 
desired from actual values of the target variables. 
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However, the quadratic preference function used as the 
theoretical basis in this present study assumes that the policy maker 
does not pre-suppose des~red values for either the targets or the 
instruments. 
Consequently, the preference function assumes the form 
The d"isutility minimization takes place subject to the constraints 
imposed by the economic structure. This view of the economic structure 
assumes the target variables to be linearly dependent on the policy 
instruments and the non-controlled predetermined variables which also 
include lagged values of fue targets and instruments. This so-called 
'policy model' can be written in matrix form as 
Y = RX + VZ 
where Y = (n x 1) vector of actual values of the target variables 
X= (m x 1) vector of actual values of the instrument variables 
Z = (k x l) vector of non--controlled predetermined variables 
R = (n x m) matrix of coefficients of the instruments 
V = (n x k) matrix of coefficients of the non-controlled 
predetermined variables. 
The substitution of the constraints into the utility function 
yields: 
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d a'X + S'(RX + VZ) 1 [ 1 + (RX + VZ) 'B(RX + VZ)] -- + -· X /\X 2 
d :::: a'X + S'RX + S'VZ + ~[X'AX + X'R'BRX + X'R'8VZ 
+ Z'V'BRX + Z'V'BVZ] 
d ::: a'X + S'RX + S'VZ + ~[X'AX + (X'R'B)(RX + VZ) 
+ (Z'V'B)(RX + VZ)] 
Minimizing the disutility with respect to the instruments~ 
(X), y·ields 
- (a+ R'B) +AX+ R'BY 
Note that this uses the first order conditions only. The second order 
conditions require the A and B matrices to be positive. This is 
usually established in setting up the problem. 
Finding the optimal X, (X0), by equating the vector of 
derivatives to zero, gives: 
Thus, every value of the 'optimal' instr·ument, x0, is equal 
to a constant, plus a linear combination of the value of the targets. 
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APPENDIX 4B 
1. Prev ous Australian Studies 
In a study of government expenditure reaction functions, 
Jonson [11] considers government non defence current and capital 
expenditure and relates these to the ratio of vacancies to total 
unemployment, the consumer price index, the level of foreign reserves, 
and a growth variable represented by Gross National expenditure. 
Jonson finds some evidence of a systematic manipulation of policy 
variables in accord with movements in the target variables. However, 
often the coefficients of the targets are either insignificant or 
their signs perverse. His findings, with respect to Government current 
expendicure, leads him to conclude that 
' ... a positive response to growth dominates current 
Comnonwealth spending and ... when only the stabilization 
var,iables ar·e in the equation, they are proxies for Gross 
national expenditure 1 • [11, p. 15] 
In the government non-defence capital expenditure equation. 
Jonson finds that none of the targets entered with the correct sign. 
Various tests lead him to believe that these targets are, once again, 
merely proxies for growth. 
The other Austral ian study in this area is the one by Kelly 
[12] who experiments with capital and current defence and non-defence 
expenditure. Generally, Kelly finds little evidence to support any 
policy reaction to the general state of the economy. The large 
majority of his success is due almost entirely to the finding of a 
reaction of government expenditure to certain wage rates and the cost 
of government services. However, Kelly does experiment with the 
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v~cancies - unemployment ratio, the consumer price index, the 
proportionate rate of increase of the CPI (i.e. the rate of inflation) 
and the level of foreign reserves. None of the result~ obtained using 
these state of the economy variables are very successful. 
Attempts were made to estimate a government expenditure 
reaction function using Commonwealth, State and local government 
(public authority) current expenditure on goods and services at current 
prices (Gt). The equation obtained was: 
Gt = -830.7186 + 39.9692Ut + 
(n.a.) (3.1782) · 
12.8219P + 0.0391FR. + 0.2309Y 
(2.7336)t (2.5796) t (18.2519)t 
R2 = 0.9940 
p ::: 0.6457 
(6.7973) 
where Yt = real Gross Domestic Product and all other variables are as 
defined previously. The high significance of the growth target (Yt) 
suggests that the reaction of Gt to the targets simply reflects a 
positive response to growth. In order to test this proposition, the 
government expenditure equation is re-estimated using the quarterly 
change in Gt as the dependent variable. The equation obtained is: 
~Gt = -21.1112 - 2.1823Ut + l.4004Pt + 0.0099FRt + 0.0045Yt 
(n.a.) (0.4759) (0.8789) (2.2426) (1.2065) 
R2 = 0.3545 
p :::: -0.5370 
(4.6154) 
The significance of the growth target is reduced substantially; 
suggesting that the previous proposition is correct. The results 
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obtained would appear to correspond to those obtained by Jonson, as 
it is apparent that much of the reaction of government expenditure is 
in response to a growth target. Hence, it can be concluded that the 
government expenditure instrument, in responding to a longer run 
target such as growth, can accurately be treated as exogenous, at 
least within the confines of a quarterly model. 
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS ESTH~ATION 
In this chapter, the results of the estimation of the reaction 
functions, specified in Chapter 4, are examined. Firstly, equations 
(4.15), (4.16), (4.19) and (4.20) are analysed to determine the 
appropriate price target. The preferred functions are then analysed 
in detail, in terms of their reaction to the various targets. The 
interdependence between the two instruments is examined, especially in 
connection with the interest rate variable, included as an intermediate 
target. The costs of adjustment of each instrument are analysed also. 
The time period is then split into phases of monetary conttaction and 
monetary expans·ion and the functions are then re-estimated. Such an 
analysis is important in determining whether or not the response of 
each inJtrument is sy~netrical during these phases. 
The estimation of equations (4.15), (4.16), (4.19) and (4.20) 
yields the following results~ 
St = -566.473- 0.346FRt + 23.005Rt + 13.569Ut 
(n.a.) (5.555) (0.576) (0.349) 
+ 17.933Pt + 7.057SRDt (5.1) 
(2.995) (0.475) 
R2 = 0.742 
p ::: 0. 584 
(4.746) 
- 21.312 - 0.123Pt + 0.0003FRt - 1 .082Ut 
(n.a.) (1.959) (0.492) (2.303) ~ 
+ 0.0003St + 0.406Rt 
( 0. 284) ( 1. 1 55) 
R2 = 0.865 
p ::: 0.856 
(11.095) 
(5.2) 
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st :::: 803.358 - 0. l95FRt + l25.045Rt - 5.679Ut (n.a.) (4.208) (3.467) · (0.141) 
+ 1 . 859r) . - 19.31?4SROt (0. 102)t ( l. 508) ( 5. 3) 
-2 0.743 R -·· 
p ::: 0.558 
(4.346) 
SRDt ::: 15.733 + 0.546Pt + 0.002FRt- 1.447Ut (n.a.) (3.333) (2.104) (4.147) 
+ O.OOlSt + 0.183Rt (1.120)' (0,595)v (5.4) 
R2 :::: 0.0855 
pl :::: 0.806 (5.451) 
p2 ::: 0.138 (1.556) 
An analysis of the equations above suggests that the inflation variable 
is to be preferred to the price level as the appropriate target. 
A comparison of the equations for S indicates that the price level 
variable is significant in (5.1) but is of the wrong sign. That is, 
equation (5.1) implies that an increase in the price level induces a 
monetary expansion represented by a net increase in S. For this 
reason, equation (5.3) is taken to represent the reaction of the 
securities instrument to changing economic circumstances. The same 
kind of comparison can be made with the alternative SRD equations, 
(5.2) and (5.4). Equation (5.2) provides an estimated coefficient for 
the price level target.with the wrong sign, suggesting that an increase 
in the price level induces a monetary expansion, represented by a 
reduction in the SRD ratio. On the other hand, when the rate of 
inflation is taken as the appropriate target in equation (5.4), it is 
of the cor·rect sign and statistically more significant. This sho~tJs 
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that an increase in the SRD ratio will occur in reaction to an increase 
in the rate of inflation. The above reasoning suggests that the rate 
of inflation is the more appropriate target. Thus, equations (5.3) 
and (5.4) are taken to represent the endogenous reaction of the open 
market instrument and the SRD instrument respectively. 
The estimates of equations (5.3) and (5.4) indicate clearly 
that the responses of the two instruments to changes in economic 
conditions differ. From equation (5.3) it is obvious that the open 
market instrument responds very significantly to movements in the 
foreign reserves tar·get. The relationship) in this case, is an invei'Se 
one indicating that an increase in the level of foreign reserves induces 
a net sale of securities. Thus, the open market instrument is use· to 
sterilize the impact of a net capital inflow on the domestic money 
supply. The size of the coefficient of the foreign reserves target 
also implies that approximately 20 per cent of an increase in the 
monetary base due to an increase in the level of Australian for·eign 
. ff b 1 f . t. 1 reserves 1s o· set y a net sa e o · secur1 1es. Reserve Bank 
statements, in connection with the use of the open market instrument, 
support the finding of equation (5.3) with respect to the assignment 
of this instrument to problems of external balance. For example, in 
1963-64, the Reserve Bank t'eports that precautionary moves had been 
initiated to 
1. The use of the open market instrument to offset or sterilize the 
effects of changes in international liquidity have also been ~ell 
documented elsewhere. See, for example, Porter [6], Rowan [9] 
and McGregor, Burrows and Zecher [4]. 
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contain and counter increases in the money supply which 
were largely the product of international transacti5ns, and 
therefore not readily controllable at the source. The Bank 
sought, through its npen market operations, and in coofdination 
with debt management, to absorb funds by increased sales of 
Government Securities to the pub'lic. 1 [8, p. 15] 
On the other hand, the open market instrument does not show 
any s·ignificant response to any of the doi:'1~stic targets, namely the 
unemployment ~~ate or the inflation target. In fact, the unemployment 
target is not only statistically insignificant, but it also exhibits 
an incorrect sign, indicating that an increase in the rate of 
unemployment induces a monetary contraction via a net sale of Government 
securities. The inflation target is statistically insignificant, 
although of the correct sign. Because of its poor statistical 
significance, however, it is not regarded as a target with which the 
open market instrument is closely associ2ted. 
The SRD instrument, in contrast to the open market instrument, 
exhibits a strong reaction to each of the domestic targets and the 
response, in each case, is of the correct sign. An increase in the 
rate of inflation, for examp-le, induces a restrictive monetary policy 
as the SRD ratio rises in response to the increased inflation. 
Furthermot'e, an increase in the unemployment rate induces a monetary 
expansion brought about by a fall in the SRD ratio. These findings 
are also supported by Reserve Bank statements in regard to past use 
of the SRD instrument. Here emphasis is undoubtedly placed on the 
influence of the SRD ratio, on the ovel'all state of liquidity in the 
economy, and the consequent implications of this tor inflationary and 
growth tendencies. In 1963, tor example, it is eointed out that 
1 
••• the paramount objective ... was to provide adequate 
financial support for a rising level of expenditure, so 
as to increase employment of labour and physical 
capacity ... 1 [8, p. 16] 
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Again, in 1969, the Reserve Bank makes it clear that 
adjustments to the SRD ratio are being made in reaction to certain 
pressures in the economy. This is made obvious by a statement that 
' ... labour market statistics suggested that pressure on 
domestic resources was slowly increasing. The SRD ratio 
was therefore increased from 8% to 91 [8, p. 28] 
In 1970-71, it is reported that there is 
• ... little evidence ... of easing in the growth of prices, 
and this continued to argue against any early relaxation 
in monetary policy.' [8, p. 6] 
Equation (5.4) also suggests that the foreign reserves target 
is significant and of the correct sign. This indicates that the 
monetary authority has used the SRD instrument to reduce the secondary 
effects of increases in the external target. The estimated results 
suggest that the open market instrument has been used primarily for 
the purposes of offsetting or steriz.:__.:--c.ing the effects of increases in 
Australia 1 S foreign reserves. On the other hand, the SRD instrument 
has been directed more towards the stabilization of fluctuations in 
the domestic economy. Such a finding reinforces the suggestion that 
there is a form of ass-ignment of the two monetary pol icy instruments 
to internal and external targets. 
5. 3 .l ns_trunL~_!!_t_ I nterdeR_~.!29S:~_<:; i es 
The estimates of the reaction functions, given by (5.3) and 
(5.4), also suggest an association or interdependency between the SRD 
instrument and the use of open market operations. Equation (5.3), for 
example, shows some evidence, although not strong, of a negative 
relationship between the SRD ratio and the Reserve Bank's holdings of 
Government Securities. Such a relat-ionship indicates that the tlt1o 
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instruments have worked in the same direction: an exogenous increase 
in the SRD ratio brings about a net sale of securities. Both these 
changes indicate a monetary contraction. Equation (5.4) reveals that 
the relationship is not symmetrical, since the open market instrument 
enters this equation with the incorrect s·ign. Such evidence suggests 
that the open market instrument is used to supplement, or reinforce, 
SRD action. In 1964, for example, with expansion increasing, the 
Reserve Bank sought to move more firmly, and on a wider front, against 
an over--increase in the supply of money. To carry out this policy 
' ... the SRD ratio for major Trading Banks was increased 
progressively in the first three months of the year ... 
(and) ... concurrently> the focus of open market operat-ions 
in Government securities was sharpened to contribute more 
effectively to the tightening of liquidity, the Bank 
becoming increasingly willing to meet buyers and more 
reluctant to accommodate those desiring to unload 
securities.• [8,pp.15-16] -
In 1968-69, use is also made of open market operations to absorb part 
of the increase in liquidity that is occurring. As the Reserve Bank 
points out 
1 
••• the activities of monetary authorities in the bond 
mark~t suvplemented the ~autionary measures implemented 
through t"he banking system. 1 [8, p. 5] 
Again, in "1969-70, faced with inflationary tendenc-ies, the Reserve Bo.nk 
increases the SRD ratio and points out that 
' ... furthennore, the Reserve Bank's operations in the 
bond market as a willing seller and a reluctant buyer 
of Government securities contributed towards tighter 
financial conditions. 1 [8, p. 2] 
The reinforcing of SRD policy with supplementary action, by 
open market operations, is one aspect commented on by Nobay in his study 
of British monetary policy reaction [5]. Among his results, Nobay finds 
that open market operations serve, among other things, to reinforce 
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Special Deposit calls. In an earlier section of his paper, Nobay 
also comments on the individual flexibility of certain instruments 
and the extent to which they can be manipulated. Nobay emphasizes 
that movements of, and the impact on, other instruments must also be 
taken into account when one particular instrument is manipulated. 
In an Australian context, this could possibly explain the harmonious 
relationship between the SRD instrument and the open market instrument 
in equation (5.3). Similarly it explains the lack of any such 
relationsh·ip in equation (5.4). That is, the short-term flexibility 
of the SRD instrument2 suggests that it is used extensively for 
internal stabilization. However SRD action can be supplemented or 
reinforced by the less flexible open market instr·ument. Hence, a 
change in the SRD rat-io evokes an harmonious change in the open-
market instrument. However, a changG in the less flexible open-market 
instrument evokes no supplementary or reinforcing action from the SRD 
instrument. 
One other aspect of the interdependency problem is also 
brought to light by the results of the reaction function estimates give11 
by equations (5.3) and (5.4). This relates to the direct association 
between the open market instrument and the interest rate. Equation 
(5.3) clearly shows the market orientated nature of the open market 
instrument; an increase in the rate of interest inducing a net purchase 
-----------·-· ---
---·-----· 
2. Since the introduction of the SRO system in 1960, there is 
evidence to suggest that it has been used primarily as a short 
term instrument. Over the sample period of this study over half 
of all changes in the SRD ratio are made within time periods of 
less than 3 months of each other. Of course, many of these are 
planned 1 step 1 changes, whereby the ratio is altered in successive 
steps. 
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of securities, thus having an expansionary effect on the money supply. 
Th·i s re l ati onsh·i p demonstrates the accommodating nature of the money 
supply which expands or c1ntracts as the demand for financial assets 
increases or decreases respectively. Equation (5.4) demonstrates, 
however, that this relationship does not exist between the SRD ratio 
and the rate of interest. The accommodating nature of the money 
supply, as suggested by equation (5.3), indicates a positive relation-
ship between the supply of money and the interest rate. 
These results have implications for the appropriate use of 
monetary policy by the monetary authol~ities. For example, according 
to the ratea view of monetary policy, the interest rate and the SRD 
ratio can be regarded as the appropriate instruments of monetary 
policy. In each case~ the outcome of a p0.rticular monetary policy 
change 1,i 11 be associated with differ'ing costs of adjustment. 
A monetary contraction (expansion) can be brought about by either 
raising (lowering) the interest rate or increasing (decreasing) the 
SRD ratio. Equation (5.3) suggests that as the interest rate is 
adjusted. an offsetting effect occurs in the open market instrument. 
A contractionary monetary policy, brought about by increasing the 
interest rate, will result in a net purehase of securities by the 
Reserve Bank. This net purchase is due to asset substitution by the 
financial institutions in the finance sector as they attempt to 
convert some of their holdings of Government securities into more 
liquid assets. This sale of securities, by the finance sector, is 
designed to meet the exigencies of the financial restrictions imposed 
initially by the monetary authorities in the form of increased interest 
rates. Equation (5.4) suggests that such an action does not occur in 
the operation of SRD policy. 
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The outcome of this association between the interest rate 
and the open market instrument suggests that there are certain costs 
of adjustment associated with the use of each of the mJnetary 
instruments for contractionary or expansionary policy purposes. 
These costs of adjustment are highlighted by observing the syrnmetrica'l 
association between S and R. This is given in an estimate of the 
equation for the intermediate target (R) with the ultimate targets 
(U, ~ and FR) and the two instruments (SRD and S) as exogenous 
explanatory variables. This equation takes the following form: 
2.210 + 0.068Ut + 0.330Pt- O.OOlFRt 
(n.a.) (0.564) (8.219) (0.432) 
+ 0.002St- 0.002SRDt (5.5) 
{4.239) (0.055) 
R2 = 0.903 
p ::: 0.382 
(2.608) 
In this equation, only the rate of inflation and the open market 
instrument are significant. This equation is of considerable 
importance in determining the costs of adjustment for each of the 
instruments and thus, for determining the choice between SRD and S 
as alternative policy measures. According to equation (5.5) a 
monetary expansion,brought about by a net purchase of Government 
securities, has the effect of increasing the interest rate. On the 
other hand, a monetary expansion, brought about by a reduction in the 
SRD ratio, has no effect on the interest rate. Such a conclusion 
reinforces the lack of association between the SRD instrument and the 
interest rate which was originally observed in equation (5.4). 
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Burger [1, p. 126] suggests that such a phenomenon~ as 
observed in equation (5.5),_ is due to a so-called 'spillover' effect. 
A monetary expansion, carried out by means of an open market purchase, 
although serving to reduce interest rates in the short run, will 
ult·imate.ly r'~su.lt in increased interest t·ates in the long run. This 
occurs because of the initial impact of the short run reduction in 
interest rates on investment and income. The resultant increase in 
income increases the demand for bank credit which ultimately puts 
pressure on the level of interest rates as firms compete for funds. 
Such a process, in the long run, results in increased interest rates, 
despite the ·initial expansionary policy. Burger's explanation of the 
'spill-over' effect, observed in equation (5.5), is corroborated by 
Friedman [2~ p. 75] vJho suggests that, a::i vJell as expansionary monetary 
policy ultimately resulting in increased interest rates, a contractionary 
policy, operating through the same channels, will result in reduced 
interest rates in the long run. This conclusion is examined in Section 
5.4 below. 
The lack of any mutual correlation between the SRD instrument 
and the interest rate, observed in equations (5.4) and (5.5) requires 
some comment. Unlike the open-market instrument, the SRD instrument is 
not market orientated. Despite this, it can be argued that an increase 
in the SRD ratio evokes a rise in interest rates as the trading banks 
reduce or restrict advances. Purvis [7, p. 79] suggests however, that 
the institutional setting in Australia alters the normally conceived 
chain of events which would result in the interest rate increasing. 
Such an alteration occurs because of the extent to which trading banks 
hold excess LGS assets and the extent to which these excess reserves 
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are used as a buffer' stock in tlieir portfolios. 3 Purv·is argues that 
the trading banks can sell their excess assets in order to meet the 
deficient SRD position, rather than by calling in advances. Such 
action reduces the likelihood of SRD policy resulting in increased 
interest rates during a contractionary monetary phase. Under these 
circumstances~ private sector liquidity is still reduced, and Purvis 
suggests that this sets the stage for a successful open market sale, 
as higher administered interest rates induce an increase in the private 
sector's holdings of Government securities. 
Purvis also argues that a similar situation exists in the 
use of open market operations as an alternative policy action. In the 
case of a contract·ionary monetary policy, open market sales are induced 
by an increase in interest rates. According to Purvis~ however, the 
institutional arrangements, as they exist in Austl·'alia, preclude( .. 
market determined rate of interest. Purvis maintains that the monetary 
authority sets the interest rate (i.e. it treats R as an instrument) 
and then pt'oceeds to sell or buy the amount of securities necessary to 
maintain this interest rate. Equations (5.3) and (5.5) both disagree 
with this point of view. Equation (5.3) suggests that the open market 
instrument responds to changes in the interest rate, and equation (5.5) 
observes that open market operations have the ultimate effect of 
increasing interest rates when the policy is expansionary. 
3. The problem of excess reserves and their effect on the operation 
of SRD policy is examined in Chapter 4. 
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5 . 4 ~~at!_?_; on a !,Y __ a n ~Co ~~-~-:t:Lo n a !Ll12_Q_e t a ~t.__Re a cl:_:L~Ii 
From the evidence presented so far, it is not possible to 
state conclusively whether the arguments are symmetric~l, and that a 
monetary contraction, achieved by selling securities on the open 
market, wi 11 be associ a ted with a genera 1 reduction in interest rates. 
This is part of a more general problem, namely, that the form of the 
endogenous reaction will vary between contraction and expansion. 
In order to investigate this aspect of the study the time 
series is split into periods of monetary policy contraction and 
expansion. The coefficients of the two reaction functions are 
estimated in both the contractionary and expansionary phases and the 
significance of the difference between the estimates is compared. 
In this way~ it is possible to conclude that policy reaction differs, 
or is the same, in these contraction..:ry and expansionary phases. 
The intention of policy has been associated with the movement in the 
SRD ratio. This is, increases in the SRD instrument are taken to 
indicate a monetary policy contraction, and decreases in the SRD are 
taken to indicate a monetary policy expansion. Purvis [7, p. 79] 
suggests that SRD calls have a history of being a signal for Reserve 
Bank monetary policy intentions. For example, an increase (decr'ease) 
in the SRD ratio would be taken, by the private sector, to indicate 
that a tighter (easier) monetary policy is being contemplated. This 
same criterion is used in splitting the time period in the contractionary 
and expansionary phases. Table 5.1 sets out the designated periods of 
contraction and expansion. 
Table 5.1 shows that the policy intention, according to the 
movement in the SRD instrument, is expansionary in forty of the fifty-six 
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P e r:i9_~.2L~l9!l e t~ __ CO_Il tract i ~I!.- and Ex pa ~1_~_9_!1_ 
12~HJl __ t~l9 7 4_C~U-
Policy Contractions Policy Expansions 
-------
1964("1) to 1964(4) 1961(1) to 1963(4) 
1969 Cl) to 1970(3) 1965(1) to 1968(4) 
1973(1) to 197 4 ( 1 ) 1970(4) to 1972 ( 4) 
1972(2) to 1974(4) 
qual~ters in the time ser·ies, and contractionary in only sixteen. Hence, 
a separate estimate of the two reaction functions, in the contractionary 
phase, provides only eleven degrees of freedom. Because of this obvious 
econometric limitation, it is not feasible to attempt to estimate the 
two reaction functions for periods of expansion and contraction 
separately, and to then apply an F-test comparing the significance of 
the difference of the estimates in these contractionary and expansionary 
phases. Instead, the shift dummy approach [3, pp. 409-30] is used, 
thus enabling the division of the time series into periods of contraction 
and expansion whilst making use of the entire 56 observations. 
The reaction functions which satisfy these requirements were 
set out in Chaoter 4 as equations (4.17) and (4.18). In this format, the 
superscripts 'e' and 'c' represent the value of the variable during 
periods of monetary expansion and contraction respectively. 
d. i = 1 . . . 10 represent the dummy va ri ab 1 es assigned 
1 
a value of zero or unity in the appropriate circumstances. 
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The value of d1 for the variables with the superscripts e(c) is unity 
in the expansionary (contractionary) phase, and zero otherwise. The 
disturbance term, sit is a random variable that satisfies all the 
basic assumptions of the classical normal linear regression model. 
The estimates of (4.17) and (4.18) adjusted for serial 
correlation are as follows: 
S = 1047.595- 29.793SRD~- 16.974SRD~- 52 841Ue 
t ( n. a. ) ( 2. 007) ( 1. l 00) (1 : 188) t 
155 282 c 11 7 e c e 
- . - Ut + . 90P~ - 32.521P~ - 0.223FR+ (1.105) (0.8l3)t.. (L651)'"' (5.082)'"' 
- 0.038FR~ + 112.771R~ + 78.076R~ (5.6) (0.531) t (3.743) (2.127) 
R2 = 0.812 
p = 0. 748 
(7.223j 
e c e c 
- 0.407 + 0.0025~- 0.002St- 1.803Ut + 0.326Ut 
(n.a.) (0.989) (1.136) (4.599) (0.288) 
+ 0.338P~ + O.ll9P~ + O.OOlFR~- O.OOlFR~ (1.785) (0.541) (0.777) (0.400) 
- 0.398Re + 0.378Rc 
(l.l42)t (0.96l)t 
R2 = 0.873 
p = 0.973 
(24.674) 
(5.7) 
The interpretation of equations (5.6) and (5.7) above tend 
to shed some additional light on the results obtained earlier. The 
equation for the securities instrument (5.6) once again reveals the 
significance of the foreign reserves target, and substantiates the 
assignment of the securities variable towards the external sector. 
In this instance however, the foreign reserves target is significant 
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only ·in the phase which is characterized as one of monetary expansion. 
This phenomenon reflects the operation of the sterilization policy 
mentioned previously, and also reflects the attitude o~ the policy 
makers towards inflationary pressure. Open market operations are 
used in the monetal~y expansion phase to h~lp dampen the inflationary 
effects of a large inflow of international finance. This inflow tends 
to stimulate the monetary or cash base w'ith the resulting inflationary 
pressures. In the monetary expansion phase, therefore, the monetary 
authorities are more concerned in containing or countering those 
increases in the money supply which are, because of their or·ig-in, not 
readily controllable at the source. On the other h~nd, the foreign 
reserves target fails to be significant in the contractionary monetary 
phase. 
Equation (5.7) shows up clL·Jrly the response of the SRD ratio 
to movements in the unemployment target. The SRD ratio reacts strongly 
to the unemployment target in the expansionary phase of policy. 
However, it does not react significantly to unemployment when the 
monetary authorities seek to contract the money supply. This apparently 
reflects the higher priority given to unemployment when the policy 
intention is expansionary. That is, unemployment has a heavier weight 
during an expansionary monetary phase and inflation is given lower 
priority. The significance of the unemployment and inflation .targets 
suggest that there is a reversal of these priorities during the 
contractionary phase. Inflat·ion is given a higher weight than 
unemployment. During this phase the unemployment target is not only 
less significant than the inflation target, but is of the incorrect 
sign. Neither target however, is highly significant. 
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The original finding of some evidence of interdependency 
between the SRD instrument and the open market instrument is again 
highlighted in equations (5.6) and (5.7). The harmonious relationship 
between SRD policy and open market policy, which suggested that SRD 
policy changes are followed or supported by open market operations) 
can be observed again in equation (5.6). On this occasion however, it 
should be noted that the harmonious relationship between the SRD 
instrument and open market operations is most strongly observed during 
times of mor.etary e;;:pansion. An ha rmon·i ous, but 1 ess significant, 
relationship is observed also during contractionary monetary phases. 
The lack of any significant relationship in the opposite direction is 
again noticeable. However,in the contractionary period,the open market 
instr'ument ~s observed with a cm~rect sign to suggest an harmonious 
relationship. 
Further information is also gleaned on the relationship 
between the interest rate and each of the instruments. Equation (5.7) 
reveals, once again, the lack of any association between the interest 
rate and the SRD instrument either in a contractionary or· an expans·i::mary 
monetary phase. Such a finding again supports Purvis' contention that 
the use of SRD policy is independent of interest rate changes because 
of the existence of LGS and excess reserves which can be used as buffer 
stocks against a call to SRD. Equation (5.6), however, demonstrates 
the positive association between the interest rate and the open market 
instrument. This is consistent with equation (5.3). The additional 
information provided in equation (5.6) shows that the association 
between R and S is symmetrical; as R increases S also rises. In 
addition, however, as R falls, S also falls. 
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The problem of adjustment costs associated with each 
instrument can be approached in the same way. The equation for R, 
(5.5), can be modified to accommodate the distinction between 
expansionary and contractionary phases. This modif-ied equation is 
as fallows: 
Rt = 0.398 + 0.05~SRD~ + 0.02lSRDf - 0.042Ue 
(n.a.) (1.277) (1.086) (0.366)t 
+ 1.243U~ + 0.210~~ + 0.376~~ + 0.0003FR~ 
(1.775) (4.405) (5.959) (1.964) 
0 0004FRc, 0 003Se + 0.002Sc (5.8) 
-( . ) t -( . t (4.?ll4)t 1.486 5.299)' : 
R2 = 0.883 
p :: 0.272 
(1.631) 
Once again, only the rate of inflation and the open mark~t 
instrument bre significant. Equation (5.8) demonstrates that a 
monetary expansion, br'ought about by a net purchase of securit·ies, 
will have the ult·imate effect of incx'eas'Zng interest rates. 
A monetary con·trac-tion~ brought about by a net sale of securities, 
win ultimately result in a redL'etion in interest rates. The 
coefficient of Sc is positive and highly significant, demonstrating 
the strong mutual association between S and R. On the other hand, 
it is observed again, in equat·ion (5.8), that a monetary expansion 
or contraction, brought about by reducing or increasing the SRD ratio, 
will have no effect on the interest rate. Equation (5.8) therefore 
suggests that the contraction of the money supply, brought about by 
a net sale of securities, is associated with a negative cost of 
adjustment in the form of reduced interest rates. Thus, the 'spillover' 
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effect described by Burger can be seen to work in both directions. 
The findings of equation (5.8) therefore substantiate Friedman•s 
theory that the Zong rnv~.n vffect of a contractionary monetary pol icy 
will be to reduce interest rates. 
The preceding analysis subsumes a disaggregated view of the 
monetary aspect of econonric policy. In this estimation, S and SRD are 
treated as policy instruments in preference to the usual monetary 
aggregates such as the money supply or the cash base. The results of 
the analysis suggest considerable support for such an approach on 
three separate grounds: firstly, the reaction of the individual 
instruments assumes a different form; secondly, the costs of adjusting 
the two instruments are quite distinct, and finally, the choice of 
instruments obviously depends on the intention of the policy change 
and the two preceding factors. 
In regard to the first point, it is apparent that there is 
an assignn1ent of ·instruments between domestic and external policy. 
The SRD instrument is more closely associated with movements in the 
two domestic policy targets; unemployment and inflation. On the other 
hand, the securities instrument is more closely associated with movements 
in Australia•s foreign reserves, particularly in regard to the problem 
of the impact of these on the supply of money. In fact, a significaht 
'sterilization' influence is observed. There is also an obvious cost 
of adjusting the securities instrument; an expansion of the money supply, 
brought about by a net purchase of securities, can only be achieved at 
the cost of higher interest rates. 
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The use of a sh"ift-·dummy approach to split the time period 
into monetary contraction and expans·ion reveals that there is also a 
negative cost associated '.Nith the contract-ion of the money supply; 
interest rates and the securities instrument are seen to be mutually 
associ a ted e\·en in contracti onary phases. Hence, the use of the SRD 
instrument is preferable when an expansionary monetary policy is to 
be achieved, because no political costs (i.e. increased interest rates) 
are associated with this instrument. 
The analysis also reveals the significance and importance 
of the •sterilization• aspect of open market operations in times of 
monetary expansion as compared with monetary contraction. This 
presumably i"l lustrates the pol·icy maker• s concern for the inflationary 
consequences of an increase in foreign reserves, and the impact of 
Uris on the cash base, during an expansional"Y phase. 
The SRD instrument also varies between periods of monetary 
expansion and contraction. The instrument reacts strongly to the 
unemployment target in the expansionary phase, but not in the 
contt'actionary pha.se. This a.pparently ref"lects the higher priority 
given to unemployment vvhen the policy intention is expansionary. 
There is some evidence of a po"licy reversal in a contractionary phase, 
as the inflation target is shown to be more important than the 
unemployment target. Neither target is highly significant during the 
contractionary period however. 
There is considerable support for the disaggregated approach 
taken in the analysis. The concept of the money supply is apparently 
less useful in the context of an analysis of economic policy. In that 
case, it appears to be more practical to think of monetary policy in 
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terms of disaggregated instruments such as the two instruments analysed 
here. In the light of these findings, it appears that little 
importance can be attached to previous reaction function studies which 
have ignored the principles set out in Waud's threefold analysis. 
These erroneously treat such aggregates, as the money supply or the 
cash base, as being the instruments of monetary policy. 
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APPENDIX 5A 
-...--~----
DATA 
Year and s SRD u Quarter ($m) (%) (%) 
1961 (M) 1234.60 15.86 2.51 
( J) 1013.30 14.44 3.39 
(S) 875.00 12.26 4.08 
(D) 818.80 11 . 71 3.50 
1962 (M) 834.50 11.27 3.09 
( J) 880.30 10.17 2.88 
(S) 880.20 10.34 2.88 
(D) 857.80 10.77 2.76 
"1963 U"1) 787.00 l 0. 38 2.54 
( J) 718.60 n .03 2.46 
(S) 714.40 10.44 2.19 
(D) 648.30 9.99 1. 94 
1964 (M) 624.00 13.90 l. 70 
( J) 661.40 14.66 1.43 
(S) 683.80 14.18 1.28 
(D) 726.60 14.76 1.23 
1965 (r~) 731.30 14.33 1.16 
( J) 846.00 13.12 1.16 
(S) 861.60 13.80 l. 23 
(D) 862.70 12.13 1.48 
1966 (M) 869.40 11.84 1. 57 
( J) 706.30 8.98 l. 54 
(S) 717.00 8. 93 1. 68 
(D) 775.50 8.27 1. 63 
1967 (M) 775.50 8.13 1. 66 
( J) 823.90 8.50 1. 75 
(S) 893.10 8.40 1. 73 
(D) 873.2.0 8.16 1. 68 
1968 (M) 961.60 7.71 1. 73 
( J) 1028.80 7.56 1. 65 
(S) 1084.40 7.48 1. 56 
(D) 1129. l 0 8. 31 1. 59 
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Year and s SRD u Quarter ($m) (%) (%) 
1969 (M} 887 10 8.21 1.45 
( \J) 871.00 8.53 l. 34 
(S) 1115.40 8.85 l. 30 
(D) 1305.20 9.28 1.33 
1970 (M) 1364.40 9.00 L 15 
(J) 1227.70 9.65 1.19 
(S) 1191. 50 9.06 1.44 
(D) 1181.00 8.69 1.34 
1971 (t\1) 1140.60 8.58 1.46 
( J) 978.60 8.25 i. 55 
(S) 779.60 7.94 1.86 
(D) 723.00 7. 72 2. 01 
1972 (M) 663.80 6.56 2.21 
( J) 663.40 6.61 2.34 
(S) 384.20 6.24 2.49 
(D) 367.70 5.95 2.24 
1973 (M) 794. l 0 6.05 1.86 
( J) 658. l 0 6.99 1. 92 
(S) 665.80 7.98 l. 75 
(D) 673.50 8.27 1.83 
1974 (t~) 670.30 8.19 1.72 
( J) 1276.50 7.98 l. 74 
(S) 1487.20 4. 26 3. 01 
(D) 1175.40 2. 72 4.84 
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. 
Year and p FR R Quarter (%) ($m) (%) 
1961 (M) 4.31 8?.2 5.46 
( J) 3.2(1 1055 5.23 
(S) 1. 81 1134 4.59 
(D) 0.78 1176 4.36 
1962 ( l~) -0.11 "1132 4.39 
( J) 
-0.77 1140 4.30 
(S) 
-0.33 1180 4.25 
(D) 0.11 1205 4.13 
1963 (~1) 0.33 1230 4.04 
I • \ ,... r-. 1292 3.75 \ v) U.O/ 
(S) 0.66 1419 3.68 
( [)) 0.44 1634 3.64 
1964 (M) 1.11 1721 3.63 
( J) l. 66 1735 4.23 
(S) 2.66 1765 4.35 
(D) 3.99 1696 4.35 
1965 U~) 3.96 1574 4.85 
(J) 4.04 1441 4.95 
(S) 3.88 1360 4.98 
( 0) 3.94 1368 4.96 
1966 (M) 3.49 14·17 4.98 
( J) 3.36 1491 4.94 
(S) 2.70 1464 4.96 
(D) 2.36 1419 4. 51 
1967 (M) 2.56 1357 4.50 
( J) 2.94 1340 4.52 
(S) 3.94 1338 4. 51 
(D) 3.30 1310 4.71 
1968 (i~) 3.29 1323 4.86 
( J) 2.86 1304 4.84 
(S) 1. 85 1334 4.83 
( 0) 2.62 1417 4.68 
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. 
Year and p FR R 
Quarter (%) ($m) (%} 
1969 (M) 2.90 1529 4.78 
( tJ) 2.87 1468 5. 01 
(S) 3.05 1350 5.27 
(D) 2.83 1329 5.30 
1970 (M) 3.19 1410 5.85 
( J) 3.73 1594 6.32 
(S) 3.80 1588 6.10 
(D) 4.87 1632 6.00 
1971 (M) 4.91 1971 6.07 
I , \ 5.39 2258 6.00 ~vJ 
(S) 6.70 2595 5.95 
(D) 7.19 2811 4.80 
1972 (M) 7.11 3305 4.80 
( J) 6.22 3691 4.58 
(S) 5.69 4426 4.33 
(D~ 4.50 4814 4.67 
1973 (M) 5.67 4425 4.65 
(J) 8.19 4252 5.70 
(S) 10.61 4111 7.70 
(D) 13.23 4091 7.63 
1974 U1) 13.57 3967 7.78 
( J) 14.40 3560 10.10 
(S) 16.04 3348 10.69 
(D) 16.25 3217 8.13 
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Year and srwe SRDc se 
Quarter (%) \%) ($m) 
1961 ( M) 15.86 0 1234.60 
( J) 14.44 0 1013.30 
(S) 12.26 0 875.80 
(D) ll . 71 0 818.80 
1962 ( tvl) 11.27 0 834.50 
( J) 10.17 0 888.30 
(S) 10.34 0 880.20 
(D) l 0. 77 0 857.80 
.1963 (M) 10.38 0 787.00 
(J) 11.03 0 718.60 
(S) 10.44 0 714.40 
(D) 9.94 0 648.30 
1964 (M) 0 13.90 0 
( J) 0 14.66 0 
(S) 0 14. 18 0 
(D) 0 14·. 76 0 
1965 U~l) 14.33 0 731.30 
( J) 13.12 0 846.00 
(S) 13.30 0 861.60 
(D) 12.13 0 862.70 
1966 ( M) 11.84 0 869.40 
(j) 8.98 0 706.30 
(S) 8.93 0 717.00 
(D) 8.27 0 775.50 
1967 U~) 8.13 0 775.50 
( l1) 8.50 0 823.90 
(S) 8.40 0 893. l 0 
(D) 8.16 0 873.20 
1968 (M) 7.71 0 961.60 
( J) 7.56 0 1028.80 
(S) 7.48 0 1084.40 
(D) 8.31 0 1129.10 
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Year and SRDe SRDc se 
Quarter (%) (%) ($m) 
1969 (M) 0 8.21 0 
( \J) 0 8.53 0 
( s) 0 8.85 0 
(D) 0 9.28 0 
1970 U~) 0 9.00 0 
( J) 0 9.65 0 
(S) 0 9.06 0 
(D) 8.69 0 118'1. 00 
1971 (M) 8.58 0 1140.60 
( J) 8.25 ,... 1"\ .... IA rl""\. u !:1/d.OU 
( s) 7.94 0 779.60 
(D) 7. 72 0 723.00 
1972 U·1) 6.56 0 663.80 
(J) 6.61 0 663.40 
(S) 6.24 0 383.20 
(D) 5.95 0 368.70 
1973 (r~) 0 6.05 0 
( J) 0 6.99 0 
{S) 0 7.98 0 
(D) 0 8.27 0 
1974 (M) 0 8.19 0 
(J) 7.98 0 12'76.50 
(S) 4.26 0 1487.20 
(D) 2.'12 0 1175.4.0 
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Year and sc ue uc 
Quarter ($m) (%) (%) 
1961 (M) 0 2.51 0 
( J) 0 3.69 0 
(S) 0 4.08 0 
(D) 0 3.50 0 
1962 ( 1'·1) 0 3.09 0 
(J) 0 2.88 0 
( s) 0 2.88 0 
(D) 0 2. 76 0 
1963 (t11) 0 2.54 0 
(J) 0 2.£16 0 
(S) 0 2.19 0 
(D) 0 1. 94 0 
1964 (M) 624.00 0 1. 70 
( J) 661.40 0 1.43 
(S) 683.80 0 1.28 
(D) 726.60 0 1.23 
. 
1965 (M) 0 1.16 0 
(J) 0 l. 16 0 
(S) 0 1. 23 0 
(D) 0 1. 48 0 
1966 (t~) 0 l. 57 0 
( J) 0 1. 54 0 
(S) 0 1. 68 0 
(D) 0 1. 63 0' 
"1967 (M) 0 l. 66 0 
( J) . 0 1. 75 0 
(S) 0 1. 73 0 
(D) 0 l. 68 0 
1968 (M) 0 1. 73 0 
( J) 0 l. 65 0 
(S) 0 l. 56 0 
(D) 0 1.59 0 
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Year and sc ue uc 
Quarter ($m) \%) (%) 
1969 (M) 887.10 0 1.45 
( J) 871.00 0 1.34 
(S) 1115.40 0 l. 30 
(D) 1305.20 0 l. 33 
1970 (M) 1364.40 0 1.15 
( J) 1227.70 0 l. 19 
(S) 1191.50 0 1. 44 
(D) 0 1.34 0 
1971 (M) 0 1.46 0 
( J) 0 l. 55 0 
(S) 0 1.86 0 
(D) 0 2.01 0 
1972 (t•1) 0 2.21 0 
( J) 0 2.34 0 
(S) 0 2.49 0 
(D) 0 2.24 0 
1973 (M) 794.10 0 l. 86 
( J) 658. l 0 0 1. 92 
(S) 665.80 0 1. 75 
(D) 673.50 0 l. 83 
1974 (M) 670.30 0 1.72 
(J) 0 l. 74 0 
(S) 0 3.01 0 
(D) 0 4.84 0 
167. 
Year and ·e p . c p FRe 
Quarter (%) (%) ($m) 
1961 (M) 4.31 0 822 
{t1) 3.20 0 1055 
(S) l. 81 0 1134 
( [)) 0. 78 0 1176 
1962 (M) -0.11 (\ 1132 
·' 
( J) -0.77 0 1140 
(S) -0.33 0 1180 
(D) 0.11 0 1205 
1963 (M) 0.33 0 1230 
( J) 0.67 A , 1'\ "'"' u IL~t:: 
(S) 0.66 0 1419 
(D) 0. 4-4 0 1634 
1964 (~1) 0 1.11 0 
( J) 0 1. 66 0 
(S) 0 ·2.66 0 
(D) 0 3.99 0 
1965 (M) 3.96 0 1574 
(J) 4.04 0 1441 
(S) 3.88 0 1360 
(D) 3.94 0 1368 
1966 (M) 3.49 0 1417 
(J) 3.36 0 1491 
(S) 2.70 0 1464 
(D) 2.36 0 1419 
1967 (M) 2.56 0 1357 
( J) 2.94 0 1340 
(S) 3.94 0 1338 
(D) 3.30 0 1310 
1968 (l~) 3.29 0 1323 
( J) 2.86 0 1304 
(S) l. 85 0 1334 
(D) 2.62 0 1417 
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Year· and ·e p . c p FRe 
Quarter (%) (%) ($m) 
1969 (M) 0 2.90 0 
( J) 0 2.87 0 
(S) 0 3.05 0 
( [)) 0 2.83 0 
1970 (M) 0 3.19 0 
(J) 0 3.73 0 
(S) 0 3.80 0 
(D) 4.87 0 1632 
1971 (M) 4. 91 0 1971 
(J) ~ ~a ,... 2258 !),jJ u 
(S) 6.70 0 2595 
(D) 7.19 0 2611 
1972 (M) 7. 11 0 3305 
( J) 6.22 0 3691 
(S) 5.69 0 4426 
( 0~ 4.50 0 4814 
1973 (M) 0 5.60 0 
(J) 0 8.19 0 
(S) 0 10.61 0 
( 0) 0 13.23 0 
1974 (!vJ) 0 13.57 0 
( J) 14.40 0 3560 
(S) 16.04 0 3348 
(D) 16.25 0 3217 
169. 
Year and FRC Re Rc 
Quarter ($m) (%) (%) 
196"1 (f~) 0 5.46 0 
(J) 0 5.23 0 
(S) 0 4.59 0 
( 0) 0 4.36 0 
1962 (M) 0 4.39 0 
(lJ) 0 4.30 0 
(S) 0 4.25 0 
(D) 0 4.13 0 
1963 (M) 0 4. 04 0 
( J) 0 3.75 0 
(S) 0 3.68 0 
( [)) 0 3.64 0 
l 964 (M) 1721 0 3.63 
( J) 1735 0 4.23 
(S) 1765 0 4.35 
( ['\ 
'. 
1696 0 4.35 
1965 (M) 0 4.85 0 
( J) 0 4.95 0 
(S) 0 4.98 0 
(D) 0 4.96 0 
1966 (M) 0 4.98 0 
(J) 0 4.94 0 
(S) 0 4.96 0 
(D) 0 4. 51 0 
1967 ( t~) 0 4.50 0 
(J) 0 4.52 0 
(S) 0 4.51 0 
(D) 0 4.71 0 
1968 (M) 0 4.86 0 
( J) 0 4.84 0 
(S) 0 4.83 0 
(D) 0 4.68 0 
170. 
Year and FRC Re Rc 
Quarter ($m) (%) (%) 
1969 (M) 1529 0 4.78 
( J) 1468 0 5. 01 
(S) 1350 0 5.27 
(D) 1329 0 5.30 
1970 (M) 1410 0 5.85 
(J) 1594 0 6.32 
(S) 1588 0 6.10 
(D) 0 6.00 0 
1971 (r~) 0 6.07 0 
( J) 0 6.00 0 
( s) 0 5.95 0 
(D) 0 4.80 0 
1972 U·1) 0 4.80 0 
( J) 0 4.58 0 
(S) 0 4.33 0 
(D) 0 4.67 0 
1973 (t\1) 4425 0 4.65 
( J) 4252 0 5.70 
(S) 4111 0 7.70 
(D) 4091 0 7.63 
1974- (~1) 3968 0 7.78 
( J) 0 10. 10 0 
(S) 0 l 0. 69 0 
(D) 0 8.13 0 
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CHAPTER 6: STABILITY OF THE REACTION FUNCTIONS 
The objective of this chapter is to test the fitted reaction 
equations for temporal stability. Christian [1] emphasises the 
importance of these tests as indicators of the policy maker's revision 
of the relative weights attached to the various policy targets. If 
the coefficients, in equations (5.3) and (5.4), prove to be constant 
through time, then we can accept that the relative weights attached to 
each target are invariant in different phases of the business cycle. 
The evidence adduced so far does not support this contention. 
In Chapter 5, the regr·ession coefficients were observed to vary with 
the policy intention. Thus, the revision of the relative weighting 
pattern at different points of the business cycle represents a major 
source of temporal instab·il ity in the reaction equations. The resr_onse 
of the SRD instrument will be to the domestic targets. The instability 
of the S-instrument may be explained by analysing its association with 
movements in the level of Australia's foreign reserves. 
Tests for stability of the reaction functions are important 
also if the reaction functions themselves are to be integrated into a 
full scale econometric model. Temporally inconsistent parameter 
estimates for the functions will l~ad tn untenable and misleading 
results, introducing a bias into the estimation of multiplier effects. 
Goldfeld and Blinder [4, pp. 631-2], in an evaluation of some of the 
conceptual problems involved, suggest that reaction patterns may alter 
because of changes in the official structure of the policy making 
administration in any one of three ways; the first is the argument 
outlined in the opening paragraph concerning the relative importance 
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attached to each of the various targets of policy; secondly, the 
economic planning tools or models of the government or the policy 
makers may be altered or revised, and finally, any new relationship 
between various policy making bodies1 may have an influence on the 
policy 'mix' . 
In order to analyse the overall problem of stability in the 
estimated reaction functions, use is made of the TIMVAR program [3] 
which ·is used to f"it an ordinary least squares regression model to 
time series data, and then to investigate the constancy of the regression 
over time. The theoretical framework of the TIMVAR technique is 
discussed in detail in section 6.1, and the various tests associated 
with the program are set out. Following this discussion, each of the 
reaction functions for S and SRD are subj2cted to the various tests. 
From th~se tests it is possible to observe firstly whether the functions 
are stable or unstable over time, and secondly the actual points at 
which any changes occur in the stability of these functions. From this 
analysis, any unstable periods will be isolated and an attempt made to 
explain the inherent instabiljty. 
6.1 The theoretical framework of the TI 
The val·idity of the assumption that any regression r·elationship 
is constant over time is dubious. Because of this, it is necessary to 
examine the statistical constancy of any estimated relationship. 
Previous attempts at analysing stability problems have concentrated on 
----·--~--------
1. For example, in Australia, the relationship between the Government, 
as represented by Treasury, and the Reserve Bank. 
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the splitting of periods and the application of the Chow test [2], 
or the use of dummy variables [5, pp. 409-30]. This results in an 
ad hoc splitting of the sample period and the possibility that the 
structural change may not be detected. One of the more general 
techniques now available is the TIMVAR program which provides a 
method of testing the stability properties of any estimated relation-
ship by the use of printed and graphical output. 
The theoretical framework of the TIMVAR technique is based 
on a regression model which can be written as: 
where t = 1 ••• T 
and ~t - the column vector of observations at each of these 
time periods, on each of the k regressors 
@t ~ the vector of regression coefficients 
~t = ~l ... ~Tare the independent normal variables, 
with an assumed mean of zero, and variances of 
2 
al ... 2 a . 
'T 
The various statistical tests defined in the TIMVAR technique 
are based on the assumption that the variances are constant over time, 
and that the null hypothesis is 
:: ........ s 
_, 
The TIMVAR technique makes use of the recursive residuals, 
defined as follows: 
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where r- k+l, ... , T. 
Any changes in the means of the v.'r' s imply departures from 
the null hypothesis, H0, of constancy in the regression coefficients. 
The first test of significance is the cumulative sums or 
cuswn test which is one means of testing the null hypothesis, H0. 
In tlris experiment, H() is tested by plotting the cumulative sum of 
u 
the recursive residuals (Wr), where this cusum plot is defined as 
l r 
L: w. 
s j=k+l J 
and s is the mean square residual. 
This statistic is then tested to see whether it differs 
significantly from its expected value of zero. If W is significant, 
r 
then H0 is rejected and instability is generally indicated. This 
arises when prediction errors are consistently positive or negative 
over a large part of the sample period. Such instability is detected 
from the graphical output of the cusum test and is represented by 
continually large movements in W . 
r 
The second major test for the stability of the specified 
regression relationship is the cumulative sum of recursive residuals 
squared, or cuswn of squares test. This test is based on a plot of 
the following, over time: 
s 
r 
:::: 
where r = k+l, ... , T. 
r 
L: 
=k+ 1 
L: j=k+ 1 
2 
w. 
J 
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Like the cusum test, the cusum of squares test involves the 
sum of the recursive one period prediction errors. However in this 
case, the errors are squared and the test stat'istic is always positive 
(Sr > 0). This test is used to determine whether the errors are evenly 
distributed throughout the sample period. H0 is rejected and instability 
indicated, if Sr is significant at a selected significance level. 
This occurs if the cusum squares plot shows wide variation. 
A final test for the stability of the specified regression is 
the homogeneity test. This test statistic is derived as a generalization 
of the Chow test, using the analysis of variance for p equal-sized non 
overlapping periods. The homogeneity test is derived by comparing it 
with the standard tables of the F-distribution. 
In those cases where the above-ffientioned tests reject the 
null hypothesis, it is worthwhile to attempt to detect the point or 
points of change. This is made possible by means of Quandt's Log 
Likelihood Ratio which is useful for detecting abrupt changes in a 
regression relationship at an unknown time. No statistical test of 
significance is associated with Quandt's test, and so its use is simply 
confined to the identification of the timing of any structural changes 
in the estimated relationship. 
In the TIMVAR output, the printout of both the backward and 
the forward recursions are made available. Since the backward 
recursions are the less important, and also because they tend to 
reinforce the findings of the forward recursions, only the latter results 
are analysed in detail. All recursions relate to a 28-period moving 
average. 
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6.2 Stabilit.z of the SRD function 
->---·-~---- ----~---~~·-------------~ 
6.2.1 The formal tests 
The value of the cusum test statistic (Wr)~ as specified 
for the SRD equation, is 1.55740. This value must be compared with 
the fo 11 owing: 
1.143 for one percent level of significance 
0.948 for five percent level of significance 
0.850 for ten percent level of significance. 
Since the output value of 1.55740 is greater than all these standard 
significance levels, the null hypothesis is rejected, and it is 
concluded that the SRD function has a 99 percent chance of being 
unstable. 
The cuswn of squares test: reinforces the earlier f·inding. 
In order to determine whether the cusum of squares test is significant 
for a particular level of significance, the test statistic produced 
by the TIMVAR output is compared with a test statistic which is taken 
2 from a specially prepared table. The TIMVAR output from the SRD 
equation provides a value of 0.210976 for the cusum of squares test. 
This value of Sr is compared with the value drawn from the table in 
Appendix 68 which is entered at row n = ~(T - k), where T is the number 
of observations and k is the number of regressors. The values for the 
one, five and ten percent levels of significance are given as follows: 
0.28951 for the one percent level of significance 
0.23835 for the five percent level of significance 
0.21268 for the ten percent level of significance. 
2. See Appendix 68. 
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The homogeneii;y sta-tistic produced in the TIMVAR output 
is compared with the standard tables of the F-distribution for 6 and 
44 degrees of freedom. The value of 3.24 for the one ~ercent level 
of significance and the value of 2.31 for the 5 percent level of 
significance is shown in the table. Both Jf these values are less 
than the value of 10.5363 given by the THWAR output and, hence, 
provide additional evidence that the SRD regression is unstable at 
both the 1 percent and the 5 percent levels. 
All three tests described above produce a similar result 
in regard to the SRD equation; instability is evident at all major 
levels of significance. It remains~ however, to determine those 
periods which have contributed to this inherent instability. 
6.2.2 ical anal is of SRO stabili 
of instabil i 
Identification o 
The TIMVAR program provides a method of graphically analysing 
and detecting the actual periods of instability in the estimated 
function. Figures 6(a) and 6(b) in Ap~endix 6A plot the cusum and 
cusum of squares tests for the SRD fun:tion. An examination of the 
plots for the cusum test indicates that the instability in the SRD 
function is fairly extensive. The unstable periods can be detected 
from the plots as being those in which considerable variation occurs 
in the plotted value of the cusum and cusum of squares statistics. 
In particular, several large periods of instability can be dete~ted 
from Figure 6(a): 
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(i) observations 20-33, corresponding to the 
per·iod 1965(4) - 1969(1) 
(ii) observations 39-43, corresponding to the 
period 1970(3)- 1971(3) 
(iii) observations 48-50, corresponding to the 
period 19'12(4) - 1973(2). 
The cusum of squares test, as graphed in Figure 6(b), 
reinforces the periods of instability observed in the plot of the 
cusum test. In fact, the periods coincide almost identically, except 
that no instability is observed in periods 48-50 according to the 
cusum of squares test. 
One further test of the accuracy in recording these observed 
periods of instability is achieved by reference to Quandt 1 s Log 
Likelihood Ratio which is plotted in Figure 6(c) in Appendix 6A. 
This test re·inforces the timing of the unstable periods obser~ved in 
the cusum and cusum of squares plots. However, an additional unstable 
period, given by observations 11-19, is noted. These observations 
correspond to the time period 1963(3) - 1965(3). 
6.2.3 
_the bus i_Ile~_s __ ~.Y_<;_~ 
Goldfeld and Blinder [4, pp. 631-2] suggest that changes in 
the reaction pattern of the policy making authorities may be brought 
about by changes in the relative weights attached to each alternative 
target of policy. These changes in relative weights are brought about 
by a change in, or re-emphasis on, one target of policy over another. 
If the policy maker operates an active counter-cyclical policy, then 
the revision of policy weights may be associated with turning points 
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in the business cycle. Such action necessitates the use of a 
contr·actionar·y monetary policy during an upsw·insJ in the cycle and 
an expansionary pol·icy in the downswing. Thus, the po'!icy maker 1 s 
intention is most likely to be revised at, or near, the turning points. 
in the business cycle. As the SRD instrument responds to the domestic 
targets - inflation and unemployment - instability in the SRD equation 
may be explained by the changed policy intention occurring at peaks 
and troughs of the cycle. This proposition may be analysed by comparing 
periods of instability in the SRD equation with the business cycle. 
The cyclical variation in activity, as represented by the time 
1 t f +h l t f th . t t ( !IGNP 01 ) • • • p o, o· ~ e rea ra ·eo grow 1n ou pu GN_P __ N , 1s g1ven 1n 
-1 
Figure 6(1) by the broken line. The SRD ratio is plotted for the same 
period. A comparison of these time paths is revealing. The cyclical 
variat·ion of the economy is apparent. For example, there is a do~Amswing 
in 1961 to the recession of that period. The SRD ratio shows a 
concomitant decline in this period, indicating an easing of credit 
market conditions. However, the lateness of the application of the SRD 
instrument in the recovery of '1962-63 is apparent. SRD po 1 icy follows 
a confused marginal pattern in the same period; the increases in the 
SRD are only small and are followed closely by small reductions. The 
large increase in the SRD ratio in early 1964 precedes the downswing 
in economic activity occurring in June 1965. The SRD instrument has 
an expansionary purpose during this latt~r period as it is reduced 
substantially. Such a policy has the desired stabilizing effect in 
this period, unlike the events of 1962-·63 which appear to be a case of 
'too little too late'. 
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Figure 6(1) 
Fluctuations in the business cycle 
and the SRD ratio 1961-1974 
Business eye l e ---·--
SRD 
In the recovery of 1966-67, the SRD instrument shows a 
variable movement. It is increased for some time as the economy 
recovers from the trough of 1966, but is then gradually reduced in 
order to stimulate the upswing. In the 1967-68 downswing, the SRD 
ratio is reduced and, as a result, it has its desired stabilizing 
effect. The recovery from this 1967-68 trough evokes a lagged 
increase in the SRD instrument so that it peaks almost a year after 
the new peak in economic activity. The downswing in 1969-70 is 
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exacerbated by initial concomitant increases in the SRD ratio. 
This policy is finally corrected in late 1970 and has the desired 
stabilizing effect over the period to ~1une 1972. It appears that, 
in general terms, the SRD instrument reacts to cyclical variations 
in output. This means that the instrument is used as a counter-
cyclical tool during these periods, although the timing of the policy 
change (1962-63, 1967-68) is sometimes inappropriate, and produces 
potentially destabilizing effects in the economy. 
The association of the SRO instrument and the business cycle 
is less clear in the period 1972-74. This may be attributed to the 
change in policy attitudes of the Whitlam Government which, at first, 
opted for a tight monetary policy to offset the inflationary effects 
of their expenditure policies. The SRD is increased in 1973; such an 
action is not inconsistent with the gentle upswing in economic activity 
in the same reriocL However, the sharp reversal of this contractionary 
policy after June 1974 does no·t appear to have been initiated by the 
cyclical variation in economic activity. 
The SRD instrument appears to follow movements in the 
business cycle until June 1974. This may explain the instability of 
the SRD function in the time series considered. The first period of 
instability, indicated only by the Quandt Log Likelihood Ratio test, 
is the period 1963(3) - 1965(3). From Figure 6(1) it is noted that 
only a sma 11 trough in activity occul~s. The s 1 ackeni ng in act"i vHy 
occurs before the confirmation of a peak level of growth which begins to 
turn down, after 1965, into a mild recession. 
The second period of instability, indicated by the various 
timvar tests, extends from 1965(4) to 1969(1). In this period, the 
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economy experiences two complete cycles; 1965-67 and 1967--69. The 
instability in the SRD function may be attributed to these cyclical 
movements for the reasons advanced earlier. The weights attached to 
the inflation and unemployment targets differ between the upswing 
and downswing, and, consequently, they are revised at some time near 
the turning points of the cycle - June 1966, June 1967 and June 1968. 
Some slight instability occurs in the SRO function in the period 
1970(3) - 1971(3). This coincides with a slight variation in the 
downswing of the cycle which occurs in June 1970 and flattens out in 
June 1971. 
The SRD function exhibits stab-ili-ty during the period 1971(4) 
to 1972(3). This occurs at a time when the variation in the business 
cycle is only slight. Such an observation provides further evidence 
to support the claim that the SRD instrument is used in a counter· 
cyclical manner. Thus, the instability of equation (5.4) is due to 
cyclical variation with the associated revision of weights on the 
policy targets. 
The last period of instability corresponds to the period 
1972(4) - 1973(2). This instability cannot be explained by reference 
to Figure 6(1), as the association between the two paths changes 
drastically. During this period, the unpredictable economic climate 
and the difficulty in interpreting the various economic indicators 
[6, p. 77] generally confused the overall direction of policy. The 
instability of the SRD function is the end result of this generally 
confused economic situation. 
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6.3.1 The formal tests 
The value of the auswn test as specified by the TIMVAR 
output is 1.00976. When compared to the three standard values 
mentioned previously, it is obvious that the function is unstable 
at the 5 percent level of significance. The null hypothesis H0 is 
thus rejected and it is concluded that the S-function has a 95 percent 
chance of being unstable. 
The TIMVAR output prescribes the cusum of squares test 
statistic for the S-function as 0.396816, which, when compared with 
the table of statistics, implies a l percent level of significance. 
The null hypothesis is again rejected and it is concluded that the 
S-function exhibits an inherent instability. 
The homogene'ity statistic produced from the THWAR output 
for the securities equation is 7.~067~. Comparing this with the 
standard tdbles of the F-distribution for 6 and 44 degrees of freedom, 
shows again that the S-function is unstable at both the 1 percent and 
the 5 percent levels. 
6. 3. 2 p._gra_p.b..i_~~li!IJ:~.?i.?._g_f S _ _?! _ _?!bi l i tY.-~- I den!_ i fi cati on_Qf___p_~ ri_g_qs 
_g_f_j_!]_.? t~. b iJjJy 
Figures 6(d) and 6(e) in Appendix 6A illustrate the cusum 
and cusum of squares tests for the S-equation. 
An examination of the cusum test graph indicates that 
several large periods of instability exist: 
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(i) observations 28-36, corresponding to the 
period 1967(4) - 1969(4). 
(ii) observations 40-45, corresponding to the 
period 1970(4) - 1972(1) 
(iii) observations 49-56~ corresponding to the 
period 1973(1) - 1974(4). 
The cusum of squares test again l'einforces the findings 
of the cusum test, exc~;pt that no large-scale instability is found 
in 1974(1) - 1974(4), 
The Quandt test, illustrated in Figure 6(f), also reinforce:,", 
the timing of the unstable periods as found by the cusum and cusum of 
squares tests. Additional peri ads of instab·i 1 ity, a 1 so detected by 
this test, are given by observations 6-10 and 14-27, corresponding to 
the period 1962(2) - 1963(2) and 1964(2) - 1967(3). 
6. 3. 3 Re_l_ati onsr!iE__!?§1~-~-~:n _!_be jns!abJli.tz __ of _ _!:_he S-i nstt:~_!!le'l!_~_ll_ti 
the 1 situation 
The analysis of equations (5.3) and (5.4) demonstrates an 
assignment of the two monetary policy instruments betvJeen internal 
and external balance. The analysis of the unstable periods for the 
S-equation is therefore carried out in terms of movements in the level 
of Australia 1 s foreign reserves. Such an approach is necessary because 
of the failure of the securities instrument to respond to either of the 
two domestic targets; inflation and unemployment. Thus, movements in 
the business cycle will fail to explain the instability of this 
particular instrument. 
Figure 6(2) plots the level of Australia 1 s foreign reserves 
from 1961 - 1974, with the major periods of instability, in the S-equation, 
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Figure 6(2) 
Level of At:stral'ia's foreign reserves 
and periods of instability 
1961-1974 $m 
marked. The most interesting observation in this regard is the 
closeness of the movement in the plotted cusum test for S and the 
level of reserves. Figure 6(3) plots the level of reserves and the 
cusum test simultaneously. Ignoring the small variations in the 
cusum plot, it is evident that the major instability in the S-function 
coincides closely with periods during which the level of reserves 
rose sharply. Several small periods of stability, as noted by the 
cusum plot, are seen to coincide with those quarters in which the 
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Figure 6 ( 3) 
Level cf Australia 1 s foreign reserves 
and the plotted cusum test 1961-1974 
CUSUH 
PLOT 
level of reserves remain steady. Even after the beginning of the 
strongly unstable period (from 1967(4) onwards) there is evidence of 
a close association between the movement in reserves and the cusum 
plot. The period 1970(2) - 1970(4) is an example of this close 
association. One further point of interest from Figure 6(3) is the 
per·iod of stability, as represented by the cusum plot, which occurs 
prior to, and after, the revaluation of December 1972. 
187. 
From the end of 1970 to the end of 1972 the level of foreign 
reserves rose rapidly. At least part of this period of external 
surplus falls within those periods in which the S-equa~ion is unstable. 
During 1970(4) - 1972(1), there was pressure on the exchange rate but 
the level of reserves was allowed to increase. Even though sharply 
rising import prices were contributing to an acceleration of cost-push 
inflation, the appropriate action - an appreciation of the exchange 
rate - was delayed. The majority of capital inflow during this period, 
which increased the level of foreign reserves,was only temporary and 
speculative [6, p. 69]. It had the adverse effect of bringing about 
a high rate of growth in the money supply. The instability of the 
S-equation during this period is an obvious result of the increased 
importance of the 'sterilization' policy of open market operations 
noted in equation (5.3). 
The other period of instability which corresponds closely, 
in terms of the cusum test and the level of foreign reserves, is the 
period 1973(1) - 1974(4). This period itself is characterized by a 
continuing decline in the level of reserves, due to the December 1972 
revaluation of the Australian dollar. Once again, the change in the 
weight of the foreign reserves variable in the S-equation is observed 
with the resultant instability showing up in the cusum and Quandt Log 
Likelihood tests. 
6 • 4 • 1 U n ~~_l(),t~_~fl_"L_ an .s:l_t_!}.f_l_C!._t i on 
The most noticeable aspect of the analysis of the stability 
of individual targets is the stability of the unemployment target 
188. 
during 1968(4) - 1970(3). This period has been discussed by Perkins 
[6, p. 60], who suggests that during 1968-69, both budgetary and 
monetary measures were su~cessful in maintaining full employment 
without serious inflation. The inflation target in the SRD equation 
(see Figure 6(h)) remains basically stable for some of this period, 
although there is some instability towards the end. This instability 
possibly results from the policy maker•s concern, during 1969-70, that 
excess demand was increasing too rapidly. The unemployment target in 
the SRD equation is also stable for the period 1971(4) - 1974(2) 
(see Figure 6(g)). During the earlier part of this period, a 
considerable amount of expansion was taking place in an effort to 
stimulate the economy ~vhich was suffering from a high level of 
unemployment. On the other hand, the inflation target in the SRD 
equatio11 does not display the same degree of stability until the end 
of 1973 wher the rate of inflation increased rapidly. From this time 
onwards, both targets display a degree of stability in terms of the 
plotted stability tests. 
6.4.2 Fore reserves 
..:._:_;__;c ___ _.,_:.._: _ ___c __ ...:_;;_ _ _;__c __ _ 
Two important periods of stability are observed for this 
target: 1966(2) - 1968(3) and 1969(1) - 1969(4). These are shown in 
Figure 6(i). Although the foreign reserves target, according to 
Figure 6(i), exhibits strong stability for the period 1973(1) - 1974(4), 
this period must be ignored. The plotting of this •stability' suggests 
that, if the scale were extended, the period would be classified as 
extremely unstable. These stable periods coincide with periods ·when 
the level of Australia's foreign reserves remained reasonably constant. 
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Normal • steril izati.on• act-ions were carried out using open market 
oper'ations wh·ich were easily borne by the money market. These periods 
of stability contrast sharply with the obvious instability which occurs 
during those periods epitomized by either rapidly rising or rapidly 
falling reserves. These findings support the original conclusions 
gleaned from Figure 6(3). 
6 . 4 . 3 I n te t~e s t 
·----
It is interesting to note from Figure 6(j) that the interest 
rate only exhibits a degree of stability from about 1971 onwards. 
In particular, three obvious stable periods are observed 
(i) 1971 (1) -· 1971 (3) 
(ii) 1972(1) - 1973(1) 
(iii) 1973(3) - 1974(3). 
Although it is not possible to specify the reasons for this 
stability, the periods tabulated correspond closely with the periods 
in which the monetary authorities were prepared to allow interest rates 
to alter, or to allow open market operations to influence the market 
rate of interest. The earlier periods, which exhibit a strong instability, 
naturally correspond to those periods in which the lack of development 
of the capital market prevented the use of open market operations to any 
grE:~a t extent. 
6 . S S ta bjl_i__tL_Qf__i n t ~Eel e:.p_~_2 en j: __ ~ n ~r.-~~~ 
It is also important to examine the periods of stability and 
instability in the relationship between SRD and S instruments. This 
test refers to the stability of the SRD instrument when it is included 
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in the S-equation and vice versa. Figures 6(k) and 6(1) illustrate 
the stability problem in these cases. It is obvious that the oeriod 
• 
1969(1) - 1974(4) is one sharacterized by a stable relationship 
between SRD and S and also S and SRD. Equations (5.3) and (5.4) 
indicate an 'harmonious' relationship between SRD and S, whereby 
changes in SRD policy induce open market operations to reinforce the 
original SRD change. This harmonious relationship is observed in 
Figure 6(k) where there is greater stability over the entire time 
period when the SRD instrument is included in the S-equation. 
Figure 6(1), on the other hand, indicates a general instability in 
all periods before 1969. There is evidence of a small period of 
stability from early 1963 to the end of 1964 illustrated by Figure 
6(1). This period of stability does not show up in Figure 6(k). 
The two reaction functions (5.3) and (5.4) are subjected to 
a detailed stability analysis by the use of the THWAR program. 
It is concluded that the two·functions are inherently unstable over 
the period of estimation. The various periods of stability and 
instability are then analysed. For the internal instrument, the SRO 
ratio, the analysis is carried out with reference to the business 
cycle. It ~s found that the instability of the SRD function is 
consistent with the operation of a countercyclical economic policy 
which serves to alter the weights attached to each internal target. 
The weights change according to whether the business cycle has reached 
the peak or trough. These results are complemented by an analysis of 
the stability of the individual targets, U and~- This analysis reveals 
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a period of stability for the unemployment target which corresponds 
to a period of 'correct 1 budgetary and monetary management. The 
inflation target is also basically stable for this sam( period, 
although instability emerges towards the end of the period as the 
policy makers become more concerned about rising prices resulting 
from excess demand during 1969-70. 
The analysis of the external instrument, S, is carried out 
with reference to movements in the level of foreign reserves. The 
main conclusion, once again, is that the S-equation is unstable for 
the majority of the time period examined. The shape of the cusurn 
test plot, indicating great instability, corresponds almost identically 
to the large increase in reserves which begins at the end of 1970 and 
continues through the decline in reserves .after 1972. The interest rate 
target exhibits a stable relationship with the open market instrument 
only after 1971. This result reflects the limited use of open market 
operations in influencing market determined rates of interest, especially 
during the earlier period from 1961-1970. 
192. 
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GRAPHICAL STABILITY TESTS 
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APPENDIX 6B 
n a= 0.20 a = 0.10 a = 0.05 a = 0.02 a = 0. 01 
l o. 4r:ooo 0.45000 0.47500 0.49000 0.49500 
2 0.3S044 0.44306 0.50855 0.56667 0.59596 
3 0. 35477 0.41811 0.46702 0.53456 0.57900 
4 0.33435 0.39075 0.44641 0.50495 0.54210 
5 0.31556 0.37359 0.42174 0.47692 0.51576 
6 0.30244 0.35522 0.40045 0.45440 0.48983 
7 0.28991 0.33905 0.38294 0.43337 0.46761 
8 0.27828 0.32538 0.361597 0.41522 0.44819 
9 0.26794 0.31325 0.35277 0.39922 0.43071 
10 0.25884 0.30221 0.34022 0. 38481 0.41517 
11 0.25071 0.29227 0.32894 0.37187 0.40122 
12 0.24325 0.28330 0.31869 0.36019. 0.38856 
13 0.23639 0.27515 0.30935 0.34954 0. 37703 
14 o. 23m o 0.26767 0.30081 0.33980 0.36649 
15 0.22430 0.26077 0.29296 0.33083 0.35679 
16 0.2"1895 0.25439 0.28570 0.32256 0.34784 
n 0.21397 0.24847 0.27897 0.31489 0.33953 
18 0.20933 0.24296 0. 27270 0.30775 0.33181 
19 0.20498 0.23781 0.26685 0.30108 0.32459 
20 0.20089 0.23298 0.26137 0.29484 0.31784 
21 0.19705 0.22844 0.25622 0.28898 0.31149 
22 0.19343 0.22416 0.25136 0.28346 0.30552 
23 0. 19001 0.22012 0.24679 0.27825 0.29989 
24 0.18677 0.21630 0.24245 0.27333 0.29456 
25 0.18370 0.2126g 0.23835 0.26866 0.28951 
26 0.18077 0.20924 0.23445 0.26423 0. 28472 
27 0. "17799 0.20596 0.23074 0.26001 0.280i6 
28 0.17533 0. 20283 0.22721 0.25600 0.27582 
29 0.17280 0.19985 0.22383 0.25217 0.27168 
30 0.17037 0.19700 0.22061 0.24851 0.26772 
31 0.16805 0.19427 0.21752 0. 24501 0.26393 
32 0.16582 0.19166 0.21457 0.24165 0.26030 
33 0.16368 0.18915 0.21173 0.23843 0.25683 
34 0.16162 0.18674 0. 20901 0.23534 0.25348 
35 0.15964 0.18442 0.20639 0.23237 0.25027 
36 0.15774 0.18218 0.20387 0. 22951 0.24718 
37 0.15590 0.18003 0.20144 0.22676 0. 24421 
38 0.15413 0.17796 0.19910 0 .. 22410 0. 24134 
39 0.15242 0.17595 0.19684 0. 22"154 0.23B57 
40 0.15076 0.174·02 0.19465 0.21906 0.23589 
207. 
T ci~l_~_o f s i 9Jltfi~~_c e _y_~_l u ~~2-.f or_ c us Ul!l o f_2_9_l:l§._t_:'e s _test con t i n u e d 
------
n a = 0.20 a= 0.10 a = 0.05 a == 0.02 a = 0. 01 
41 0.14916 0.'17215 0.19254 0.216L:8 0.23331 
42 0. 14761 0. 17034 0.19050 0.21436 0.23081 
43 0. 14611 0.16858 0.18852 0.21212 0.22839 
44 0.14466 0.16688 0.18661 0.28995 0.2260Fi 
45 0. "14325 0.16524 0. "18475 0.20785 0. 2237/ 
46 0.14188 0.16364 0. 1829!3 0.20581 0.22157 
47 0.14055 0.16208 0.18120 0.20383 0.21943 
48 0.13926 0.16058 0.17950 0.20190 0.21735 
49 0.13800 0.15911 0.17785 0.20003 0.21534 
50 0.13678 0. 15769 0.17624 0.19822 0.21337 
51 0.13559 0.15630 0.17468 0.19645 0. 21146 
52 0.13443 0.15495 0.173"16 0.194-73 0.20961 
53 0.13330 0.15363 0.17168 0.19305 0.20780 
54 0.13221 0.15235 0.17024 0.19142 0.20604 
55 0.13113 0.15110 0.16884 0.18983 0.20432 
56 0.13009 0.14989 0.16746 0.18828 0.20265 
57 0.12907 0. "]4870 0.16613 0.18677 0. 20101 
58 0.12807 0.14754 0.16482 0.18529 0.19942 
59 0.12710 0.14641 0.16355 0.18385 0.19786 
60 0.12615 0.14530 0.16230 0.18245 0.19635 
61 0.12522 0.14422 G.16109 0. 181 07 0.19486 
62 0,12431 0.14316 0.15990 0.17973 0.19341 
63 0.12342 0.14213 0.15874 0.17841 0.19199 
64 0.12255 0.14112 0.15760 0.17713 0.19061 
65 0.12170 0.14013 0.15649 0.17587 0.18925 
66 0.12087 0.13916 0.15540 0.17464 0.18792 
67 0.12006 0.13821 0.15433 0.17344 0.18662 
68 0. 11926 0.13728 0.15329 0.17226 0.18535 
69 0.11848 0.13637 0.15227 0.17110 0.18410 
70 0.11771 0.13548 0.15127 0.16997 0.18288 
71 0.11696 0.13461 0.15028 0.16886 0.18168 
72 0.11622 0.13375 0.14932 0.16777 0.18051 
73 0.11550 0.13291 0.14838 0.16671 0.17936 
74 0.11479 0.13208 0.14745 0.16566 0.17823 
75 0.11409 0.13128 0.14654 0.16463 0.17712 
76 0. 11341 0.13048 0.14565 0.16363 0.17604 
77 0.11273 0.12970 0.14478 0.16264 0.17497 
78 0. 11208 0.12894 0.14392 0.16167 0.17392 
79 0.11143 0.12818 0.14307 0.16071 0.17289 
80 0.11079 0.12745 0.14224 0.15978 0.17188 
81 0.11017 0.12672 0. 14143 0.15886 0.17089 
82 0.10955 0.12601 0.14063 0.15795 0.16992 
83 0. 10895 0.12531 0.13984 0.15706 0.16896 
84 0.10835 0.12462 0.13907 0.15619 0.16802 
85 0.10777 0.12394 0.13831 0.15533 0.16709 
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J.i:'2l~ of s ·Ig_~jf·i C_9._l1Ce ~~.l~~~-~_fQ.r:__CU?Um_..Q_f squares test continued 
n a= 0.20 a = 0.10 a = 0.05 a = 0.02 a = 0. 01 
86 0.1 0Tl9 0.12327 0.13756 0.1544 9 0.16618 
87 0 .. , 0663 0.12262 0.13682 0.15366 0.16528 
88 0.10607 0.12197 0. 1361 0 0.15284 0.16440 
89 0.10553 0.12134 0.13538 0.15203 0.16353 
90 0.10499 0.12071 0.13468 0.15124 0.16268 
91 0.10446 0.12010 0.13399 0.15046 0.16184 
92 0.10393 0. 11949 0.13331 0.14970 0.16101 
93 0.10342 0.11889 0.13264 0.14894 0.16020 
94 0. "l 0291 0.11831 0.13198 0.14820 0.15940 
95 0.10241 0. 11773 0.13133 0.14747 0.15861 
96 0.10192 0.11716 0. 13070 0.14674 0.15783 
97 0.10144 0.11659 0.13006 0.14603 0.15706 
98 0.10096 0.11604 0.12944 0.14533 0.15631 
99 0.10049 o. n 550 0.12883 0.14464 0.15556 
100 0.10002 0. 11496 0.12823 0.14396 0.15483 
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CHAPTER 7: POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
----------.--·-----------
The major results of this thesis and their policy 
implications al~e now summarized. The general conclusion is that 
monetary policy is endogenous over the time period considered. 
There is a significant reaction of the two instruments of policy 
to the designated targets. This general conclusion is reinforced 
by a number of associated findings. The policy response of the 
two chosen instruments differs. It appears that the SRD instrument 
responds to the domestic targets; inflation and unemployment. On the 
other hand~ the securities instrument shows a reaction to problems 
of external balance as part of an effective sterilization policy. 
The observed mutual correlation of the securities instrument with 
interest rates reflects the market or lentation of this instrument. 
The interest rate is not significant in the SRD function and the 
same adjustment costs do not relate to the operation of this instrument. 
Finally, the fitted equations appear to be unstable because the policy 
makers revise the weights attached to the various policy targets. 
ThR SRD instrument appears to react to cyclical movements. Thus the 
weights on inflation and unemployment differ between the expansionary 
and contractionary phases of the cycle. The policy implications of 
the results are discussed separately. 
7.1 End095'!JeiJy _ _9__D.sL_as_signment of J.D_?_!:r~ent~ 
The results of the previous analysis reinforce the view that 
monetary policy in Australia is endogenous. Hence it should be treated 
as such in the formulation of econometr-ic models. Goldfeld and 
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Blinder [4] have already emphasized the importance of incorporating 
reaction equations into econometric models. This is especially 
important vvhen dynamic polic,'r multipliers are to be derived from 
such models. Failure to adopt this approach will tend to bias these 
calculated multipliers, even though it will have no effect on the 
estimation of the structural coefficients of the models. 
The assignment problem has its origin in the discussion 
by Mundell [5] who demonstrates that monetary policy should be 
directed towards external stabilization and fiscal policy towards 
internal stabilization. The findings of the analysis in Chapter 5 
reveal that such an assignment of instruments exists in Australia 
although not along the same lines as suggested by Mundell. In fact, 
the findings reveal an assignment of the individual monetary policy 
instruments to internal and external targets. The SRD instrument, 
for example~ displays a convincingly strong attachment to the two 
internal targets of policy; unemployment and inflation. On the other 
hand, the securities instrument is assigned to the external target; 
foreign reserves. Undoubtedly, this stems from the need for the 
Reserve Bank to control increases in for'eign reserves at the stage 
where they have an immediate impact on the money supply via the 
monetary base. This 1 sterilizing' or 1 offsett·ing' process means that 
the effect of increased levels of foreian reserves can be neutralized 
by the sale of securities, thus partially compensating for the increase 
in the monetary base. This, in turn, partially alleviates any adverse 
impact on the domestic economy. The internal policy objectives, on the 
other hand, are found to be more effectively controlled by the SRD 
instrument. 
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7. 2 Int~_!:'_dep_~.!J!lenc~l _ _Instr:uments 
It is important) when analysing monetary policy reaction 
functions, to consider the possible inter·action between monetary 
instruments. Previous reaction function studies have usually chosen 
only one ·ins':rument to represent the act·ions of the monetary 
authorities. In practice, however, the monetary authorities have 
several instruments at their disposal. Because of this fact, it is 
possible that the instruments may interact with one another. Hence, 
each instrument must be set with reference to the others. The 
assumption that the policy instruments are interdependent presupposes 
that they are not structurally linked. In this case, the alteration 
of one of the instruments has no impact on the others. 
The application of such an approach to the present study 
results in the conclusion that there is a certain degree of 'harmonious' 
interaction between the SRD instrument and the securities instrument. 
It is found that an exogenous increase in the SRD instrument evokes a 
reduction in Reserve Bank holdings of Government securities - both of 
which involve a mcnetary contraction. This suggests that open market 
operations are used to supplement the operations of the SRD instrument. 
Nobay's [6] findings lend support to this argument as he finds, for 
Britain, that open market operations are used to reinforce calls to 
Special Deposits. 
The findings of this present study indicate that the SRD 
instrument is not being used to reinforce an open market policy. 
In this case, the open market instrument does not enter the SRD 
equation significantly or with the correct sign. This may be explained 
by reference to the use of the Securities instrument as part of a 
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'sterilization' policy. The SRD instrument has no direct influence 
on the cash base and cannot be used to reinforce the Securities 
instrument in this role. A net sale of securities works directly on 
the cash base. In brief, the Securities instrument may be used to 
reinforce credit rationing in restricting the growth of the money 
supply, but the SRD instrument cannot be used to directly reinforce 
the Securities instrument by reducing the cash base. 
7. 3 -~o ?j_?_g__f_~<ij u_s tme n 1 
One further aspect which is related to the interdependence 
of the monetary policy instruments becomes clear when the relationship 
betv1een the ·interest rate and the two monetary instruments is analysed. 
Firstly, the accon~odating nature of the money supply is illustrated 
by the posit-ive relationship betv-1een dw interest rate and Reserve Bank 
holdings of Government Securities. That is, as the rate of interest 
rises, a net purchase of securities is induced, thus expanding the 
money supply. Such a relationship does not exist between the interest 
rate and the SRD instrument. 
The mutual positive relationship between the interest rate and 
the open market instrument is observed in equation (5.8). This result 
has important implications for the costs associated with the adjustment 
of the open market instrument. It shows that an increase in the money 
supply brought about by a net purchase of securities has the ultimate 
effect of increasing market determined rates of interest in the long 
run. Such a result occurs as a result of the so-called 1 Spil1-over' 
effect described by both Burger [l] and Friedman [2]. Equation (5.9), 
in which the interest rate equation is split into contractionary and 
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expansionary periods, demonstrates further that the 'spill-ov9r' 
effect works in the opposite direction as well. That is, open market 
sales, designed to reduce the money supply, will ultimately result in 
lower interest rates. Once again it is observed that no association 
exists betwe2n the SRD instrument and the interest rate. As a result, 
no political or economic costs are associated with the use of this 
i nstrumc~nt. 
One of the major policy implications of these findings is 
that there are costs associated with the use of the open market 
" 
instrument. These findings suggest that it is more appropriate to 
use the SRD instrument for monetary expansion and open market operations 
for monetary contraction. There are no political or economic costs 
associated with the expansion of the money supply brought about by 
reducing the SRD ratio. There are negative costs (in the form of 
long run r·eductions in interest rates) associated with a monetary 
contraction brought about by a net sale of securities. Interest rates 
must rise in the short run to ensure that the sale of securities takes 
place. This short run rise fn interest rates has the effect of 
reducing investment and, thus, income. The resultant drop in income 
decreases the demand for bank credit which, in the long run, eases the 
pressure on interest rates as less firms compete for the available 
funds. 
£QJJ_st 
The use of the shift dummy approach enables the time period to 
be split into periods of monetary contraction and monetary expansion. 
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This analysis permits the weights on each target to be inferred 
during these differing periods. One of the most important findings 
revealed by this approach is the differing weight given to the 
unemployment target in each of the periods. The target is highly 
signH·icant (in the SRD function) during p~!riods of monetary expansion~ 
and relatively insignificant during periods of monitary contraction. 
This shows the additional weight given to the unemployment target 
during periods of expansion. The inflation target varies little in 
significance between periods of monetary expansion and contraction. 
There is some evidence however to suggest that greater weight is given 
to the inflation target, compared with the unemployment target, during 
periods of monetary contraction. Both these findings suggest a reversal 
of priorities in the two phases of monetaty policy: unemployment is of 
greater importance during a monetary expansion and inflation is given 
a greater weight during a monetary contraction. 
A similar finding is evident from equation (5.9) where the 
foreign reserves target ·is more significant during times of monetary 
expansion. That is, the policy maker attaches a greater weight to 
th·is target during a monetary expansion. This occurs as the policy 
maker attempts to avoid an additional adverse expansionary effect on 
the money supply caused by an increase in foreign reserves. 
The findings of the 1 Split-period 1 analysis have implications 
for the for~ulation of reaction functions. They suggest that the form 
of the functions change according to the phase of monetary policy being 
considered. This change is the result of an adjustment in the weights 
attached to each of the targets during each phase of policy. The 
changeable nature of the reaction functions is also highlighted by the 
findings of the stability tests. 
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7. 5 ;;tabi.l_i_!y_ of the functions_ 
The TIMVAR output and the cusum , cusum of squares, 
homogeneity and Quandt tests all suggest that the SRD- and S-functions 
are inherently unstable. Much of the instability is obviously due to 
the changing weights on the targets during different phases of 
monetary policy. The graphical output of the TIMVAR programme, 
however, allows an analysis of the particular unstable quarters. 
/'J 
The SRD function is analysed in terms of movement in Australia's 
economic cycle. From this it is observed that there is a close 
connection between the periods of instability of the SRD equation 
and movements in the cycle. The instability here is due to the 
changing weights given to the two internal targets, unemployment and 
inflation. The operation of a strong counter-cyclical policy during the 
period of study contributes to an inL2rent instabil'ity in the reaction 
function. A similar analysis can be carried out for the S-function, 
this time in terms of the movements in the level of foreign reserves. 
The differing approaches taken here again reflect the significant 
assignment of the two instruments between internal and external policy. 
This time the connection is not as obvious or specific. However, it 
is possible to relate movements in the graphical cusum of squares test 
to movements in Australia's foreign reserves, especially during those 
periods when foreign reserves rose, or fell, drastically. These periods 
are noted as ones of extreme instability in the equation for S. 
The graphical output is also important in analysing the 
question of interdependence between the two instruments. Equations 
(5.3) and (5.4) suggest the existence of a one-way 'harmonious' 
relationship between SRD and S, whereby changes in the SRD instrunent 
216. 
induce changes in open market operations to complement the SRD change. 
The stability in this direction is noted from Figure 6(k) where there 
is less drastic variation over the entire time period. Figure 6(1) 
however, indicates a h·igher level of stability in the SRD equation, 
suggesting tkct the harmonious relationship does not operate in the 
opposite direction. That is, the SRD instrument is not used to 
reinforce open market policy. From 1969 onwards, the relationship is 
generally stable. This suggests that the two instruments have been 
used to complement each other more often in this period. 
Among other findings, it is noted that the interest rate is 
only stable in the S-equation from 1971 onwards. This suggests that 
the monetary authorities have not always responded to changes in the 
interest rate by altering the supply of money via open market operations. 
Similarly, the unemployment, inflation and foreign reserves targets all 
display differing levels of stability over differ'ent time periods. 
The stability analysis suggests that it is difficult to 
attempt an integration of the reaction functions into an econometric 
model without imposing signif~cant restrictions on the period of 
estimation of such models. Perhaps the best approach, as Froyen 
[3, p. 187] emphasizes, may be to 
• ... neglect monetary policy reaction functions in the 
model's estimation, but take account of separately 
estimated reaction functions when interpreting policy 
mu 1 tip l i e rs. ' 
7. 6 De~~~L.QF.Jl_~~~f (Qe stl!._~ 
Further work is required on the impact of the reaction 
functions on the derivation of policy multipliers. The analysis of 
Chapter 5 suggests that it is m·isleading to treat monetary policy in 
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Australia as exogenous. Consequently, any model of the Australian 
economy vJhich attempts to observe the relative impact of monetary 
and fiscal policy will derive monetary multipliers which are biased. 
Such a model should, more correctly, take into account the presence 
of reaction functions for each of the monetary policy instr·uments. 
More importantly, such models should concentrate on a disaggregated 
approach to the study of monetary pol-icy. That is, the impact of 
changes in the individual instruments should be analysed, in preference 
to a monetary aggregate such as the money stock or the monetary base. 
These disaggregated functions should be inserted in a model 
of the Austral ian economy. Simulation could then be carried out over 
the estimation period. This would assist in the effective calculation 
and compar-ison of unbiased monetary policy multipliers with the two 
monetary instruments defined exogeno~~ly and endogenously. 
One basic problem in this further work occurs however, as 
a result of the observed instability in the reaction functions. The 
functions themselves can only be of assistance in forecasting the 
direction of monetary policy as long as they ex~ibit an inherent 
stability. More work is therefore req~ired, as well, on this basic 
problem of instability. Such an analysis could proceed by investigat·ing 
the points at which the weights on each policy target change. That is, 
desired values for each of the targets could be formulated in an effort 
to detect points at which the policy ~akers alter the instruments in 
response to the changing targets. 
The present study concentrates solely on current quarter 
reactions of the instruments and targets. Such an approach is adopted 
because of the ·interest ·in determining whether certain monetary 
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instruments react, within the same quarter, to specified policy 
targets. Hence, the lag structure associated with such a reaction 
is ignored. Further work in this area should concentrate on 
investigating the lags attached to each policy target. This could be 
attempted with the use of monthly data, provided that the availability 
and reliability of certain data (such as, on the inflation target) 
permitted such an approach. 
This further work should certainly be attempted in the 
future, especially in the light of the increasing importance of monetary 
policy analysis. 
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